From Red Cliffs to Chosin: the Chinese Way Of War PDF Download
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Author: Major James G. Pangelinan
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 178289988X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 179
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Book Description
This monograph examines Chinese warfare and suggests that three and a half millennia of Chinese military history have produced a distinctive and enduring Chinese Way Of War. While the art and science of war in China have evolved considerably throughout its history, the characteristics and philosophies of its style of warfare contain some propensities that endure from antiquity to the present. They are: The Chinese military orientation focuses more on the strategic and operational levels of war than the tactical. The Chinese prefer strategic maneuver warfare to attritional or other forms of warfare. Chinese warfare emphasizes the importance of shaping operations, the arrangement of the conditions of the war, campaign, or battlefield in one’s favor before initiating combat. Finally, deception and unorthodox warfare play a leading role in Chinese martial philosophy and conduct of war. These four propensities of the Chinese way of war are general trends that emerge when the entire span of Chinese warfare is broadly considered. Rooted in the philosophy and theories of the great military classics of ancient Chinese, these propensities provide continuities in the war fighting styles, traditions, and preferences of Chinese armies throughout history. While none of the four propensities of Chinese warfare are practiced by China alone, when aggregated they form a broad approach to war fighting that is unlike that of any other country in the world. The distinctiveness of the Chinese way of war is a product of China’s unique cultural traditions, religious and social philosophies, and historical evolution.
Author: Major James G. Pangelinan
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 178289988X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 179
Get Book Here
Book Description
This monograph examines Chinese warfare and suggests that three and a half millennia of Chinese military history have produced a distinctive and enduring Chinese Way Of War. While the art and science of war in China have evolved considerably throughout its history, the characteristics and philosophies of its style of warfare contain some propensities that endure from antiquity to the present. They are: The Chinese military orientation focuses more on the strategic and operational levels of war than the tactical. The Chinese prefer strategic maneuver warfare to attritional or other forms of warfare. Chinese warfare emphasizes the importance of shaping operations, the arrangement of the conditions of the war, campaign, or battlefield in one’s favor before initiating combat. Finally, deception and unorthodox warfare play a leading role in Chinese martial philosophy and conduct of war. These four propensities of the Chinese way of war are general trends that emerge when the entire span of Chinese warfare is broadly considered. Rooted in the philosophy and theories of the great military classics of ancient Chinese, these propensities provide continuities in the war fighting styles, traditions, and preferences of Chinese armies throughout history. While none of the four propensities of Chinese warfare are practiced by China alone, when aggregated they form a broad approach to war fighting that is unlike that of any other country in the world. The distinctiveness of the Chinese way of war is a product of China’s unique cultural traditions, religious and social philosophies, and historical evolution.
Author: United States Army Command and General S
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781503300224
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 92
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Book Description
This book examines Chinese warfare and suggests that three and a half millennia of Chinese military history have produced a distinctive and enduring Chinese way of war. While the art and science of war in China have evolved considerably throughout its history, the characteristics and philosophies of its style of warfare contain some propensities that endure from antiquity to the present. They are: The Chinese military orientation focuses more on the strategic and operational levels of war than the tactical. The Chinese prefer strategic maneuver warfare to attritional or other forms of warfare. Chinese warfare emphasizes the importance of shaping operations, the arrangement of the conditions of the war, campaign, or battlefield in one's favor before initiating combat. Finally, deception and unorthodox warfare play a leading role in Chinese martial philosophy and conduct of war. These four propensities of the Chinese way of war are general trends that emerge when the entire span of Chinese warfare is broadly considered. Rooted in the philosophy and theories of the great military classics of ancient Chinese, these propensities provide continuities in the warfighting styles, traditions, and preferences of Chinese armies throughout history. While none of the four propensities of Chinese warfare are practiced by China alone, when aggregated they form a broad approach to warfighting that is unlike that of any other country in the world. The distinctiveness of the Chinese way of war is a product of China's unique cultural traditions, religious and social philosophies, and historical evolution.
Author: James D. Kiras
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198902085
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 529
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Book Description
Special Operations Success establishes a new benchmark in military theory in this deeply analytic and innovative work. It answers several pressing questions: How successful have American special operations been over the past quarter-century? Are special forces fated to cycles of expansion and misuse? Will special forces invariably exceed the authorities granted to them because of they are? Is a general theory of special operations feasible given the range of activities and conditions that fall under the category? Kiras' work is based on two decades of practical, teaching, and consulting experience within different special operations communities, and its analysis and conclusions are designed to inform practitioners, policymakers, educators, and the general public. The book develops a framework, in the form of a theory comprising capabilities and control, for the comprehensively evaluating special operations success, and is divided into three parts: Part I lays the foundation for a general theory of special operations, Part II explores the two component parts of theory, capabilities and control, and Part III uses various aspects of the theory, depending on available information, to assess the success of special operations over a twenty-year period in the United Kingdom, South Africa, and the United States.
![Frozen Chosin: U.S. Marines At The Changjin Reservoir [Illustrated Edition] PDF](https://books.google.com/books/content/images/frontcover/i0ZvCwAAQBAJ?fife=w80-h100)
Author: Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786256088
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 415
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Book Description
Includes more than 40 maps, plans and illustrations. This volume in the official History of the Marine Corps chronicles the part played by United States Marines in the Chosin Reservoir Campaign. The race to the Yalu was on. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur’s strategic triumph at Inchon and the subsequent breakout of the U.S. Eighth Army from the Pusan Perimeter and the recapture of Seoul had changed the direction of the war. Only the finishing touches needed to be done to complete the destruction of the North Korean People’s Army. Moving up the east coast was the independent X Corps, commanded by Major General Edward M. Almond, USA. The 1st Marine Division, under Major General Oliver P. Smith, was part of X Corps and had been so since the 15 September 1950 landing at Inchon. After Seoul the 1st Marine Division had reloaded into its amphibious ships and had swung around the Korean peninsula to land at Wonsan on the east coast. The landing on 26 October 1950 met no opposition; the port had been taken from the land side by the resurgent South Korean army. The date was General Smith’s 57th birthday, but he let it pass unnoticed. Two days later he ordered Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr., 47, to move his 7th Marine Regimental Combat Team north from Wonsan to Hamhung. Smith was then to prepare for an advance to the Manchurian border, 135 miles distant. And so began one of the Marine Corps’ greatest battles—or, as the Corps would call it, the “Chosin Reservoir Campaign.” The Marines called it the “Chosin” Reservoir because that is what their Japanese-based maps called it. The South Koreans, nationalistic sensibilities disturbed, preferred—and, indeed, would come to insist—that it be called the “Changjin” Reservoir.
Author: United States. Marine Corps
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Korean War, 1950-1953
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Scott Ray McMichael
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Infantry
Languages : en
Pages : 264
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Book Description
This study seeks to clarify the nature of light infantry. General characteristics of light infantry forces are identified, and an analysis of how light forces operate tactically and how they are supported is presented. In the process, the relationship of the light infantry ethic to its organization is evaluated, and the differences between light infantry and conventional infantry is illuminated. For the purpose of this study, the term conventional infantry refers to modern-day motorized and mechanized infantry and to the large dismounted infantry forces typical of the standard infantry divisions of World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. The study concludes that light infantry is unique and distinct. A light infantry ethic exits and manifests itself in a distinctive tactical style, in a special attitude toward the environment, in a freedom from dependence on fixed lines of communication, and in a strong propensity for self-reliance. The study is based on a historical analysis of 4 light infantry forces employed during and since World War II: The Chindits, in the 1944 Burma campaign against the Japanese; The Chinese communist Forces during the Korean War; British operations in Malaya and Borneo 1948-66; and the First Special Service Force in the mountains of Italy 1942-44. -- p. [2] of cover.
Author: Donald W. Boose
Publisher: www.Militarybookshop.CompanyUK
ISBN: 9781907521089
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 516
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Book Description
Contains the definitive history of the extensive but little known U.S. Army amphibious operations during the Korean War, 1950-1953. Provides insights to modern planners crafting future joint or combined operations in that part of the world.Originally published in 2008. Illustrated.
Author: Russell A. Gugeler
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 264
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Book Description
A description of selected small unit actions, written primarily to acquaint junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers with combat experiences in Korea.
Author: Moyers S. Shore
Publisher: Good Press
ISBN:
Category : Fiction
Languages : en
Pages : 157
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Book Description
The Battle for Khe Sanh is a book by Moyers S. Shore. During the Vietnam War a battle was conducted in the Khe Sanh area of northwestern Vietnam, and this work presents equipment and tactics of US forces and how they fought VC forces.
Author: James A. Field, Jr.
Publisher: University Press of the Pacific
ISBN: 9780898756753
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 520
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Book Description
Americans think of the Korean War as death and hardship in the bitter hills of Korea. It was certainly this, and for those who fought this is what they generally saw. Yet every foot of the struggles forward, every step of the retreats, the overwhelming victories, the withdrawals and last ditch stands had their seagoing support and overtones. The spectacular ones depended wholly on amphibious power -- the capability of the twentieth century scientific Navy to overwhelm land-bound forces at the point of contact. Yet the all pervading influence of the sea was present even when no major landing or retirement or reinforcement highlighted its effect. When navies clash in gigantic battle or hurl troops ashore under irresistible concentration of ship-borne guns and planes, nations understand that sea power is working. It is not so easy to understand that this tremendous force may effect its will silently, steadily, irresistibly even though no battles occur. No clearer example exists of this truth in wars dark record than in Korea. Communist-controlled North Korea had slight power at sea except for Soviet mines. So beyond this strong underwater phase the United States Navy and allies had little opposition on the water. It is, therefore, easy to fail to recognize the decisive role navies played in this war fought without large naval battles.
