Libertarian Free Will PDF Download
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Author: David Palmer (Professor)
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199860084
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 246
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Book Description
This book is a collection of new essays on the libertarian position on free will and related issues that focuses specifically on the views of philosopher Robert Kane. Written by a distinguished group of philosophers, the essays range from various areas of philosophy including metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of mind.
Author: David Palmer (Professor)
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199860084
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 246
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Book Description
This book is a collection of new essays on the libertarian position on free will and related issues that focuses specifically on the views of philosopher Robert Kane. Written by a distinguished group of philosophers, the essays range from various areas of philosophy including metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of mind.
Author: Michael McKenna
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351777513
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 405
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Book Description
This book was published in 2003. This book explores an important issue within the free will debate: the relation between free will and moral responsibility. In his seminal article "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility", Harry Frankfurt launched a vigorous attack on the standard conception of that relation, questioning the claim that a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Since then, Frankfurt's thesis has been at the center of philosophical discussions on free will and moral responsibility. "Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities", edited by David Widerker and Michael McKenna, draws together the most recent work on Frankfurt's thesis by leading theorists in the area of free will and responsibility. As the majority of the essays appear here for the first time, "Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities" offers the newest developments in this important debate.
Author: Derk Pereboom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521029961
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 257
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Book Description
Argues that morality, meaning and value remain intact even if we are not morally responsible for our actions.
Author: Kevin Timpe
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 1441115048
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 166
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Book Description
Much contemporary scholarship on free will focuses on whether it is compatible with causal determinism. According to compatibilists, it is possible for an agent to be determined in all her choices and actions and still be free. Incompatibilists, on the other hand, think that the existence of free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism. There are two dominant general conceptions of the nature of free will. According to the first of these, free will is primarily a function of being able to do otherwise than one in fact does. On this view, free will centrally depends upon alternative possibilities. The second approach focuses instead on issues of sourcehood, holding that free will is primarily a function of an agent being the source of her actions in a particular way. This book demarcates these two different conceptions free will, explores the relationship between them, and examines how they relate to the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. It ultimately argues for a version of Source Incompatibilism.
Author: Randolph Clarke
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780195306422
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 276
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Book Description
This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent causation and nondeterministic event causation. He defends this view from a number of objections but argues that we should find the substance causation required by any agent-causal account to be impossible. Clarke concludes that if a broad thesis of incompatibilism is correct - one on which both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism - then no libertarian account is entirely adequate.
Author: Christopher Evan Franklin
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190682787
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 249
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Book Description
In this book, Christopher Evan Franklin develops and defends a novel version of event-causal libertarianism. This view is a combination of libertarianism--the view that humans sometimes act freely and that those actions are the causal upshots of nondeterministic processes--and agency reductionism--the view that the causal role of the agent in exercises of free will is exhausted by the causal role of mental states and events (e.g., desires and beliefs) involving the agent. Franklin boldly counteracts a dominant theory that has similar aims, put forth by well-known philosopher Robert Kane. Many philosophers contend that event-causal libertarians have no advantage over compatibilists when it comes to securing a distinctively valuable kind of freedom and responsibility. To Franklin, this position is mistaken. Assuming agency reductionism is true, event-causal libertarians need only adopt the most plausible compatibilist theory and add indeterminism at the proper juncture in the genesis of human action. The result is minimal event-causal libertarianism: a model of free will with the metaphysical simplicity of compatibilism and the intuitive power of libertarianism. And yet a worry remains: toward the end of the book, Franklin reconsiders his assumption of agency reductionism, arguing that this picture faces a hitherto unsolved problem. This problem, however, has nothing to do with indeterminism or determinism, or even libertarianism or compatibilism, but with how to understand the nature of the self and its role in the genesis of action. Crucially, if this problem proves unsolvable, then not only is event-causal libertarianism untenable, so also is event-causal compatibilism.
Author: John Martin Fischer
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1405182040
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 240
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Book Description
Focusing on the concepts and interactions of free will, moralresponsibility, and determinism, this text represents the mostup-to-date account of the four major positions in the free willdebate. Four serious and well-known philosophers explore the opposingviewpoints of libertarianism, compatibilism, hard incompatibilism,and revisionism The first half of the book contains each philosopher’sexplanation of his particular view; the second half allows them todirectly respond to each other’s arguments, in a lively andengaging conversation Offers the reader a one of a kind, interactive discussion Forms part of the acclaimed Great Debates in Philosophyseries
Author: Christian List
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674239814
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 225
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Book Description
A crystal-clear, scientifically rigorous argument for the existence of free will, challenging what many scientists and scientifically minded philosophers believe. Philosophers have argued about the nature and the very existence of free will for centuries. Today, many scientists and scientifically minded commentators are skeptical that it exists, especially when it is understood to require the ability to choose between alternative possibilities. If the laws of physics govern everything that happens, they argue, then how can our choices be free? Believers in free will must be misled by habit, sentiment, or religious doctrine. Why Free Will Is Real defies scientific orthodoxy and presents a bold new defense of free will in the same naturalistic terms that are usually deployed against it. Unlike those who defend free will by giving up the idea that it requires alternative possibilities to choose from, Christian List retains this idea as central, resisting the tendency to defend free will by watering it down. He concedes that free will and its prerequisites—intentional agency, alternative possibilities, and causal control over our actions—cannot be found among the fundamental physical features of the natural world. But, he argues, that’s not where we should be looking. Free will is a “higher-level” phenomenon found at the level of psychology. It is like other phenomena that emerge from physical processes but are autonomous from them and not best understood in fundamental physical terms—like an ecosystem or the economy. When we discover it in its proper context, acknowledging that free will is real is not just scientifically respectable; it is indispensable for explaining our world.
Author: Neil Levy
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199601380
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 238
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Book Description
The concept of luck plays an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility. Neil Levy presents an original account of luck and argues that it undermines our freedom and moral responsibility no matter whether determinism is true or not.
Author: Shaun Nichols
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199291845
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 199
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Book Description
Shaun Nichols offers a naturalistic, psychological account of the origins of the problem of free will. He argues that our belief in indeterminist choice is grounded in faulty inference and therefore unjustified, goes on to suggest that there is no single answer to whether free will exists, and promotes a pragmatic approach to prescriptive issues.
