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Author: International Monetary Fund
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451926472
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
The paper emphasizes the role of institutions and incentives in the presence of externalities. An economy with multiple public decision makers is likely to experience “overspending,” “undertaxing,” “overborrowing,” and “overinflation” unless effective institutions exist for overcoming coordination failure. External financing may weaken incentives for adjustment over the longer run unless assistance is made conditional on fundamental institutional reforms. The paper also analyzes reforms that strengthen incentives to provide effort. Uncertainty regarding future taxes reduces present effort and the responsiveness of output to market signals. In addition, the paper addresses the adverse effects of bank insurance and soft budget constraints.
Author: International Monetary Fund
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451926472
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Get Book Here
Book Description
The paper emphasizes the role of institutions and incentives in the presence of externalities. An economy with multiple public decision makers is likely to experience “overspending,” “undertaxing,” “overborrowing,” and “overinflation” unless effective institutions exist for overcoming coordination failure. External financing may weaken incentives for adjustment over the longer run unless assistance is made conditional on fundamental institutional reforms. The paper also analyzes reforms that strengthen incentives to provide effort. Uncertainty regarding future taxes reduces present effort and the responsiveness of output to market signals. In addition, the paper addresses the adverse effects of bank insurance and soft budget constraints.
Author: Joshua Aizenman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bank insurance
Languages : en
Pages : 62
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Book Description
The paper emphasizes the role of institutions and incentives in the presence of externalities. An economy with multiple public decision makers is likely to experience "overspending," "undertaxing," "overborrowing," and "overinflation" unless effective institutions exist for overcoming coordination failure. External financing may weaken incentives for adjustment over the longer run unless assistance is made conditional on fundamental institutional reforms. The paper also analyses reforms that strengthen incentives to provide effort. Uncertainty regarding future taxes reduces present effort and the responsiveness of output to market signals. In addition, the paper addresses the adverse effects of bank insurance and soft budget constraints.
Author: Steven Kelman
Publisher: Praeger Pub Text
ISBN: 9780865690820
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 170
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Book Description
Sets forth in a straightforward and sensible way the philosophical reasons for the non-economist's skepticism of the economist's view of the world. Its relevance extends beyond environmental issues to other areas where microeconomic theory is being applied to public policy. Kelman cites results to confirm his view that both opponents and supporters of economic incentives have important philosophical concerns. He takes the role of an advocate of the use of incentives in formulating an environmental policy. He also discusses political strategy from the point of view of the policy entrepreneur who is trying to get ideas adopted. Economists and non-economists alike will welcome this book as a bridge over a perceptual gap in an important area of policymaking.
Author: Joshua Aizenman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economic policy
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Book Description
The purpose of this paper is to study why decentralized economies often fail to achieve national objective in the presence of externalities. The paper employs a two-period, open economy framework in which the central government allocates its tax revenues among a larger number of individual decision makers (e.g., provincial authorities or managers of state enterprises). The central government has only limited monitoring capacity, which gives individual decision makers the opportunity to commit to spend more than the incomes they are officially allocated. Our analysis suggests that adverse macroeconomic shocks reduce the likelihood that decentralized decision makers will behave in a manner that limits spending and inflation to national objectives. This is demonstrated for declines in the current or expected future levels of domestic output, for a rise in foreign interest rates, and for a reduction in the quantity of external credit. We next demonstrate that debt relief can promote a shift in the composition of spending toward the types of productive investments that generate positive externalities. This is not only because debt relief that expands the availability of current resources has positive direct income effects, but also because debt relief can promote a shift from opportunistic behavior to cooperation among individual decision makers.
Author: Lluís Bru
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contagion (Social psychology)
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
Author: Bela Balassa
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN: 9781349182060
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 497
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Book Description
Author: Philip Keefer
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 0031210104
Category : Democracy
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
Countries vary systematically with respect to the incentives of politicians to provide broad public goods, and to reduce poverty. Even in developing countries that are democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to political rents, and to private transfers that benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfections in political markets, that are greater in some countries than in others. The authors review the theory, and evidence on the impact of incomplete information of voters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and social polarization on political incentives. They argue that the effects of these imperfections are large, but that their implications are insufficiently integrated into the design of policy reforms aimed at improving the provision of public goods, and reducing poverty.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Computer network resources
Languages : en
Pages : 300
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Book Description
Author: Bruce M. Owen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
The authors assisted the World Bank in conducting an economic evaluation of the effectiveness of legal aid clinics for poor women in Ecuador. The legal aid clinics were a small part of a project to promote legal and judicial reform (LJR) in Ecuador, in turn part of a World Bank initiative to promote such reforms throughout the developing world. World Bank support for the clinics was ending just as we began our work. Measuring the effectiveness of the clinics presented two challenges: deciding what to measure and finding a practical way to measure it. LJR is thought to contribute to economic growth and the reduction of poverty. Reform is also thought to increase the quality of life, because people place an independent value on "the rule of law." We need to assess the performance of the legal clinics against these goals. The literature on LJR in developing nations largely ignores the literature on microeconomic analysis of law, and hence lacks a framework for linking legal reform to economic growth at the level of microeconomic agents. Our first task is to apply economic learning to the problem of legal reform - that is, to identify the microeconomic foundations of the rule of law as they apply here. Once accomplished, this model points clearly to what should be measured in evaluating reforms: the positive externality of reforms on expectations of what courts will do. The second challenge - measurement - is conducted under typical real world constraints. The clinics did not collect or preserve ideal data, an evaluation component was not built into the project, funds for data collection and analysis were limited, and the objectives we ultimately decided to measure were not necessarily those that the clinics set out to achieve. In light of these difficulties, our econometric results are useful chiefly as a demonstration that empirical evaluation of the contributions of LJR to economic development is possible. We were not able to measure more than a hint of the most important benefits of the clinics - their spillover impact on non-participants. But even without this potentially very large positive externality, the clinics appear to have made a contribution to the economic well-being of poor women in Ecuador. In the future, legal and judicial reform projects should be undertaken not merely to achieve abstract procedural norms derived from western legal experience, but to promote economic development by capitalizing on the law's potential leverage or spillover effects on the incentives of economic agents.
Author: Peter J. Hammond
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
