Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence PDF full book. Access full book title Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence by MissEva Gutierrez. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: MissEva Gutierrez
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451847408
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 31
Get Book Here
Book Description
This paper explores the relationship between the constitutional entrenchment of central bank independence and inflation performance. Empirical studies for developing countries have not found a relationship between central bank independence, proxied by the "de jure" independence established in the central bank law, and inflation. We argue that the constitution is likely to be better enforced than ordinary statutes owing to its higher legal rank. Our empirical analysis finds that in a sample of Latin American and Caribbean countries, those countries that entrench the independence of the central bank in the constitution have a better inflation performance.
Author: MissEva Gutierrez
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451847408
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 31
Get Book Here
Book Description
This paper explores the relationship between the constitutional entrenchment of central bank independence and inflation performance. Empirical studies for developing countries have not found a relationship between central bank independence, proxied by the "de jure" independence established in the central bank law, and inflation. We argue that the constitution is likely to be better enforced than ordinary statutes owing to its higher legal rank. Our empirical analysis finds that in a sample of Latin American and Caribbean countries, those countries that entrench the independence of the central bank in the constitution have a better inflation performance.
Author: Eva Gutiérrez
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking, Central
Languages : en
Pages : 38
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Otmar Issing
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 42
Get Book Here
Book Description
Central bank independence is now a major issue in debates about institutional reforms designed to improve economic performance. Professor Issing's paper is notable for its scholarly discussion of the meaning of 'independence' and his analysis of its effects. Moreover, because of his position inside the Bundesbank which is among the most independent of central banks and which provides a model for the constitution of the proposed European Central Bank he writes with a degree of expertise not available to most authors. Interest in central bank independence arose from the world-wide acceleration of inflation in the 1 970s which stimulated interest in means of 'anchoring' anti-inflation policy. Germany was in advance of other countries in recognising the importance of price stability and es-tablishing an institution to produce it, making the Bundesbank independent in 1957. Professor Issing argues that when independence is coupled with a price stability objective, economic performance appears to improve. Not only is inflation lower, but there is evidence that real growth is higher. In his view, central bank independence comes 'top of the list' of institutional arrangements designed to safeguard the stability of money.
Author: Charles T. Carlstrom
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 14
Get Book Here
Book Description
We document increased central bank independence within the set of industrialized nations. This increased independence can account for nearly two thirds of the improved inflation performance of these nations over the last two decades.
Author: Prakash Loungani
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking, Central
Languages : en
Pages : 44
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Christopher Adolph
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 110703261X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 389
Get Book Here
Book Description
Adolph illustrates the policy differences between central banks run by former bankers relative to those run by bureaucrats.
Author: José De Gregorio
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 54
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Mr.Alberto Musalem Borrero
Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
ISBN: 9781451843743
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
This paper examines the implications of central bank independence for equilibrium macroeconomic performance. The focus is on institutional arrangements governing financial relationships between central banks and ministries of finance, in the presence of competing objectives and constraints across institutions. Abstracting from long-run considerations, higher central bank independence increases fiscal discipline and results in lower inflation and growth, generating a short-run institutional Phillips curve. In the presence of sufficiently strong negative long-run externalities of inflation onto growth, higher CBI also increases fiscal discipline and generates lower inflation, however, it also yields higher growth and generates an inverted institutional Phillips curve. Strikingly, higher central bank independence is found to be frequently sub-optimal for a wide set of stylized economies. Whether these economies are empirically relevant is an open question.
Author: Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger
Publisher: International Finance Section Department of Econ Ton Univers
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 100
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Michael A. Jenkins
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking
Languages : en
Pages : 26
Get Book Here
Book Description
