International Competition in Vertically Differentiated Markets with Innovation and Imitation: Trade Policy Versus Free Trade PDF Download
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Author: Eugen Kováč
Publisher:
ISBN: 9788073441241
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 51
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Book Description
Author: Eugen Kováč
Publisher:
ISBN: 9788073441241
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 51
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Book Description
Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 58
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Book Description
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
The incentives to innovate for the incumbent and the entrant in a vertically differentiated market are analised, in the absence of uncertainty. It turns out that if consumers marginal willingness to pay for quality is sufficiently low, the efficiency effect observationally works so as to favour innovation by the entrant, i.e., competition. Otherwise, it operates to the advantage of the incumbent who acquire the right to innovate, preempting thus the rival.
Author: G. De Fraja
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Federico Etro
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540496017
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 296
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Book Description
This book reviews recent progress in the theory of oligopoly and market leadership and provides new results on the theory of Stackelberg competition and Nash competition with strategic investment under endogenous entry. These theories are applied to models of competition in quantities, prices and to patent races. The results are used to propose a new approach to competition policy and issues of the abuse of dominance.
Author: Rafał Śliwiński
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1000476995
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 149
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Book Description
Understanding the latest trends and technologies and their impact on enterprises, organizations or state administrations is essential to successfully develop a business in the age of Industry 4.0. This book presents a unique selection of topics and offers the reader an understanding of the implications of the newest technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT), Augmented Reality (AR) and new trends like social media and sustainable competitiveness in business. It presents the impact of the newest trends on businesses, consumers, and the result on the economy. Contributions showcase the technical perspective of new technologies and provides an innovative and enriching perspective on the implementation of AI in e-commerce and the developmental barriers it can create, modern social media usage in enterprises, the newest trends in innovation management, sustainable competitiveness in the business context, the influence and effect of augmented reality, and the privacy problem of Internet of Things to consumers. This book illustrates how to develop innovation cooperation between business, academia and public institutions through the example of biopharmaceutical industry. It will be of value to researchers, academics, professionals, and students in the fields of economics, management, international business.
Author: Abhimanyu Khan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
We study the market outcome that evolves in the long-run when price-setting firms, that compete in a differentiated market, are driven by an imitation dynamic. We find that the prices that can evolve in the long-run depend on the level of market differentiation and on the degree of oversight firms have on market decisions and outcomes. The unique symmetric pure Nash equilibrium price is always supported in the long-run, and it is the unique long-run market outcome for high and low levels of differentiation, when there is no oversight or even with limited oversight on market decisions and outcomes. For intermediate levels of differentiation, in addition to the Nash equilibrium price, there is a set of prices that may emerge in the long-run while these other prices are below Nash equilibrium price when there is almost no oversight on market performances, they are above Nash equilibrium price when the oversight on market performances is more acute.
Author: Antonella Petrillo
Publisher: BoD – Books on Demand
ISBN: 1803557621
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 294
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Book Description
In the business world, digital transformation involves finding and developing new strategies and modernizing the information technology of private and public companies. This book presents practices, challenges, and opportunities related to digital transformation. It includes fourteen chapters that address digital transformation in a variety of industries, including finance, construction, education, marketing, and more.
Author: Andrew Ronald Dick
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Research, Industrial
Languages : en
Pages : 488
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Book Description
Author: Brandon James Hoffman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 182
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Book Description
This is a collection of essays on the topic of vertical markets and resellers. The first two chapters look at the effects of mandatory dealer laws on prices and profits in vertical markets with differentiated goods. The third chapter looks at the quality of products chosen when manufacturers use resellers compared to when they do not. All three chapters show that competition is lessened when mandatory dealer laws exist. Chapter 1 addresses the US automobile market which has laws in almost every state that require sales of new vehicles go through franchised dealers, and manufacturers are not allowed to sell directly to consumers. While vertical markets can provide many benefits to both producer and consumer alike, double-marginalization is often seen as a problem for producers and consumers with vertical markets; whereby firms on different levels both have market power and thus are both able to charge a markup over cost. Contracts and implicit agreements can mitigate or lessen the negative externality associated with double-marginalization, but I develop a model to show that double-marginalization can be a good thing for producers, while simultaneously being bad for consumers. The model has a single dimension on product differentiation and different levels of vertical markets. In this model, firms either sell to consumers or other firms. How far removed the manufacturer of the good is from the final consumer determines the number of vertical markets. A market with one level consists of a manufacturer who sells directly to consumers, while a market with two levels consists of a manufacturer who sells to a reseller who in turn sells to consumers. I find that the profits of the manufacturer of the good can be up to three times as high when there are two levels instead of one and that they will always be at least twice as high. This model also shows that manufacturers can benefit from the existence of a law that requires they use dealers, even though any one single manufacturer has an incentive to not use a dealer. Chapter 2 addresses mandatory dealer laws in a setting without perfectly inelastic demand. Under a certain set of circumstances, manufacturers can earn higher profits after the introduction of these mandatory dealer laws than they would be without them. In this chapter, I remove the perfectly inelastic total demand restriction, and instead show how the elasticity of total demand plays a role in a manufacturer's preference for a mandatory dealer law. For the model used in this paper, I find that total demand does not need to be very inelastic at all, and in fact, can be elastic at the equilibrium prices and quantities. The findings in this paper run contrary to expectation, where double-marginalization is something that hurts manufacture's profits. In chapter 3, I analyze the benefit of moving first in a vertically differentiated market with manufacturers and retailers. Both retailers and manufactures are assumed to be profit-maximizing entities. Here the choice of the incumbent manufacturer creates an indifference between entering with a higher quality or entering with a lower quality for the entering manufacturer. Entry-quality decisions and wholesale pricing are related to the competition of retailers selling the manufacturers product and the degree of consumers' taste for quality. I examine the indifference of the entering manufacturer and highlight the benefits of being able to set quality first as an incumbent manufacturer when pricing stages are simultaneous. Stackelberg competition in the quality stage allows for the possibility for inferior-quality entry as well as superior-quality entry. The first-mover advantage dominates the high-quality advantage in this setting which is consistent with my findings in the dock and boat-lift markets.
