IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS OR CONTRACTS AND EQUILIBRIA WITH RATIONING. - PART III - OPTIMAL COMMODITY TAXATION AND EQUILIBRIA WITH RATIONING PDF Download
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Author: Yves YOUNES
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Languages : en
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Author: Yves YOUNES
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ISBN:
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Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Yves Younes
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 18
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Author: Yves YOUNES
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Yves YOUNES
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Category :
Languages : en
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Author: Yves Younes
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Author: United States
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Category : Price regulation
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Author: United States. National Archives and Records Service
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Category : Archives
Languages : en
Pages : 188
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Author: Richard J. Gilbert
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Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Author: Julio J. Rotemberg
Publisher: Forgotten Books
ISBN: 9780656230693
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Excerpt from Rationing in Centrally Planned Economies One of the principal differences between centrally planned and more market oriented economies is that rationing is endemic in the former. These shortages in goods and labor markets have been documented by a wide range of observers including Kormai Wilczynski (1982) and Walker Interestingly such shortages are also common when more market oriented economies go through periods of price controls (rockoff This paper attempts to explain the apparently peculiar tendency of governments to generate rationing whenever they have control over prices. The basic premise in the paper is that prices must be set in relative ignorance: the state of demand is unknown when prices at which transactions take place are set. That this premise leads to equilibrium rationing is not surprising given that rationing is endemic in the disequilibrium literature which is driven by the assumption that prices are set in advance (see, for example, Barro and Grossman What still needs to be explained is why prices chosen by central planners make rationing more common than under decentralized price setting. I show that this difference is an almost necessary consequence of assuming that the planner seeks to achieve an efficient allocation of resources. When planners and price setting firms are put on equal footing in terms of the information they have when prices are set, benign planners rationally accept more frequent rationing in return for lower prices. Before reviewing this explanation in detail, it is worth considering some of the alternative explanations for rationing in centrally planned economies. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
Author: Patrick Bolton
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262025768
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 746
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A comprehensive introduction to contract theory, emphasizing common themes and methodologies as well as applications in key areas. Despite the vast research literature on topics relating to contract theory, only a few of the field's core ideas are covered in microeconomics textbooks. This long-awaited book fills the need for a comprehensive textbook on contract theory suitable for use at the graduate and advanced undergraduate levels. It covers the areas of agency theory, information economics, and organization theory, highlighting common themes and methodologies and presenting the main ideas in an accessible way. It also presents many applications in all areas of economics, especially labor economics, industrial organization, and corporate finance. The book emphasizes applications rather than general theorems while providing self-contained, intuitive treatment of the simple models analyzed. In this way, it can also serve as a reference for researchers interested in building contract-theoretic models in applied contexts.The book covers all the major topics in contract theory taught in most graduate courses. It begins by discussing such basic ideas in incentive and information theory as screening, signaling, and moral hazard. Subsequent sections treat multilateral contracting with private information or hidden actions, covering auction theory, bilateral trade under private information, and the theory of the internal organization of firms; long-term contracts with private information or hidden actions; and incomplete contracts, the theory of ownership and control, and contracting with externalities. Each chapter ends with a guide to the relevant literature. Exercises appear in a separate chapter at the end of the book.
