Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation

Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation PDF Author: Craig Peters
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ISBN:
Category : Airlines
Languages : en
Pages : 56

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Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation

Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation PDF Author: Craig Peters
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Airlines
Languages : en
Pages : 56

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Book Description


Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation

Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation PDF Author: Craig Peters
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Airlines
Languages : en
Pages : 39

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Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation

Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation PDF Author: Yaa Akosa Antwi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Antitrust enforcement in the hospital industry has been an area of sharp contention in recent years. Prior to the decision in the Evanston Northwestern case in 2005, the Federal Trade Commission and the United States Department of Justice had lost the last seven hospital cases. One of the reasons for the failure of the government to prevail in these court cases has been their inability to convince the courts to accept their definition of a geographic market. In reviewing mergers, the antitrust enforcement authorities seek to determine what effects the proposed merger would have on prices, quality, and other related aspects of the prospectively merging firms' services. Most commonly, the primary focus is on the effect of the prospective merger on prices. There are a number of different approaches to the evaluation of hospital mergers, and these approaches often lead to differing predictions about the effects of the merger on hospital prices. In this paper we propose a method of hospital merger analysis which relies, in part, on calculating an index of hospital competition called the Logit Competition Index (LOCI). LOCI is calculated using hospital discharge data. Using these data, discharges are organized into types, the market shares of the hospitals in the analysis are calculated within these types, and then these market shares are aggregated together into a numerical index. Changes in this index due to a merger are theorized to predict the price changes caused by the merger. Consequently, our methodology does not require the definition of a geographical market. We apply our method to simulate merger effects of consummated and hypothetical mergers using data of hospitals in the state of California from 1992 to 2004. We find that the wave mergers that happened in California in the 1990's led to substantial increase in price not only for merging firms but also non-merging firms. Finally, because of the long span of our data, we are able to compare our predicted price increase with actual price increase of consummated mergers. Our methodology predicts well actual changes in price due to merger. These results have important implications for merger analysis in hospital markets and also for antitrust enforcement. It presents antitrust authorities with a methodology does not rely on geographic market definition but predicts fairly well price increases due to mergers.

Do Merger Simulation and Critical Loss Analysis Differ Under the SLC and Dominance Test?

Do Merger Simulation and Critical Loss Analysis Differ Under the SLC and Dominance Test? PDF Author: Ioannis Kokkoris
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 13

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In this article we will evaluate whether the application and the efficiency of two types of empirical analysis in the assessment of mergers in jurisdictions applying the dominance and the SLC tests are different due to the application of the different legal substantive test. Thus, we will consider whether the different legal substantive test leads to different application of the empirical analysis or to different assessment of mergers leading to non-coordinated effects by courts, based on the same empirical analysis.We will address two methods of empirical analysis that concern two essential stages in the assessment of a merger. One such type of empirical analysis refers to the assessment of the unilateral effects of the merger on competition and one that is used in the definition of the relevant market. These two methods are the merger simulation and the critical loss analysis respectively. We will investigate their theoretical background and see how these two methods are applied in practice in cases brought before courts in jurisdictions applying the dominance test and the SLC test. The jurisdictions we will focus in this article are the USA and the European Union. The next part of this article briefly deals with the SLC and the dominance test. The second part of this article deals with the mechanics and the case law behind the two above-mentioned empirical methods. Finally, in the last part of this article we will evaluate whether the methodology behind merger simulation, used in the evaluation of the competitive effects, and critical loss analysis, used in market definition, varies depending on the substantive test that competition authorities apply to assess mergers.

Simulation as an Alternative to Structural Merger Policy in Differentiated Products Industries

Simulation as an Alternative to Structural Merger Policy in Differentiated Products Industries PDF Author: Gregory Werden
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ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 42

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Upward Price Pressure, Merger Simulation, and Merger Simulation Light

Upward Price Pressure, Merger Simulation, and Merger Simulation Light PDF Author: Michael D. Noel
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 8

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The Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have traditionally used market shares as an early preliminary screen in evaluating the potential for anticompetitive effects of a proposed merger. Recently, Farrell and Shapiro proposed a new merger screen known as Upward Price Pressure. This article discusses the advantages and disadvantages of this screen, contrasts it to more complicated full merger simulations, and ultimately suggests a merger simulation light approach that has elements of both and that may be more useful in the very early stages of analysis.

Reliability Examination in Horizontal-Merger Price Simulations

Reliability Examination in Horizontal-Merger Price Simulations PDF Author: Hisayuki Yoshimoto
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40

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Horizontal-merger price simulations, which rely upon pre-merger data to predict post-merger prices, have been proposed and used in antitrust policymaking. However, a dearth of closely observed large mergers in differentiated-product industries makes empirical investigations of simulation performance extremely difficult, and raises many questions regarding the accuracy of simulation performance. Although a handful of previous studies exist, they focus on short-term simulation performances and ignore long-run effects of mergers. This research investigates the long-run simulation performance and long-run pricing effects of merger in the Korean automobile industry for the period 1991-2010. This period saw the merger of Hyundai and Kia Motors in 1998, a merger caused by the Asian economic crisis and which resulted in the conglomeration of 70 percent of the Korean automobile market. By taking Nevo's (2000, 2001) method as a base and measuring its performance against this real-world merger, I find that post-merger prices can be predicted reasonably well in the short term, but that large discrepancies appear in the long-run simulation. To account for this discrepancy, I confirm four further factors that appear essential to move toward a more accurate post-merger price simulation model: change in marginal costs, change in product lines, and change in consumer incomes and preferences. I counterfactually investigate each factor's contribution to price change, confirming their significance. In my investigation I estimate consumer preferences and substitution patterns leading up to the merger, then I calculate marginal costs, and simulate post-merger prices. In addition, I estimate automobile assembly plant-level production functions to evaluate merger synergy effects. By incorporating changes in the four factors I mention, I can account for 61 percent of the long-run price discrepancies.

Predicting the Competitive Effects of Mergers by Listening to Customers

Predicting the Competitive Effects of Mergers by Listening to Customers PDF Author: Kenneth Heyer
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ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 56

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Merger Simulation

Merger Simulation PDF Author: Roy Jacob Epstein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 43

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Prospects and Limits of Merger Simulations as a Computational Antitrust Tool

Prospects and Limits of Merger Simulations as a Computational Antitrust Tool PDF Author: Oliver Budzinski
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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