Essays on the Economics of Contracting and Institutional Choice PDF Download
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Author: Steven Curtis Hackett
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Institutional economics
Languages : en
Pages : 418
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Book Description
Author: Steven Curtis Hackett
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Institutional economics
Languages : en
Pages : 418
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Book Description
Author: Viktor J Vanberg
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1134867964
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 322
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Book Description
Using an analysis which draws on economics, law, moral philosophy, sociology and political science, Vanberg demonstrates how the rules and institutions which are the basis of cooperation in society can be systematically explained.
Author: Rudolf Richter
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319141546
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 217
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Book Description
This collection of essays comprises some of Rudolf Richter’s important contributions to research on New Institutional Economics (NIE). It deals with the central idea, principles, and methodology of New Institutional Economics and explores its relation to sociology and law. Other chapters examine applications of NIE to various microeconomic and macroeconomic issues in the face of uncertainty, from entrepreneurship to the euro crisis.
Author: Shinsuke Kambe
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 132
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Book Description
Author: Hanoch Dagan
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107135982
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 195
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Book Description
The Choice Theory of Contracts is an engaging landmark that shows, for the first time, how freedom matters to contract.
Author: Ekkehart Schlicht
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642469884
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 306
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Book Description
Modern institutional economics witnesses a merging of formal and informal strands of theorizing. This development has offered new and vigorous perspectives which avoid both arbitrariness and theoretical sterility. The essays on contract theory gathered here exemplify this development. They propone new results on central issues in contractual theorizing. The theory of the firm in its variegated aspects forms, naturally, the core of the present set of contributions. Issues of ownership, integration, delegation, and finan ce are analyzed. Some contributions use the theoretical approach of contract theory to explore other issues, like medical care, public good problems, the economics of crime, environmental economics, and international trade. The contributors are leading young economists. They have participated in one or se veral classes of the 'International Summer School on the New Institutional Economics' which has been organized by Rudolf Richter in the years 1988 through 1994 and is now continued by Urs Schweizer. The theoretical style of these contributions has been influ enced by this experience. This collection of essays is intended to express the thanks of the contributors to Rudolf Richter. His initiatives for scholarly instruction and for inter national exchange of ideas have helped to create and to diffuse the understanding of and the engagement for the new institutional economics in Europe.
Author: Christian Schultz
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540281614
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 380
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Book Description
Competition and efficiency is at the core of economic theory. This volume collects papers of leading scholars, which extend the conventional general equilibrium model in important ways: Efficiency and price regulation are studied when markets are incomplete and existence of equilibria in such settings is proven under very general preference assumptions. The model is extended to include geographical location choice, a commodity space incorporating manufacturing imprecision and preferences for club-membership, schools and firms. Inefficiencies arising from household externalities or group membership are evaluated. Core equivalence is shown for bargaining economies. The theory of risk aversion is extended and the relation between risk taking and wealth is experimentally investigated. Other topics include determinacy in OLG with cash-in-advance constraints, income distribution and democracy in OLG, learning in OLG and in games, optimal pricing of derivative securities, the impact of heterogeneity at the individual level for aggregate consumption, and adaptive contracting in view of uncertainty.
Author: Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3658241330
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 211
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Book Description
Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.
Author: Rongzhu Ke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 203
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Book Description
(Cont.) The main advantage of the current approach is the relaxation of the global concavity of agent utility. We show that under a set of mild conditions, the fixed point approach is applicable and the solution to the principal agent problem exists. In particular, if the log likelihood ratio is monotonically increasing in output but decreasing in effort, the best response correspondence against a MK contract has and only has one unique fixed point. Our approach unifies Jewitt's (1988) and Rogerson's (1985) proofs of validity of FOA, and provides a general method to judge validity of FOA. Based on the fixed-point approach, with some additional specifications, we restore Jewitt's (1988) results to situations where the distribution is not convex and the log likelihood ratio is not bounded from below (e.g., normal distribution), or there exists a limited liability constraint. Furthermore, we generalize our results to a situation where the agent's utility is non separable. In this fairly general environment, we prove a necessary and sufficient condition for the FOA to be valid, which provides an important method to identify the validity of FOA and compute the solution of the original problem. Finally, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a general non-linear bi-level optimization problem to be solvable based on FOA, without a convex constrained set. Chapter 3 constructs a concrete mechanism/auction to explore the consequence of imposing the ex post participation constraint.
Author: Viktor Vanberg
Publisher: Psychology Press
ISBN: 9780415154710
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 232
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Book Description
This book examines the institutional dimension of markets and the rules and institutions that condition the operation of market economies.
