Author: Jacques Paul LawarréePublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 418
Book Description
Incentive Contracts with Strategic Agents
Author: Jacques Paul LawarréePublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 418
Book Description
Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents
Author: Joel S. DemskiPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 58
Book Description
Managerial Incentive Contracts and Strategic Entry Deterrence
Author: Alessandro NocePublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 41
Book Description
Relational Incentive Contracts for Teams of Multitasking Agents
Author: Ola KvaløyPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Unique implementation of incentive contracts with many agents
Author: Ching-to MaPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Commercial agents
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Book Description
Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
Author: Ching-to MaPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Incentives in industry
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Book Description
Incentive Contracts in Two-sided Moral Hazards with Multiple Agents
Author: Nabil I. Al-NajjarPublisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business ethics
Languages : en
Pages : 23
Book Description
Incentive Contracts when Agents Distort Probabilities
Author: Víctor Gonzáles-JiménezPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Multiagent Incentive Contracts
Author: Qi LuoPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 17
Book Description
Incentive contracts with multiple agents is a classical decentralized decision-making problem with asymmetric information. Contract design aims to incentivize noncooperative agents to act in the principal's interest over a planning horizon. We extend the single-agent incentive contract to a multiagent setting with history-dependent terminal conditions. Our contributions include: (a) Finding sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal multiagent incentive contracts and conditions under which they form a unique Nash Equilibrium; (b) Showing that the optimal multiagent incentive contracts can be solved by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation with equilibrium constraints; (c) Proposing a backward iterative algorithm to solve the problem.
Optimal Incentive Contracts When Agents Can Save, Borrow, and Default
Author: David S. BizerPublisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
The standard Principal-Agent (PA) model assumes that the principal can control the agent's consumption profile. In an intertemporal setting, however, Rogerson (1985a) shows that given the optimal PA contract, the agent has an unmet precautionary demand for savings. Thus the standard PA model is invalid if the agent has access to credit markets. In this paper we generalize the standard PA model to allow for saving and borrowing by the agent. We show that the impact of such access critically depends upon the treatment of default. If default is notpermitted, efficiency is strictly reduced by the introduction of credit markets, and the equilibrium level of borrowing or saving is indeterminate in the model. If default is allowed, however, the optimal contract depends upon the level of bankruptcy protection in the economy, which is described by a minimum level of wage income. We show that there is an optimal intermediate range of bankruptcy protection. Within this range, allowing default increases efficiency in the economy relative to the case of no default. Also, the model predicts specific levels of consumer debt, interest and default rates as function of the level of bankruptcy protection level.
