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Author: Berislav Marušić
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0198714041
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 252
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Book Description
The author explores how we should take evidence into account when thinking about future actions, such as resolving to do something we know will be difficult. Should we believe we will follow through, or not? He argues that if it is important to us, we can rationally believe we will do it, even if our belief contradicts the evidence.
Author: Berislav Marušić
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0198714041
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 252
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Book Description
The author explores how we should take evidence into account when thinking about future actions, such as resolving to do something we know will be difficult. Should we believe we will follow through, or not? He argues that if it is important to us, we can rationally believe we will do it, even if our belief contradicts the evidence.
Author: Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136682686
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 159
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Book Description
The question of whether it is ever permissible to believe on insufficient evidence has once again become a live question. Greater attention is now being paid to practical dimensions of belief, namely issues related to epistemic virtue, doxastic responsibility, and voluntarism. In this book, McCormick argues that the standards used to evaluate beliefs are not isolated from other evaluative domains. The ultimate criteria for assessing beliefs are the same as those for assessing action because beliefs and actions are both products of agency. Two important implications of this thesis, both of which deviate from the dominant view in contemporary philosophy, are 1) it can be permissible (and possible) to believe for non-evidential reasons, and 2) we have a robust control over many of our beliefs, a control sufficient to ground attributions of responsibility for belief.
Author: Berislav Marusic
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191023426
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 256
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Book Description
Evidence and Agency is concerned with the question of how, as agents, we should take evidence into account when thinking about our future actions. Suppose you are promising or resolving to do something that you have evidence is difficult for you to do. For example, suppose you are promising to be faithful for the rest of your life, or you are resolving to quit smoking. Should you believe that you will follow through, or should you believe that there is a good chance that you won't? If you believe the former, you seem to be irrational since you believe against the evidence. Yet if you believe the latter, you seem to be insincere since you can't sincerely say that you will follow through. Hence, it seems, your promise or resolution must be improper. Nonetheless, we make such promises and resolutions all the time. Indeed, as the examples illustrate, such promises and resolutions are very important to us. The challenge is to explain this apparent inconsistency in our practice of promising and resolving. To meet this challenge, Berislav Marusic considers a number of possible responses, including an appeal to 'trying', an appeal to non-cognitivism about practical reason, an appeal to 'practical knowledge', and an appeal to evidential constraints on practical reasoning. He rejects all these and defends a solution inspired by the Kantian tradition and by Sartre in particular: as agents, we have a distinct view of what we will do. If something is up to us, we can decide what to do, rather than predict what we will do. But the reasons in light of which a decision is rational are not the same as the reasons in light of which a prediction is rational. That is why, provided it is important to us to do something we can rationally believe that we will do it, even if our belief goes against the evidence.
Author: Berislav Marusic
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 9780198801368
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 256
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Book Description
Evidence and Agency is concerned with the question of how, as agents, we should take evidence into account when thinking about our future actions. Suppose you are promising or resolving to do something that you have evidence is difficult for you to do. For example, suppose you are promising to be faithful for the rest of your life, or you are resolving to quit smoking. Should you believe that you will follow through, or should you believe that there is a good chance that you won't? If you believe the former, you seem to be irrational since you believe against the evidence. Yet if you believe the latter, you seem to be insincere since you can't sincerely say that you will follow through. Hence, it seems, your promise or resolution must be improper. Nonetheless, we make such promises and resolutions all the time. Indeed, as the examples illustrate, such promises and resolutions are very important to us. The challenge is to explain this apparent inconsistency in our practice of promising and resolving. To meet this challenge, Berislav Marusic; considers a number of possible responses, including an appeal to 'trying', an appeal to non-cognitivism about practical reason, an appeal to 'practical knowledge', and an appeal to evidential constraints on practical reasoning. He rejects all these and defends a solution inspired by the Kantian tradition and by Sartre in particular: as agents, we have a distinct view of what we will do. If something is up to us, we can decide what to do, rather than predict what we will do. But the reasons in light of which a decision is rational are not the same as the reasons in light of which a prediction is rational. That is why, provided it is important to us to do something we can rationally believe that we will do it, even if our belief goes against the evidence.
Author: Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136682759
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 181
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Book Description
The question of whether it is ever permissible to believe on insufficient evidence has once again become a live question. Greater attention is now being paid to practical dimensions of belief, namely issues related to epistemic virtue, doxastic responsibility, and voluntarism. In this book, McCormick argues that the standards used to evaluate beliefs are not isolated from other evaluative domains. The ultimate criteria for assessing beliefs are the same as those for assessing action because beliefs and actions are both products of agency. Two important implications of this thesis, both of which deviate from the dominant view in contemporary philosophy, are 1) it can be permissible (and possible) to believe for non-evidential reasons, and 2) we have a robust control over many of our beliefs, a control sufficient to ground attributions of responsibility for belief.
Author: Donald J. Kiser
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Agency (Law)
Languages : en
Pages : 136
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Book Description
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 1120
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Book Description
Author: Charles Tilford McCormick
Publisher: West Publishing Company
ISBN:
Category : Evidence (Law)
Languages : en
Pages : 938
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Book Description
Author: Neil Levy
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019289532X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 211
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Book Description
"Why do people come to reject climate science or the safety and efficacy of vaccines, in defiance of the scientific consensus? A popular view explains bad beliefs like these as resulting from a range of biases that together ensure that human beings fall short of being genuinely rational animals. This book presents an alternative account. It argues that bad beliefs arise from genuinely rational processes. We've missed the rationality of bad beliefs because we've failed to recognize the ubiquity of the higher-order evidence that shapes beliefs, and the rationality of being guided by this evidence. The book argues that attention to higher-order evidence should lead us to rethink both how minds are best changed and the ethics of changing them: we should come to see that nudging - at least usually - changes belief (and behavior) by presenting rational agents with genuine evidence, and is therefore fully respectful of intellectual agency. We needn't rethink Enlightenment ideals of intellectual autonomy and rationality, but we should reshape them to take account of our deeply social epistemic agency"--
Author: Ian V. Rowe
Publisher: Templeton Foundation Press
ISBN: 1599475847
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 305
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Book Description
Every child in America deserves to know that a path to a successful life exists and that they have the power to follow it. But many never set foot on that path because they grow up hearing the message that systemic forces control their destinies, or that they are at fault for everything that has gone wrong in their lives. These children often come from difficult circumstances. Many are raised by young, single parents, live in disadvantaged neighborhoods, attend substandard schools, and lack the moral safeguards of religious and civic institutions. As a result, they can be dispirited into cycles of learned helplessness rather than inspired to pursue their own possibilities. Yet this phenomenon is not universal. Some children thrive where others do not. Why? Are there personal behaviors and institutional supports that have proven to make a difference in helping young people chart a course for their futures? Agency answers with a loud and clear “yes!” This book describes four pillars that can uplift every young person as they make the passage into adulthood: Family, Religion, Education, and Entrepreneurship. Together, these pillars embody the true meaning of freedom, wherein people are motivated to embrace the ennobling responsibilities of building healthy social structures and shaping the outcomes of their own lives. For that reason, Ian Rowe calls the four pillars the FREE framework. With this framework in place, children are empowered to develop agency, which Rowe defines as the force of one’s free will, guided by moral discernment. Developing agency is the alternative to the debilitating ‘blame-the-system’ and ‘blame-the-victim’ narratives. It transcends our political differences and beckons all who dare to envision lives unshackled by present realities. In addition to making the case for agency, Rowe shares his personal story of success coming from an immigrant family. He defends America as an ever-improving country worthy of our esteem. He corrects misguided calls for “anti-racism” and “equity,” and champions a game plan for creating new agents of agency, dedicated to promoting the aspirational spirit of America’s children, and showing them the path that will set them FREE.
