Ethical Subjectivism and Expressivism

Ethical Subjectivism and Expressivism PDF Author: Neil Sinclair
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108586651
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 138

Get Book Here

Book Description
Ethical subjectivists hold that moral judgements are descriptions of our attitudes. Expressivists hold that they are expressions of our attitudes. These views cook with the same ingredients – the natural world, and our reactions to it – and have similar attractions. This Element assesses each of them by considering whether they can accommodate three central features of moral practice: the practicality of moral judgements, the phenomenon of moral disagreement, and the mind-independence of some moral truths. In the process, several different versions of subjectivism are distinguished (simple, communal, idealising, and normative) and key expressivist notions such as 'moral attitudes' and 'expression' are examined. Different meanings of 'subjective' and 'relative' are examined and it is considered whether subjectivism and expressivism make ethics 'subjective' or 'relative' in each of these senses.

Ethical Subjectivism and Expressivism

Ethical Subjectivism and Expressivism PDF Author: Neil Sinclair
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108586651
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 138

Get Book Here

Book Description
Ethical subjectivists hold that moral judgements are descriptions of our attitudes. Expressivists hold that they are expressions of our attitudes. These views cook with the same ingredients – the natural world, and our reactions to it – and have similar attractions. This Element assesses each of them by considering whether they can accommodate three central features of moral practice: the practicality of moral judgements, the phenomenon of moral disagreement, and the mind-independence of some moral truths. In the process, several different versions of subjectivism are distinguished (simple, communal, idealising, and normative) and key expressivist notions such as 'moral attitudes' and 'expression' are examined. Different meanings of 'subjective' and 'relative' are examined and it is considered whether subjectivism and expressivism make ethics 'subjective' or 'relative' in each of these senses.

A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays

A. J. Ayer: Memorial Essays PDF Author: Alfred Jules Ayer
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521422469
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 247

Get Book Here

Book Description
A. J. Ayer, who died in 1989, was acknowledged as one of Britain's most distinguished philosophers. In this memorial collection of essays leading Western philosophers reflect on Ayer's place in the history of philosophy and explore aspects of his thought and teaching. The volume also includes a posthumous essay by Ayer himself: "A Defence of Empiricism." These essays are undoubtedly a fitting tribute to a major figure, but the collection is not simply retrospective; rather it looks forward to present and future developments in philosophical thought that Ayer's work has stimulated.

Ethics and Experience

Ethics and Experience PDF Author: Tim Chappell
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 131749265X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 240

Get Book Here

Book Description
"Ethics and Experience" presents a wide-ranging and thought-provoking introduction to the question famously posed by Socrates: How is life to be lived? 'An excellent primer for any student taking a course on moral philosophy, the book introduces ethics as a single and broadly unified field of inquiry in which we apply reason to try and solve Socrates' question. "Ethics and Experience "examines the major forms of ethical subjectivism and objectivism - including expressivism, error theory', naturalism, and intuitionism. The book lays out the detail of the most significant contemporary moral theories - including utilitarianism, virtue ethics, Kantianism, and contractarianism - and reconsiders these theories in the light of two questions that should perhaps be asked more often: Is moral theory, with its tendency to regiment ethical thought and experience, really the best way for us to apply reason to deciding how to live? And, might it not be more truly reasonable to look for less system and more insight?

Subjective versus Objective Moral Wrongness

Subjective versus Objective Moral Wrongness PDF Author: Peter A. Graham
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9781108706612
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages :

Get Book Here

Book Description


Ethical Realism

Ethical Realism PDF Author: William J. FitzPatrick
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108586449
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 144

Get Book Here

Book Description
This Element examines the many facets of ethical realism and the issues at stake in metaethical debates about it—both between realism and non-realist alternatives, and between different versions of realism itself. Starting with a minimal core characterization of ethical realism focused on claims about meaning and truth, we go on to develop a narrower and more theoretically useful conception by adding further claims about objectivity and ontological commitment. Yet even this common understanding of ethical realism captures a surprisingly heterogeneous range of views. In fact, a strong case can be made for adding several more conditions in order to arrive at a proper paradigm of realism about ethics when understood in a non-deflationary way. We then develop this more robust realism, bringing out its distinctive take on ethical objectivity and normative authority, its unique ontological commitments, and both the support for it and some challenges it faces.

Taking Morality Seriously

Taking Morality Seriously PDF Author: David Enoch
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 019161856X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 308

Get Book Here

Book Description
In Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism David Enoch develops, argues for, and defends a strongly realist and objectivist view of ethics and normativity more broadly. This view—according to which there are perfectly objective, universal, moral and other normative truths that are not in any way reducible to other, natural truths—is familiar, but this book is the first in-detail development of the positive motivations for the view into reasonably precise arguments. And when the book turns defensive—defending Robust Realism against traditional objections—it mobilizes the original positive arguments for the view to help with fending off the objections. The main underlying motivation for Robust Realism developed in the book is that no other metaethical view can vindicate our taking morality seriously. The positive arguments developed here—the argument from the deliberative indispensability of normative truths, and the argument from the moral implications of metaethical objectivity (or its absence)—are thus arguments for Robust Realism that are sensitive to the underlying, pre-theoretical motivations for the view.

Constructivism in Ethics

Constructivism in Ethics PDF Author: Carla Bagnoli
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107276551
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 271

Get Book Here

Book Description
Are there such things as moral truths? How do we know what we should do? And does it matter? Constructivism states that moral truths are neither invented nor discovered, but rather are constructed by rational agents in order to solve practical problems. While constructivism has become the focus of many philosophical debates in normative ethics, meta-ethics and action theory, its importance is still to be fully appreciated. These new essays written by leading scholars define and assess this new approach in ethics, addressing such questions as the nature of constructivism, how constructivism improves our understanding of moral obligations, how it accounts for the development of normative practices, whether moral truths change over time, and many other topics. The volume will be valuable for advanced students and scholars of ethics and all who are interested in questions about the foundation of morality.

Practical Expressivism

Practical Expressivism PDF Author: Neil Sinclair
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0198866100
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 314

Get Book Here

Book Description
What is morality? Neil Sinclair argues that it is a purely natural interpersonal co-ordination device, whereby human beings express their attitudes in order to influence others' attitudes and actions. Sinclair shows that even if moral practice is fundamentally expressive, it can still possess the features that make morality appear objective.

Moral Disagreement

Moral Disagreement PDF Author: Folke Tersman
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521853385
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 172

Get Book Here

Book Description
Folke Tersman explores the nature of moral thinking by examining moral disagreement.

Ethical Sentimentalism

Ethical Sentimentalism PDF Author: Remy Debes
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108618766
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 305

Get Book Here

Book Description
In recent years there has been a tremendous resurgence of interest in ethical sentimentalism, a moral theory first articulated during the Scottish Enlightenment. Ethical Sentimentalism promises a conception of morality that is grounded in a realistic account of human psychology, which, correspondingly, acknowledges the central place of emotion in our moral lives. However, this promise has encountered its share of philosophical difficulties. Chief among them is the question of how to square the limited scope of human motivation and psychological mechanism - so easily influenced by personal, social, and cultural circumstance - with the seeming universal scope and objective nature of moral judgment. The essays in this volume provide a comprehensive evaluation of the sentimentalist project with a particular eye to this difficulty. Each essay offers critical clarification, innovative answers to central challenges, and new directions for ethical sentimentalism in general.