Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428951938
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 129
Book Description
Generic drug entry prior to patent expiration an FTC study
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428951938
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 129
Book Description
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428951938
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 129
Book Description
Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 143798553X
Category : Drugs
Languages : en
Pages : 16
Book Description
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 143798553X
Category : Drugs
Languages : en
Pages : 16
Book Description
Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration
Author: United States. Federal Trade Commission
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Drugs
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
In April 2001, the Commission began an industry-wide study focused on certain aspects of generic drug competition under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. The Amendments provide certain methods by which generic drug manufacturers can obtain approval to market a generic version of a brand-name product. The study's purpose was to provide a more complete picture of how generic drug competition has developed under one method the Amendments established: generic entry prior to expiration of the brand-name company's patents on the relevant drug product.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Drugs
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
In April 2001, the Commission began an industry-wide study focused on certain aspects of generic drug competition under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. The Amendments provide certain methods by which generic drug manufacturers can obtain approval to market a generic version of a brand-name product. The study's purpose was to provide a more complete picture of how generic drug competition has developed under one method the Amendments established: generic entry prior to expiration of the brand-name company's patents on the relevant drug product.
Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patient Expiration
Author: United States. Federal Trade Commission
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Drugs
Languages : en
Pages : 136
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Drugs
Languages : en
Pages : 136
Book Description
Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration
Author: United States. Federal Trade Commission
Publisher: William s Hein & Company
ISBN: 9781575887456
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 113
Book Description
"In April 2001, the Commission began an industry-wide study focused on certain aspects of generic drug competition under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. The Amendments provide certain methods by which generic drug manufacturers can obtain approval to market a generic version of a brand-name product. The study's purpose was to provide a more complete picture of how generic drug competition has developed under one method the Amendments established: generic entry prior to expiration of the brand-name company's patents on the relevant drug product. This report sets forth the results of the study. The study was prompted, in part, by the Commission's enforcement actions against alleged anticompetitive agreements that relied on certain Hatch-Waxman provisions. The study was designed to determine whether such agreements are isolated instances or more typical, and whether particular provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments are susceptible to strategies to delay or deter consumer access to low-cost generic alternatives to brand-name drug products." -- from the Introduction, p. 1.
Publisher: William s Hein & Company
ISBN: 9781575887456
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 113
Book Description
"In April 2001, the Commission began an industry-wide study focused on certain aspects of generic drug competition under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments. The Amendments provide certain methods by which generic drug manufacturers can obtain approval to market a generic version of a brand-name product. The study's purpose was to provide a more complete picture of how generic drug competition has developed under one method the Amendments established: generic entry prior to expiration of the brand-name company's patents on the relevant drug product. This report sets forth the results of the study. The study was prompted, in part, by the Commission's enforcement actions against alleged anticompetitive agreements that relied on certain Hatch-Waxman provisions. The study was designed to determine whether such agreements are isolated instances or more typical, and whether particular provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments are susceptible to strategies to delay or deter consumer access to low-cost generic alternatives to brand-name drug products." -- from the Introduction, p. 1.
The Law and Economics of Generic Drug Regulation
Author: Christopher Scott Hemphill
Publisher: Stanford University
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 249
Book Description
This dissertation examines the law and economics of generic drug entry, and the problems that arise from specific U.S. regulatory arrangements that govern innovation and competition in the market for patented pharmaceuticals. As Chapter 1 explains, competitive entry by generic drug makers is limited by both patents and industry-specific regulation, which together provide the means for brand-name drug makers to avoid competition and thereby recoup large investments in research, development, and testing. At the same time, the complex rules of the Hatch-Waxman Act furnish a pathway by which generic drug makers may challenge the validity or scope of brand-name patents, with a view to entering the market with a competing product prior to patent expiration. The subsequent chapters examine several aspects of the competitive interaction between brand-name and generic drug makers. Chapter 2 analyzes settlements of patent litigation between brand-name and generic drug makers, in which the brand-name firm pays the generic firm in exchange for delayed market entry. Such pay-for-delay settlements are an important, unresolved question in U.S. antitrust policy. The analysis reveals that the pay-for-delay settlement problem is more severe than has been commonly understood. Several specific features of the Act—in particular, a 180-day bounty granted to certain generic drug makers as an incentive to pursue pre-expiration entry—widen the potential for anticompetitive harm from pay-for-delay settlements, compared to the usual understanding. In addition, I show that settlements are "innovation inefficient" as a means of providing profits and hence ex ante innovation incentives to brand-name drug makers. To the extent that Congress established a preferred tradeoff between innovation and competition when it passed the Act, settlements that implement a different, less competition-protective tradeoff are particularly problematic from an antitrust standpoint. Chapter 3 synthesizes available public information about pay-for-delay settlements in order to offer a new account of the extent and evolution of settlement practice. The analysis draws upon a novel dataset of 143 such settlements. The analysis uncovers an evolution in the means by which a brand-name firm can pay a generic firm to delay entry, including a variety of complex "side deals" by which a brand-name firm can compensate a generic firm in a disguised fashion. It also reveals several novel forms of regulatory avoidance. The analysis in the chapter suggests that, as a matter of institutional choice, an expert agency is in a relatively good position to conduct the aggregate analysis needed to identify an optimal antitrust rule. Chapter 4 examines the co-evolution of increased brand-name patenting and increased generic pre-expiration challenges. It draws upon a second novel dataset of drug approvals, applications, patents, and other drug characteristics. Its first contribution is to chart the growth of patent portfolios and pre-expiration challenges. Over time, patenting has increased, measured by the number of patents per drug and the length of the nominal patent term. During the same period, challenges have increased as well, and drugs are challenged sooner, relative to brand-name approval. The analysis shows that brand-name sales, a proxy for the profitability of the drug, have a positive effect on the likelihood of generic challenge, consistent with the view that patents that later prove to be valuable receive greater ex post scrutiny. The likelihood of challenge also varies by patent type and timing of expiration. Conditional on sales and other drug characteristics, drugs with weaker patents, particularly those that expire later than a drug's basic compound patent, face a significantly higher likelihood of challenge. Though the welfare implications of Hatch-Waxman patent challenge provisions are complicated, these results suggest these challenges serve a useful purpose, in promoting scrutiny of low quality and late-expiring patents.
Publisher: Stanford University
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 249
Book Description
This dissertation examines the law and economics of generic drug entry, and the problems that arise from specific U.S. regulatory arrangements that govern innovation and competition in the market for patented pharmaceuticals. As Chapter 1 explains, competitive entry by generic drug makers is limited by both patents and industry-specific regulation, which together provide the means for brand-name drug makers to avoid competition and thereby recoup large investments in research, development, and testing. At the same time, the complex rules of the Hatch-Waxman Act furnish a pathway by which generic drug makers may challenge the validity or scope of brand-name patents, with a view to entering the market with a competing product prior to patent expiration. The subsequent chapters examine several aspects of the competitive interaction between brand-name and generic drug makers. Chapter 2 analyzes settlements of patent litigation between brand-name and generic drug makers, in which the brand-name firm pays the generic firm in exchange for delayed market entry. Such pay-for-delay settlements are an important, unresolved question in U.S. antitrust policy. The analysis reveals that the pay-for-delay settlement problem is more severe than has been commonly understood. Several specific features of the Act—in particular, a 180-day bounty granted to certain generic drug makers as an incentive to pursue pre-expiration entry—widen the potential for anticompetitive harm from pay-for-delay settlements, compared to the usual understanding. In addition, I show that settlements are "innovation inefficient" as a means of providing profits and hence ex ante innovation incentives to brand-name drug makers. To the extent that Congress established a preferred tradeoff between innovation and competition when it passed the Act, settlements that implement a different, less competition-protective tradeoff are particularly problematic from an antitrust standpoint. Chapter 3 synthesizes available public information about pay-for-delay settlements in order to offer a new account of the extent and evolution of settlement practice. The analysis draws upon a novel dataset of 143 such settlements. The analysis uncovers an evolution in the means by which a brand-name firm can pay a generic firm to delay entry, including a variety of complex "side deals" by which a brand-name firm can compensate a generic firm in a disguised fashion. It also reveals several novel forms of regulatory avoidance. The analysis in the chapter suggests that, as a matter of institutional choice, an expert agency is in a relatively good position to conduct the aggregate analysis needed to identify an optimal antitrust rule. Chapter 4 examines the co-evolution of increased brand-name patenting and increased generic pre-expiration challenges. It draws upon a second novel dataset of drug approvals, applications, patents, and other drug characteristics. Its first contribution is to chart the growth of patent portfolios and pre-expiration challenges. Over time, patenting has increased, measured by the number of patents per drug and the length of the nominal patent term. During the same period, challenges have increased as well, and drugs are challenged sooner, relative to brand-name approval. The analysis shows that brand-name sales, a proxy for the profitability of the drug, have a positive effect on the likelihood of generic challenge, consistent with the view that patents that later prove to be valuable receive greater ex post scrutiny. The likelihood of challenge also varies by patent type and timing of expiration. Conditional on sales and other drug characteristics, drugs with weaker patents, particularly those that expire later than a drug's basic compound patent, face a significantly higher likelihood of challenge. Though the welfare implications of Hatch-Waxman patent challenge provisions are complicated, these results suggest these challenges serve a useful purpose, in promoting scrutiny of low quality and late-expiring patents.
Drug Wars
Author: Robin Feldman
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 131673949X
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 165
Book Description
While the shockingly high prices of prescription drugs continue to dominate the news, the strategies used by pharmaceutical companies to prevent generic competition are poorly understood, even by the lawmakers responsible for regulating them. In this groundbreaking work, Robin Feldman and Evan Frondorf illuminate the inner workings of the pharmaceutical market and show how drug companies twist health policy to achieve goals contrary to the public interest. In highly engaging prose, they offer specific examples of how generic competition has been stifled for years, with costs climbing into the billions and everyday consumers paying the price. Drug Wars is a guide to the current landscape, a roadmap for reform, and a warning of what is to come. It should be read by policymakers, academics, patients, and anyone else concerned with the soaring costs of prescription drugs.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 131673949X
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 165
Book Description
While the shockingly high prices of prescription drugs continue to dominate the news, the strategies used by pharmaceutical companies to prevent generic competition are poorly understood, even by the lawmakers responsible for regulating them. In this groundbreaking work, Robin Feldman and Evan Frondorf illuminate the inner workings of the pharmaceutical market and show how drug companies twist health policy to achieve goals contrary to the public interest. In highly engaging prose, they offer specific examples of how generic competition has been stifled for years, with costs climbing into the billions and everyday consumers paying the price. Drug Wars is a guide to the current landscape, a roadmap for reform, and a warning of what is to come. It should be read by policymakers, academics, patients, and anyone else concerned with the soaring costs of prescription drugs.
Studies by the Staff
Author: United States. Cabinet Committee on Price Stability
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Big business
Languages : en
Pages : 174
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Big business
Languages : en
Pages : 174
Book Description
Patent-term Extension and the Pharmaceutical Industry
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Drugs
Languages : en
Pages : 88
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Drugs
Languages : en
Pages : 88
Book Description
A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation
Author: Michael Kremer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Book Description