Author: Dorit Bar-On
Publisher: Clarendon Press
ISBN: 0191532428
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 465
Book Description
Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own minds. We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what we say goes; an avowal such as "I'm feeling so anxious" or "I'm thinking about my next trip to Paris," it is typically supposed, tells it like it is. But why is that? Why should what I say about my present mental states carry so much more weight than what others say about them? Why should avowals be more immune to criticism and correction than other claims we make? And if avowals are not based on any evidence or observation, how could they possibly express our knowledge of our own present mental states? Bar-On proposes a Neo-Expressivist view according to which an avowal is an act through which a person directly expresses, rather than merely reports, the very mental condition that the avowal ascribes. She argues that this expressivist idea, coupled with an adequate characterization of expression and a proper separation of the semantics of avowals from their pragmatics and epistemology, explains the special status we assign to avowals. As against many expressivists and their critics, she maintains that such an expressivist explanation is consistent with a non-deflationary view of self-knowledge and a robust realism about mental states. The view that emerges preserves many insights of the most prominent contributors to the subject, while offering a new perspective on our special relationship to our own minds.
Speaking My Mind
Author: Dorit Bar-On
Publisher: Clarendon Press
ISBN: 0191532428
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 465
Book Description
Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own minds. We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what we say goes; an avowal such as "I'm feeling so anxious" or "I'm thinking about my next trip to Paris," it is typically supposed, tells it like it is. But why is that? Why should what I say about my present mental states carry so much more weight than what others say about them? Why should avowals be more immune to criticism and correction than other claims we make? And if avowals are not based on any evidence or observation, how could they possibly express our knowledge of our own present mental states? Bar-On proposes a Neo-Expressivist view according to which an avowal is an act through which a person directly expresses, rather than merely reports, the very mental condition that the avowal ascribes. She argues that this expressivist idea, coupled with an adequate characterization of expression and a proper separation of the semantics of avowals from their pragmatics and epistemology, explains the special status we assign to avowals. As against many expressivists and their critics, she maintains that such an expressivist explanation is consistent with a non-deflationary view of self-knowledge and a robust realism about mental states. The view that emerges preserves many insights of the most prominent contributors to the subject, while offering a new perspective on our special relationship to our own minds.
Publisher: Clarendon Press
ISBN: 0191532428
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 465
Book Description
Dorit Bar-On develops and defends a novel view of avowals and self-knowledge. Drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the theory of action, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, she offers original and systematic answers to many long-standing questions concerning our ability to know our own minds. We are all very good at telling what states of mind we are in at a given moment. When it comes to our own present states of mind, what we say goes; an avowal such as "I'm feeling so anxious" or "I'm thinking about my next trip to Paris," it is typically supposed, tells it like it is. But why is that? Why should what I say about my present mental states carry so much more weight than what others say about them? Why should avowals be more immune to criticism and correction than other claims we make? And if avowals are not based on any evidence or observation, how could they possibly express our knowledge of our own present mental states? Bar-On proposes a Neo-Expressivist view according to which an avowal is an act through which a person directly expresses, rather than merely reports, the very mental condition that the avowal ascribes. She argues that this expressivist idea, coupled with an adequate characterization of expression and a proper separation of the semantics of avowals from their pragmatics and epistemology, explains the special status we assign to avowals. As against many expressivists and their critics, she maintains that such an expressivist explanation is consistent with a non-deflationary view of self-knowledge and a robust realism about mental states. The view that emerges preserves many insights of the most prominent contributors to the subject, while offering a new perspective on our special relationship to our own minds.
Self-Expression
Author: Mitchell S. Green
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199283788
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 241
Book Description
This systematic philosophical study of self-expression explores the ways in which it reveals our states of thought, feeling, and experience. Green defends striking new theses on such topics as our ability to perceive emotion in others, artistic expression, empathy, expressive language, meaning, facial expression, and speech acts.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199283788
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 241
Book Description
This systematic philosophical study of self-expression explores the ways in which it reveals our states of thought, feeling, and experience. Green defends striking new theses on such topics as our ability to perceive emotion in others, artistic expression, empathy, expressive language, meaning, facial expression, and speech acts.
Expression and the Inner
Author: David H. Finkelstein
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674263413
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 206
Book Description
At least since Descartes, philosophers have been interested in the special knowledge or authority that we exhibit when we speak about our own thoughts, attitudes, and feelings. Expression and the Inner contends that even the best work in contemporary philosophy of mind fails to account for this sort of knowledge or authority because it does not pay the right sort of attention to the notion of expression. Following what he takes to be a widely misunderstood suggestion of Wittgenstein's, Finkelstein argues that we can make sense of self-knowledge and first-person authority only by coming to see the ways in which a self-ascription of, say, happiness (a person's saying or thinking, "I'm happy this morning") may be akin to a smile--akin, that is, to an expression of happiness. In so doing, Finkelstein contrasts his own reading of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind with influential readings set out by John McDowell and Crispin Wright. By the final chapter of this lucid work, what's at stake is not only how to understand self-knowledge and first-person authority, but also what it is that distinguishes conscious from unconscious psychological states, what the mental life of a nonlinguistic animal has in common with our sort of mental life, and how to think about Wittgenstein's legacy to the philosophy of mind.
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674263413
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 206
Book Description
At least since Descartes, philosophers have been interested in the special knowledge or authority that we exhibit when we speak about our own thoughts, attitudes, and feelings. Expression and the Inner contends that even the best work in contemporary philosophy of mind fails to account for this sort of knowledge or authority because it does not pay the right sort of attention to the notion of expression. Following what he takes to be a widely misunderstood suggestion of Wittgenstein's, Finkelstein argues that we can make sense of self-knowledge and first-person authority only by coming to see the ways in which a self-ascription of, say, happiness (a person's saying or thinking, "I'm happy this morning") may be akin to a smile--akin, that is, to an expression of happiness. In so doing, Finkelstein contrasts his own reading of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind with influential readings set out by John McDowell and Crispin Wright. By the final chapter of this lucid work, what's at stake is not only how to understand self-knowledge and first-person authority, but also what it is that distinguishes conscious from unconscious psychological states, what the mental life of a nonlinguistic animal has in common with our sort of mental life, and how to think about Wittgenstein's legacy to the philosophy of mind.
Self-Knowledge
Author: Brie Gertler
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136858113
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 564
Book Description
How do you know your own thoughts and feelings? Do we have ‘privileged access’ to our own minds? Does introspection provide a grasp of a thinking self or ‘I’? The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. In this outstanding introduction Brie Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. Beginning with an outline of the distinction between self-knowledge and self-awareness and providing essential historical background to the problem, Gertler addresses specific theories of self-knowledge such as the acquaintance theory, the inner sense theory, and the rationalist theory, as well as leading accounts of self-awareness. The book concludes with a critical explication of the dispute between empiricist and rationalist approaches. Including helpful chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary, Self Knowledge is essential reading for those interested in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and personal identity.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136858113
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 564
Book Description
How do you know your own thoughts and feelings? Do we have ‘privileged access’ to our own minds? Does introspection provide a grasp of a thinking self or ‘I’? The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. In this outstanding introduction Brie Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. Beginning with an outline of the distinction between self-knowledge and self-awareness and providing essential historical background to the problem, Gertler addresses specific theories of self-knowledge such as the acquaintance theory, the inner sense theory, and the rationalist theory, as well as leading accounts of self-awareness. The book concludes with a critical explication of the dispute between empiricist and rationalist approaches. Including helpful chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary, Self Knowledge is essential reading for those interested in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and personal identity.
Transparency and Self-Knowledge
Author: Alex Byrne
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192554735
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 240
Book Description
Alex Byrne sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge-knowledge of one's mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans' discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is 'transparent': self-knowledge is achieved by an 'outward glance' at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an 'inward glance' at one's own mind. Belief is the clearest case, with the inference being from 'p' to 'I believe that p'. One serious problem with this idea is that the inference seems terrible, because 'p' is at best very weak evidence that one believes that p. Another is that the idea seems not to generalize. For example, what is the worldly premise corresponding to 'I intend to do this', or 'I feel a pain'? Byrne argues that both problems can be solved, and explains how the account covers perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination, and thought. The result is a unified theory of self-knowledge that explains the epistemic security of beliefs about one's mental states (privileged access), as well as the fact that one has a special first-person way of knowing about one's mental states (peculiar access).
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192554735
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 240
Book Description
Alex Byrne sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge-knowledge of one's mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans' discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is 'transparent': self-knowledge is achieved by an 'outward glance' at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an 'inward glance' at one's own mind. Belief is the clearest case, with the inference being from 'p' to 'I believe that p'. One serious problem with this idea is that the inference seems terrible, because 'p' is at best very weak evidence that one believes that p. Another is that the idea seems not to generalize. For example, what is the worldly premise corresponding to 'I intend to do this', or 'I feel a pain'? Byrne argues that both problems can be solved, and explains how the account covers perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination, and thought. The result is a unified theory of self-knowledge that explains the epistemic security of beliefs about one's mental states (privileged access), as well as the fact that one has a special first-person way of knowing about one's mental states (peculiar access).
Authority and Estrangement
Author: Richard Moran
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691089450
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 242
Book Description
Since Socrates, and through Descartes to the present day, the problems of self-knowledge have been central to philosophy's understanding of itself. Today the idea of ''first-person authority''--the claim of a distinctive relation each person has toward his or her own mental life--has been challenged from a number of directions, to the point where many doubt the person bears any distinctive relation to his or her own mental life, let alone a privileged one. In Authority and Estrangement, Richard Moran argues for a reconception of the first-person and its claims. Indeed, he writes, a more thorough repudiation of the idea of privileged inner observation leads to a deeper appreciation of the systematic differences between self-knowledge and the knowledge of others, differences that are both irreducible and constitutive of the very concept and life of the person. Masterfully blending philosophy of mind and moral psychology, Moran develops a view of self-knowledge that concentrates on the self as agent rather than spectator. He argues that while each person does speak for his own thought and feeling with a distinctive authority, that very authority is tied just as much to the disprivileging of the first-person, to its specific possibilities of alienation. Drawing on certain themes from Wittgenstein, Sartre, and others, the book explores the extent to which what we say about ourselves is a matter of discovery or of creation, the difficulties and limitations in being ''objective'' toward ourselves, and the conflicting demands of realism about oneself and responsibility for oneself. What emerges is a strikingly original and psychologically nuanced exploration of the contrasting ideals of relations to oneself and relations to others.
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691089450
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 242
Book Description
Since Socrates, and through Descartes to the present day, the problems of self-knowledge have been central to philosophy's understanding of itself. Today the idea of ''first-person authority''--the claim of a distinctive relation each person has toward his or her own mental life--has been challenged from a number of directions, to the point where many doubt the person bears any distinctive relation to his or her own mental life, let alone a privileged one. In Authority and Estrangement, Richard Moran argues for a reconception of the first-person and its claims. Indeed, he writes, a more thorough repudiation of the idea of privileged inner observation leads to a deeper appreciation of the systematic differences between self-knowledge and the knowledge of others, differences that are both irreducible and constitutive of the very concept and life of the person. Masterfully blending philosophy of mind and moral psychology, Moran develops a view of self-knowledge that concentrates on the self as agent rather than spectator. He argues that while each person does speak for his own thought and feeling with a distinctive authority, that very authority is tied just as much to the disprivileging of the first-person, to its specific possibilities of alienation. Drawing on certain themes from Wittgenstein, Sartre, and others, the book explores the extent to which what we say about ourselves is a matter of discovery or of creation, the difficulties and limitations in being ''objective'' toward ourselves, and the conflicting demands of realism about oneself and responsibility for oneself. What emerges is a strikingly original and psychologically nuanced exploration of the contrasting ideals of relations to oneself and relations to others.
Know Thyself
Author: Mitchell S. Green
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317197828
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 247
Book Description
Know Thyself: The Value and Limits of Self-Knowledge takes the reader on tour of the nature, value, and limits of self-knowledge. Mitchell S. Green calls on classical sources like Plato and Descartes, 20th-century thinkers like Freud, recent developments in neuroscience and experimental psychology, and even Buddhist philosophy to explore topics at the heart of who we are. The result is an unvarnished look at both the achievements and drawbacks of the many attempts to better know one’s own self. Key topics in this volume include: Knowledge – what it means to know, the link between wisdom and knowledge, and the value of living an "examined life" Personal identity – questions of dualism (the idea that our mind is not only our brain), bodily continuity, and personhood The unconscious — including the kind posited by psychoanalysis as well as the form proposed by recent research on the so-called adaptive unconscious Free will – if we have it, and the recent arguments from neuroscience challenging it Self-misleading – the ways we willfully deceive ourselves, and how this relates to empathy, peer disagreement, implicit bias, and intellectual humility Experimental psychology – considerations on the automaticity of emotion and other cognitive processes, and how they shape us This book is designed to be used in conjunction with the free ‘Know Thyself’ MOOC (massive open online course) created through collaboration of the University of Connecticut's Project on Humility and Conviction in Public Life, and the University of Edinburgh’s Eidyn research centre, and hosted on the Coursera platform (https://www.coursera.org/learn/know-thyself). The book is also suitable as a text for interdisciplinary courses in the philosophy of mind or self-knowledge, and is highly recommended for anyone looking for a short overview of this fascinating topic.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317197828
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 247
Book Description
Know Thyself: The Value and Limits of Self-Knowledge takes the reader on tour of the nature, value, and limits of self-knowledge. Mitchell S. Green calls on classical sources like Plato and Descartes, 20th-century thinkers like Freud, recent developments in neuroscience and experimental psychology, and even Buddhist philosophy to explore topics at the heart of who we are. The result is an unvarnished look at both the achievements and drawbacks of the many attempts to better know one’s own self. Key topics in this volume include: Knowledge – what it means to know, the link between wisdom and knowledge, and the value of living an "examined life" Personal identity – questions of dualism (the idea that our mind is not only our brain), bodily continuity, and personhood The unconscious — including the kind posited by psychoanalysis as well as the form proposed by recent research on the so-called adaptive unconscious Free will – if we have it, and the recent arguments from neuroscience challenging it Self-misleading – the ways we willfully deceive ourselves, and how this relates to empathy, peer disagreement, implicit bias, and intellectual humility Experimental psychology – considerations on the automaticity of emotion and other cognitive processes, and how they shape us This book is designed to be used in conjunction with the free ‘Know Thyself’ MOOC (massive open online course) created through collaboration of the University of Connecticut's Project on Humility and Conviction in Public Life, and the University of Edinburgh’s Eidyn research centre, and hosted on the Coursera platform (https://www.coursera.org/learn/know-thyself). The book is also suitable as a text for interdisciplinary courses in the philosophy of mind or self-knowledge, and is highly recommended for anyone looking for a short overview of this fascinating topic.
Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation
Author: Katharina T. Kraus
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 110883664X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 321
Book Description
Explores the relationship between self-knowledge, individuality, and personal development by reconstructing Kant's account of personhood.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 110883664X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 321
Book Description
Explores the relationship between self-knowledge, individuality, and personal development by reconstructing Kant's account of personhood.
The Self and Self-Knowledge
Author: Annalisa Coliva
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199590656
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 297
Book Description
Investigates philosophical issues to do with the self and self-knowledge. It focuses on two main problems: how to account for I-thoughts and the consequences that doing so would have for our notion of the self; and how to explain subjects' ability to know the kind of psychological states they enjoy.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199590656
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 297
Book Description
Investigates philosophical issues to do with the self and self-knowledge. It focuses on two main problems: how to account for I-thoughts and the consequences that doing so would have for our notion of the self; and how to explain subjects' ability to know the kind of psychological states they enjoy.
Loving Bravely
Author: Alexandra H. Solomon
Publisher: New Harbinger Publications
ISBN: 1626255830
Category : Family & Relationships
Languages : en
Pages : 204
Book Description
As seen on The TODAY Show! “A godsend to anyone searching for, but struggling to find, true love in their lives.” —Kristin Neff, PhD, author of Self-Compassion "Empowering and compassionate, and its lessons are universal." —Publishers Weekly Real love starts with you. In order to attract a life partner and build a healthy intimate relationship, you must first become a good partner to yourself. This book offers twenty invaluable lessons that will help you explore and commit to your own emotional and psychological well-being so you can be ready, resilient, and confident in love. Many of us enter into romantic relationships full of expectation and hope, only to be sorely disappointed by the realization that the partner we’ve selected is a flawed human being with their own neuroses, history, and desires. Most relationships end because one or both people haven’t done the internal work necessary to develop self-awareness and take responsibility for their own experiences. We’ve all heard “You can’t love anyone unless you love yourself,” but amid life’s distractions and the myth of perfect, romantic love, how exactly do you do that? In Loving Bravely, psychologist, professor and relationship expert Alexandra H. Solomon introduces the idea of relational self-awareness, encouraging you to explore your personal history to gain an understanding of your own relational patterns, as well as your strengths and weaknesses in relationships. By doing so, you’ll learn what relationships actually require, beyond the fairytale notions of romance. And by maintaining a steady but gentle focus on yourself, you’ll build the best possible foundation for making a loving connection. By understanding your past relationship experiences, cultivating a strong sense of self-awareness, and determining what it is you really want in a romantic partner—you’ll be ready to find the healthy, lasting love your heart desires.
Publisher: New Harbinger Publications
ISBN: 1626255830
Category : Family & Relationships
Languages : en
Pages : 204
Book Description
As seen on The TODAY Show! “A godsend to anyone searching for, but struggling to find, true love in their lives.” —Kristin Neff, PhD, author of Self-Compassion "Empowering and compassionate, and its lessons are universal." —Publishers Weekly Real love starts with you. In order to attract a life partner and build a healthy intimate relationship, you must first become a good partner to yourself. This book offers twenty invaluable lessons that will help you explore and commit to your own emotional and psychological well-being so you can be ready, resilient, and confident in love. Many of us enter into romantic relationships full of expectation and hope, only to be sorely disappointed by the realization that the partner we’ve selected is a flawed human being with their own neuroses, history, and desires. Most relationships end because one or both people haven’t done the internal work necessary to develop self-awareness and take responsibility for their own experiences. We’ve all heard “You can’t love anyone unless you love yourself,” but amid life’s distractions and the myth of perfect, romantic love, how exactly do you do that? In Loving Bravely, psychologist, professor and relationship expert Alexandra H. Solomon introduces the idea of relational self-awareness, encouraging you to explore your personal history to gain an understanding of your own relational patterns, as well as your strengths and weaknesses in relationships. By doing so, you’ll learn what relationships actually require, beyond the fairytale notions of romance. And by maintaining a steady but gentle focus on yourself, you’ll build the best possible foundation for making a loving connection. By understanding your past relationship experiences, cultivating a strong sense of self-awareness, and determining what it is you really want in a romantic partner—you’ll be ready to find the healthy, lasting love your heart desires.