General MacArthur’s Strategic Success During The Early Months Of The Korean War PDF Download
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Author: LTC James D. Clay
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786252724
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 83
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Book Description
Many military professionals regard General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as a very polarizing figure in military history, from his strategic use of maneuver to defeat the Japanese at Leyte to his public defiance of the Commander in Chief, President Truman on his policy towards the Korean War. Seen by many as a tactical genius, while others viewed him as an egomaniac, General MacArthur exhibited both sides of this complex character, but the evidence shows that MacArthur possessed a level of military competence that set him apart from his contemporaries. In 1950, MacArthur demonstrated one of his most embarrassing defeats as well as one of his most brilliant successes within the course of ten weeks. MacArthur exemplifies a level of confidence that earned him the modern reputation as an operational artist from his ability to turn the tide of war and restore South Korea’s sovereignty.
Author: LTC James D. Clay
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786252724
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 83
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Book Description
Many military professionals regard General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as a very polarizing figure in military history, from his strategic use of maneuver to defeat the Japanese at Leyte to his public defiance of the Commander in Chief, President Truman on his policy towards the Korean War. Seen by many as a tactical genius, while others viewed him as an egomaniac, General MacArthur exhibited both sides of this complex character, but the evidence shows that MacArthur possessed a level of military competence that set him apart from his contemporaries. In 1950, MacArthur demonstrated one of his most embarrassing defeats as well as one of his most brilliant successes within the course of ten weeks. MacArthur exemplifies a level of confidence that earned him the modern reputation as an operational artist from his ability to turn the tide of war and restore South Korea’s sovereignty.
Author: U S Army Command and General Staff Coll
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781501044588
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 54
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Book Description
From 1945- 1950, the United States Army transitioned from a conventional force designed for maneuver warfare in Europe to a role, which supported the Air Force in their delivery of nuclear weapons. This secondary role emerged from strategic studies conducted by the National Security Council in response to President Truman's desire to focus military efforts against the communist East without bankrupting the nation. From this study, the National Security Council determined Communism as a threat to the free world, which triggered the start of a nuclear arms race. Determined that war would be won by the Air Force delivering nuclear weapons on targets, the Army became the bill payer at the expense of its modernization efforts. This reduction in funding limited the Army's ability to train at a collective level and forced the Army to use dated equipment from World War II. Consequently, Senior Army leaders put their faith in the advent of nuclear weapons and did not train their forces for other contingencies such as a limited war.
Author: D. Clayton James
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Civil supremacy over the military
Languages : en
Pages : 28
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Book Description
Author: World Watch Media
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781541138827
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Book Description
The General vs. the PresidentGeneral MacArthur vs. President TrumanBook Preview:Truman relieving General Douglas MacArthur caused a bit of an uproar amongst the American public. His motives were to limit the conflict in Korea, resulting in his decision to remove MacArthur. General MacArthur was full of ego and flair, and issues between the two were inevitable. When the Korean war first began in June of 1950, MacArthur had fantastic military strategies and maneuvers up his sleeve. He used these to keep South Korea protected from communist invaders in North Korea. MacArthur urged to enact a policy to defeat North Korean forces entirely. Truman agreed, but did so warily, as he was aware the People's Republic of China may feel threatened and join the fight. During October of 1950, MacArthur assured Truman that the Chinese wouldn't interfere. Directly afterwards, in November and December, Chinese troops burst into the American lines, hundreds of thousands of soldiers preventing American forces from entering North Korea. MacArthur requested the use of bombs against communist China, as well as to utilize Taiwanese forces to fight the People's Republic of China. When Truman denied him these requests, their public disagreement began.
Author: Major Remco van Ingen
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786253909
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 78
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Book Description
This monograph addresses operational art during a specific period of the Korean War. Both General Walton Walker and General Douglas MacArthur developed operational approaches to unify Korea when the decision was made to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea. General MacArthur’s approach used two major ground commands, was more daring, but more complicated. General Walker, on the other hand suggested an approach under one unified ground commander, seemed more methodical, and less daring. Ultimately, General MacArthur’s approach was the one executed. The X Corps amphibious assault did not bring the anticipated result. The out loading of X Corps, in preparation for the assault took longer than anticipated and the enemy had mined the sea approaches to Wonsan. These two factors combined with an unsynchronized ground attack by I ROK Corps eliminated the chance of a successful envelopment. The monograph provides insight in the relationship between the commander’s personality, his previous operational experiences, and his preference for a particular type of operational approach.
Author: Richard Halworth Rovere
Publisher: Transaction Publishers
ISBN: 9781412824392
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 366
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Book Description
This book was first published in 1951 as The General and the President after President Harry S. Truman relieved General Douglas MacArthur in the midst of the Korean Warââ¬â¢a memorably explosive incident in American political history. But its significance extends far beyond a dramatic episode in the nation's past. This literate and ironic work continues to be an invaluable guide to the conflict between civilian and military authority, and it illuminates laterââ¬â¢and currentââ¬â¢controversies over the role the United States should play in Asian affairs. This new edition is graced by a remarkable introductory essay by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. The text is reprinted from the 1965 republication under the title The MacArthur Controversy, that is, the book as originally written with a few tenses altered and a few topical allusions deleted. General MacArthur and President Truman will be of special interest to students of American diplomacy, politics, and culture and to all concerned with the relationship between the armed forces and larger society.
Author: Wayne Thompson
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 0788140094
Category : Korean War, 1950-1953
Languages : en
Pages : 65
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Book Description
Despite American success in preventing the conquest of South Korea by communist North Korea, the Korean War of 1950-1953 did not satisfy Americans who expected the kind of total victory they had experienced in WW II. In Korea, the U.S. limited itself to conventional weapons. Even after communist China entered the war, Americans put China off-limits to conventional bombing as well as nuclear bombing. Operating within these limits, the U.S. Air Force helped to repel 2 invasions of South Korea while securing control of the skies so decisively that other U.N. forces could fight without fear of air attack.
Author: Theodore Kinni
Publisher: Reuters Books
ISBN: 9780137150823
Category : Leadership
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
General MacArthur defined principles of leadership that were decades ahead of their time. In this book, the authors reveal what MacArthur knew about setting the right goals, building sleek, fast-response organizations, inspiring subordinates to unprecedented performance, focusing relentlessly on results, and winning.
Author: U. S. Military
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781520934211
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 63
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Book Description
In the months following North Korea's invasion of South Korea, United Nations forces fought back from near defeat to the brink of victory. General MacArthur received high praise for the successful amphibious assault at Inchon. This paper argues that his decision making after Inchon, between 15 September and late November 1950, was flawed and led to the selection of an inappropriate course of action for operations in North Korea. The paper questions General MacArthur's failure to pursue the nearly defeated North Korean forces, his decision to leave Eighth Army and X Corps as separate commands, and the fatal decision to advance his forces to the Manchurian border. Further, this paper argues that General MacArthur's success at Inchon, created an atmosphere in which his superiors hesitated to question his decision making. In the months following the June 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea, United Nation forces, commanded by General Douglas MacArthur, fought back from near defeat to the brink of victory. In an even shorter period of time those same forces suffered another massive defeat in November 1950, after crossing the 38th Parallel. This case study will examine General MacArthur's decision making between 15 September and late November 1950, to argue that his course of action after Inchon was inappropriate and resulted in a prolonged war without victory. Popular Korean War history dwells on operations around the Pusan perimeter and the amphibious assault at Inchon. At Pusan, United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces bought necessary time to build up forces in Korea. This early defensive operation prevented a total defeat in South Korea. Inchon severed the supply lines of an already over extended North Korean Peoples's Army (NKPA) and sent it fleeing north in retreat. Historical records are less clear on why United Nations forces did not immediately exploit the success of Inchon. Rather than pursue and destroy the remaining North Korean forces, General MacArthur elected to prepare his forces for another amphibious operation on the east coast of Korea. After wasting valuable time repositioning his forces, General MacArthur crossed the 38th Parallel in pursuit of the NKPA. Was he justified in these actions, or did he fail to capitalize on the success of Inchon?
Author: U S Military
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781704105819
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 90
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Book Description
This study applies the theory of the operational artist to evaluate General Douglas MacArthur's command in the Korean War to illuminate considerations in regards to a senior military commander's authority to discuss policy and negotiate military strategy with policymakers and their responsibility to operate within the constraints imposed by policy to achieve the political aim, through the military aim. Victory emerged through the restoration of the 38th Parallel, where discourse and negotiation between policymakers and the operational artist resolved the tension between policy and military strategy, while tragedy and failure emerged in the remainder of General MacArthur's command, when the discourse failed and the operational artist disregarded policy constraints in pursuit of his own aims. The analysis implicates considerations for senior military commanders in their role as operational artists in the context of large-scale combat operations within wars of limited aims, constrained by competing interests.This compilation also includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.Publishing Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Operations in October 2017, the U.S. Army shifted the priority from focusing on counterinsurgency to large-scale combat operations (LSCO), making LSCO against a peer threat represent the most significant readiness requirement. This realignment responds to a perceived threat from the military advancement and recent aggressive activity by competitor nations such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and China's activity in the South China Sea serve as examples of the intent to contest the world order. In addition, the overlapping interests between the nations heighten concern. Within this context, the potential exists for miscalculation, leading to escalation, as well as simultaneous conflict in multiple regions. This strategic environment challenges the National Command Authority (NCA), supported by military professionals, in establishing political aims and allocation of resources across competing global interests. Thus, arises the question, with consideration to the dynamics of the political environment and potential for LSCO with limited aims, what is the role of senior military commanders with relation to the NCA in the development and implementation of policy and military strategy to further U.S. interests?Carl von Clausewitz's theory On War explains the nature of war, which remains relevant in understanding warfare in the twenty-first century. He derived the nature of real, or limited, war as a political endeavor in pursuit of limited aims, establishing the necessity for the civil-military relationship. Clausewitz deduced that war is an instrument of policy, emerging from the realm of politics consisting of the interrelationship between the enmity of the people, the chance of military victory deduced by commanders, and the purpose or reason, narrative and legitimacy given by the government for the use of force. Because of political origins, the degree of force employed depends on the political aim with consideration to the conditions and capacities of the belligerents. Thus, war does not reach the logical extremes of uncontrolled violence because political interests moderate the effort. The greater the political motivation for war, the greater the belligerent contributes to the war effort.
