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Author: Wanchuan Lin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 57
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Book Description
The literature has mixed results on how formal insurance affects informal risk sharing. Whether such effect is motivated extrinsically or intrinsically also remains unclear. We design a lab experiment in which formal insurance is introduced and removed unexpected and the insurance purchase decisions are either voluntary or forced. We find, quite surprisingly, that informal risk sharing is significantly improved after the removal of formal insurance, primarily for subjects making asymmetric insurance take-up decisions voluntarily. Investigating the dynamics suggests that it is those who take the insurance acting first to share more risk for their partners. We propose a model based on a particular feature of social preferences, guilt aversion, to explain our findings.
Author: Wanchuan Lin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 57
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Book Description
The literature has mixed results on how formal insurance affects informal risk sharing. Whether such effect is motivated extrinsically or intrinsically also remains unclear. We design a lab experiment in which formal insurance is introduced and removed unexpected and the insurance purchase decisions are either voluntary or forced. We find, quite surprisingly, that informal risk sharing is significantly improved after the removal of formal insurance, primarily for subjects making asymmetric insurance take-up decisions voluntarily. Investigating the dynamics suggests that it is those who take the insurance acting first to share more risk for their partners. We propose a model based on a particular feature of social preferences, guilt aversion, to explain our findings.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 46
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Book Description
Author: Wanchuan Lin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 65
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Book Description
This paper investigates the crowding-out effect of formal insurance on informal risk-sharing arrangements via theory and laboratory experiment. Our model and simulation predict that the crowding out of private transfers is often more than one-for-one and will reduce the total risk coverage. Furthermore, the existence of a moderate degree of altruism exaggerates the crowding-out effect, especially when there is an ex-ante income inequality. These predictions are mostly supported by the laboratory experiment, except that the crowding-out effect is not more than one-for-one, and hence the total risk coverage is not significantly reduced by formal insurance.
Author: Steve Boucher
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
Moral hazard and adverse selection impede the development of formal crop insurance markets in developing countries. Besides, the risk mitigation provided by informal risk-sharing arrangements is restricted by their inability to protect against covariate shocks. In this context, index-based insurance is seen as a promising scheme as it is immune to moral hazard and adverse selection and may offer effective protection against covariate shocks. It would thus seem that the two institutions are ideal complements. Unfortunately, this intuition ignores the potential effects on incentives and behavior generated by the interaction between both schemes. This paper explores this interaction in a model with moral hazard and shows that the formal contract may crowd out informal risk-sharing if it is offered to individuals. Second, we find that both risk-taking and welfare may be reduced by the introduction of index insurance if the premium is set too high. If the formal insurance is offered to the group instead of the individual, the impact on moral hazard is internalized and welfare increases.
Author: Pierre Dubois
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Insurance
Languages : en
Pages : 46
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Book Description
Author: Munro, Laura
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 60
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Book Description
Recognition of take-up and transaction cost challenges in individual microinsurance has led to a surge of interest in group microinsurance. Yet few studies have considered the effect of group insurance on the investment decisions of the insured. In the case of weather index insurance, this is an important omission. Analogous to group microcredit, group weather insurance may exacerbate two key challenges depending on the information environment: moral hazard and group pressure. Experimental results from a framed field experiment in Gujarat, India, confirm that group pressure leads to an 8 percent reduction in risk taking in contexts with perfect information and group insurance (relative to individual insurance). The effects of moral hazard are more limited, however. As higher risk taking is associated with higher average agricultural productivity—and thus, development—these findings put a premium on greater attention to group selection, the information environment, and the regulation of payout distribution.
Author: Andinet Delelegn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Risk management
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Book Description
Author: Petyon Young
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0444537678
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 1025
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Book Description
The ability to understand and predict behavior in strategic situations, in which an individual's success in making choices depends on the choices of others, has been the domain of game theory since the 1950s. Developing the theories at the heart of game theory has resulted in 8 Nobel Prizes and insights that researchers in many fields continue to develop. In Volume 4, top scholars synthesize and analyze mainstream scholarship on games and economic behavior, providing an updated account of developments in game theory since the 2002 publication of Volume 3, which only covers work through the mid 1990s. - Focuses on innovation in games and economic behavior - Presents coherent summaries of subjects in game theory - Makes details about game theory accessible to scholars in fields outside economics
Author: Truman Packard
Publisher: Human Development Perspectives
ISBN: 9781464814273
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
"This white paper focusses on the policy interventions made to help people manage risk, uncertainty and the losses from events whose impacts are channeled primarily through the labor market. The objectives of the white paper are: to scrutinize the relevance and effects of prevailing risk-sharing policies in low- and middle-income countries; take account of how global drivers of disruption shape and diversify how people work; in light of this diversity, propose alternative risk-sharing policies, or ways to augment and improve current policies to be more relevant and responsive to peoples' needs; and map a reasonable transition path from the current to an alternative policy approach that substantially extends protection to a greater portion of working people and their families. This white paper is a contribution to the broader, global discussion of the changing nature of work and how policy can shape its implications for the wellbeing of people. We use the term risk-sharing policies broadly in reference to the set of institutions, regulations and interventions that societies put in place to help households manage shocks to their livelihoods. These policies include formal rules and structures that regulate market interactions (worker protections and other labor market institutions) that help people pool risks (social assistance and social insurance), to save and insure affordably and effectively (mandatory and incentivized individual savings and other financial instruments) and to recover from losses in the wake of livelihood shocks ('active' reemployment measures). Effective risk-sharing policies are foundational to building equity, resilience and opportunity, the strategic objectives of the World Bank's Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice. Given failures of factor markets and the market for risk in particular the rationale for policy intervention to augment the options that people have to manage shocks to their livelihoods is well-understood and accepted. By helping to prevent vulnerable people from falling into poverty --and people in the poorest households from falling deeper into poverty-- effective risk-sharing interventions dramatically reduce poverty. Households and communities with access to effective risk-sharing instruments can better maintain and continue to invest in these vital assets, first and foremost, their human capital, and in doing so can reduce the likelihood that poverty and vulnerability will be transmitted from one generation to the next. Risk-sharing policies foster enterprise and development by ensuring that people can take appropriate risks required to grasp opportunities and secure their stake in a growing economy."--
Author: Amy Finkelstein
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231538685
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 161
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Book Description
Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
