Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident PDF Download
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Author: DIANE Publishing Company
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 0788119125
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 267
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Book Description
Author: DIANE Publishing Company
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 0788119125
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 267
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 784
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Book Description
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Solid propellant rockets
Languages : en
Pages : 784
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Book Description
Author: Diane Vaughan
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 022634696X
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 622
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Book Description
“An in-depth account of the events and personal actions which led to a great tragedy in the history of America’s space program.” —James D. Smith, former Solid Rocket Booster Chief, NASA, Marshall Space Flight Center When the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded on January 28, 1986, millions of Americans became bound together in a single, historic moment. Many still vividly remember exactly where they were and what they were doing when they heard about the tragedy. Diane Vaughan recreates the steps leading up to that fateful decision, contradicting conventional interpretations to prove that what occurred at NASA was not skullduggery or misconduct but a disastrous mistake. Why did NASA managers, who not only had all the information prior to the launch but also were warned against it, decide to proceed? In retelling how the decision unfolded through the eyes of the managers and the engineers, Vaughan uncovers an incremental descent into poor judgment, supported by a culture of high-risk technology. She reveals how and why NASA insiders, when repeatedly faced with evidence that something was wrong, normalized the deviance so that it became acceptable to them. In a new preface, Vaughan reveals the ramifications for this book and for her when a similar decision-making process brought down NASA’s Space Shuttle Columbia in 2003. “Vaughn finds the traditional explanation of the [Challenger] accident to be profoundly unsatisfactory . . . One by one, she unravels the conclusions of the Rogers Commission.” —The New York Times “A landmark study.” —Atlantic “Vaughn gives us a rare view into the working level realities of NASA . . . The cumulative force of her argument and evidence is compelling.” —Scientific American
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Accidents
Languages : en
Pages : 450
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Book Description
Author: Allan J. McDonald
Publisher: University Press of Florida
ISBN: 0813047013
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 1075
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Book Description
On a cold January morning in 1986, NASA launched the Space Shuttle Challenger, despite warnings against doing so by many individuals, including Allan McDonald. The fiery destruction of Challenger on live television moments after launch remains an indelible image in the nation’s collective memory. In Truth, Lies, and O-Rings, McDonald, a skilled engineer and executive, relives the tragedy from where he stood at Launch Control Center. As he fought to draw attention to the real reasons behind the disaster, he was the only one targeted for retribution by both NASA and his employer, Morton Thiokol, Inc., makers of the shuttle's solid rocket boosters. In this whistle-blowing yet rigorous and fair-minded book, McDonald, with the assistance of internationally distinguished aerospace historian James R. Hansen, addresses all of the factors that led to the accident, some of which were never included in NASA's Failure Team report submitted to the Presidential Commission. Truth, Lies, and O-Rings is the first look at the Challenger tragedy and its aftermath from someone who was on the inside, recognized the potential disaster, and tried to prevent it. It also addresses the early warnings of very severe debris issues from the first two post-Challenger flights, which ultimately resulted in the loss of Columbia some fifteen years later.
Author: United States. Columbia Accident Investigation Board
Publisher: U.S. Independent Agencies and Commission
ISBN:
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 260
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Book Description
CD-ROM accompanying vol. 1 contains text of vol. 1 in PDF files and six related motion picture files in Quicktime format.
Author: United States. Congress. House. Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Space shuttles
Languages : en
Pages : 58
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Book Description
Author: United States. Columbia Accident Investigation Board
Publisher: U.S. Independent Agencies and Commission
ISBN:
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 252
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Book Description
CD-ROM accompanying vol. 1 contains text of vol. 1 in PDF files and six related motion picture files in Quicktime format.
Author: Julianne G. Mahler
Publisher: Georgetown University Press
ISBN: 1589016025
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 253
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Book Description
Just after 9:00 a.m. on February 1, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia broke apart and was lost over Texas. This tragic event led, as the Challenger accident had 17 years earlier, to an intensive government investigation of the technological and organizational causes of the accident. The investigation found chilling similarities between the two accidents, leading the Columbia Accident Investigation Board to conclude that NASA failed to learn from its earlier tragedy. Despite the frequency with which organizations are encouraged to adopt learning practices, organizational learning—especially in public organizations—is not well understood and deserves to be studied in more detail. This book fills that gap with a thorough examination of NASA’s loss of the two shuttles. After offering an account of the processes that constitute organizational learning, Julianne G. Mahler focuses on what NASA did to address problems revealed by Challenger and its uneven efforts to institutionalize its own findings. She also suggests factors overlooked by both accident commissions and proposes broadly applicable hypotheses about learning in public organizations.
