Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9812818472
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
Book Description
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9812818472
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
Book Description
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9812818472
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
Book Description
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Repeated Games and Reputations
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198041217
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198041217
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Book Description
The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks
Author: Yann Bramoullé
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190216832
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 857
Book Description
The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks represents the frontier of research into how and why networks they form, how they influence behavior, how they help govern outcomes in an interactive world, and how they shape collective decision making, opinion formation, and diffusion dynamics. From a methodological perspective, the contributors to this volume devote attention to theory, field experiments, laboratory experiments, and econometrics. Theoretical work in network formation, games played on networks, repeated games, and the interaction between linking and behavior is synthesized. A number of chapters are devoted to studying social process mediated by networks. Topics here include opinion formation, diffusion of information and disease, and learning. There are also chapters devoted to financial contagion and systemic risk, motivated in part by the recent financial crises. Another section discusses communities, with applications including social trust, favor exchange, and social collateral; the importance of communities for migration patterns; and the role that networks and communities play in the labor market. A prominent role of networks, from an economic perspective, is that they mediate trade. Several chapters cover bilateral trade in networks, strategic intermediation, and the role of networks in international trade. Contributions discuss as well the role of networks for organizations. On the one hand, one chapter discusses the role of networks for the performance of organizations, while two other chapters discuss managing networks of consumers and pricing in the presence of network-based spillovers. Finally, the authors discuss the internet as a network with attention to the issue of net neutrality.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190216832
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 857
Book Description
The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks represents the frontier of research into how and why networks they form, how they influence behavior, how they help govern outcomes in an interactive world, and how they shape collective decision making, opinion formation, and diffusion dynamics. From a methodological perspective, the contributors to this volume devote attention to theory, field experiments, laboratory experiments, and econometrics. Theoretical work in network formation, games played on networks, repeated games, and the interaction between linking and behavior is synthesized. A number of chapters are devoted to studying social process mediated by networks. Topics here include opinion formation, diffusion of information and disease, and learning. There are also chapters devoted to financial contagion and systemic risk, motivated in part by the recent financial crises. Another section discusses communities, with applications including social trust, favor exchange, and social collateral; the importance of communities for migration patterns; and the role that networks and communities play in the labor market. A prominent role of networks, from an economic perspective, is that they mediate trade. Several chapters cover bilateral trade in networks, strategic intermediation, and the role of networks in international trade. Contributions discuss as well the role of networks for organizations. On the one hand, one chapter discusses the role of networks for the performance of organizations, while two other chapters discuss managing networks of consumers and pricing in the presence of network-based spillovers. Finally, the authors discuss the internet as a network with attention to the issue of net neutrality.
Journal of Economic Theory
Author: Karl Shell
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Stochastic Teams, Games, and Control under Information Constraints
Author: Serdar Yüksel
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3031540719
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 935
Book Description
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3031540719
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 935
Book Description
Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262011471
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 372
Book Description
The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262011471
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 372
Book Description
The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Political Game Theory
Author: Nolan McCarty
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9781107438637
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9781107438637
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.
Complex Social and Behavioral Systems
Author: Marilda Sotomayor
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 9781071603673
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This volume in the Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, Second Edition, combines the main features of Game Theory, covering most of the fundamental theoretical aspects under the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches, with the procedures of Agent-Based Modeling for studying complex systems composed of a large number of interacting entities with many degrees of freedom. In Game Theory, the cooperative approach focuses on the possible outcomes of the decision-makers’ interaction by abstracting from the "rational" actions or decisions that may lead to these outcomes. The non-cooperative approach focuses on the actions that the decision-makers can take. As John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern argued in their path-breaking book of 1944 entitled Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, most economic questions should be analyzed as games. The models of game theory are abstract representations of a number of real-life situations and have applications to economics, political science, computer science, evolutionary biology, social psychology, and law among others. Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) is a relatively new computational modeling paradigm which aims to construct the computational counterpart of a conceptual model of the system under study on the basis of discrete entities (i.e., the agent) with some properties and behavioral rules, and then to simulate them in a computer to mimic the real phenomena. Given the relative immaturity of this modeling paradigm, and the broad spectrum of disciplines in which it is applied, a clear cut and widely accepted definition of high level concepts of agents, environment, interactions and so on, is still lacking. This volume explores the state-of-the-art in the development of a real ABM ontology to address the epistemological issues related to this emerging paradigm for modeling complex systems.
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 9781071603673
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
This volume in the Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, Second Edition, combines the main features of Game Theory, covering most of the fundamental theoretical aspects under the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches, with the procedures of Agent-Based Modeling for studying complex systems composed of a large number of interacting entities with many degrees of freedom. In Game Theory, the cooperative approach focuses on the possible outcomes of the decision-makers’ interaction by abstracting from the "rational" actions or decisions that may lead to these outcomes. The non-cooperative approach focuses on the actions that the decision-makers can take. As John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern argued in their path-breaking book of 1944 entitled Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, most economic questions should be analyzed as games. The models of game theory are abstract representations of a number of real-life situations and have applications to economics, political science, computer science, evolutionary biology, social psychology, and law among others. Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) is a relatively new computational modeling paradigm which aims to construct the computational counterpart of a conceptual model of the system under study on the basis of discrete entities (i.e., the agent) with some properties and behavioral rules, and then to simulate them in a computer to mimic the real phenomena. Given the relative immaturity of this modeling paradigm, and the broad spectrum of disciplines in which it is applied, a clear cut and widely accepted definition of high level concepts of agents, environment, interactions and so on, is still lacking. This volume explores the state-of-the-art in the development of a real ABM ontology to address the epistemological issues related to this emerging paradigm for modeling complex systems.
Ten Steps to a Results-based Monitoring and Evaluation System
Author: Jody Zall Kusek
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 0821382896
Category : Government productivity
Languages : en
Pages : 270
Book Description
An effective state is essential to achieving socio-economic and sustainable development. With the advent of globalization, there are growing pressures on governments and organizations around the world to be more responsive to the demands of internal and external stakeholders for good governance, accountability and transparency, greater development effectiveness, and delivery of tangible results. Governments, parliaments, citizens, the private sector, NGOs, civil society, international organizations and donors are among the stakeholders interested in better performance. As demands for greater accountability and real results have increased, there is an attendant need for enhanced results-based monitoring and evaluation of policies, programs, and projects. This Handbook provides a comprehensive ten-step model that will help guide development practitioners through the process of designing and building a results-based monitoring and evaluation system. These steps begin with a OC Readiness AssessmentOCO and take the practitioner through the design, management, and importantly, the sustainability of such systems. The Handbook describes each step in detail, the tasks needed to complete each one, and the tools available to help along the way."
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 0821382896
Category : Government productivity
Languages : en
Pages : 270
Book Description
An effective state is essential to achieving socio-economic and sustainable development. With the advent of globalization, there are growing pressures on governments and organizations around the world to be more responsive to the demands of internal and external stakeholders for good governance, accountability and transparency, greater development effectiveness, and delivery of tangible results. Governments, parliaments, citizens, the private sector, NGOs, civil society, international organizations and donors are among the stakeholders interested in better performance. As demands for greater accountability and real results have increased, there is an attendant need for enhanced results-based monitoring and evaluation of policies, programs, and projects. This Handbook provides a comprehensive ten-step model that will help guide development practitioners through the process of designing and building a results-based monitoring and evaluation system. These steps begin with a OC Readiness AssessmentOCO and take the practitioner through the design, management, and importantly, the sustainability of such systems. The Handbook describes each step in detail, the tasks needed to complete each one, and the tools available to help along the way."