Essays on Multi-product Supply Chains PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Essays on Multi-product Supply Chains PDF full book. Access full book title Essays on Multi-product Supply Chains by Shu Zhou. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Shu Zhou
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 202
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Shu Zhou
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 202
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Yue Cheng
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
The essays in the dissertation examine product returns in Closed-loop Supply Chains from multiple perspectives by using different methodologies. The studies investigate the relationships among the three major supply chain entities, such as manufacturers, retailers and consumers.The first chapter provides an introduction of the research related to products returns. The second chapter of the dissertation studies the contracting issues between Manufacturers and Retailers by using laboratory experiments. Chapter three studies consumers perceptions of different types of return policies provided by retailers. Quasi-experiments were used to collect data and do the following analysis. Chapter four builds up an analytical model to segment the market by using different return policies. The last chapter concludes the future studies.
Author: James Abbey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 110
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Stefan Hahler
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Micha Hirschinger
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3658119462
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 135
Get Book Here
Book Description
Micha Hirschinger emphasizes the importance of foresight on logistics and institutions in particular for effective decision making as distinct research in this context is limited. He applies a systematic and transferable multi-method approach based on Delphi studies and fuzzy c-means cluster analysis to develop profound scenarios for the future. He uses the relevance of information-processing requirements to investigate whether centralization of purchasing organizations increases functional efficiency. The author finally shows how a sharing-economy business model transfer could help to overcome the limited access to factor markets, especially trucks, at the base of the pyramid.
Author: James Edward Paine
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
The field of Operations Management, and closely related fields of Operations Research and Industrial Engineering, focus intensely on addressing real-world problems associated with the design and management of product and service delivery systems in a human context. System Dynamics is a framework to understand, design for, and manage change emerging from both structural and behavioral features, and is uniquely suited to address policy questions in socio-technical supply chain contexts. Using System Dynamics, Operations Management, and Supply Chain Research methods this work expands on existing toolsets and theory and provides policy insights in dynamic supply chain and service delivery systems. Chapter 1 presents a methodological contribution to the System Dynamics and Supply Chain Research communities by developing a novel framework for supply chain models by combining three classic methods: co-flow differential equation structures, spot price discovery, and multinomial logistic choice modeling. Chapter 2 applies this framework to build a structural theory explaining the simultaneous surge in food insecurity alongside surges in food surplus and purposeful disposal at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. Utilizing this structural theory, this chapter further illustrates policies that could help mitigate these stresses. Chapter 3 continues the concepts of managing a behaviorally driven multi-echelon supply subject to shocks. Utilizing a simulated environment, different policy features implied by parallel streams of Operations Management and Supply Chain literature are directly tested. These include policies that range from myopic, limited information decision rules to more modern, but data-intensive machine learning methods.
Author: Noam Shamir
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
This dissertation is comprised of three essays that explore various research questions related to incentives for information sharing in decentralized supply chains. The first essay, in chapter 2, introduces a new motivation for information sharing in decentralized supply chains - as a mechanism to achieve truthful information sharing and reduce signaling costs. In this essay I study a two echelon supply chain with one manufacturer selling a homogenous product to n price setting competing retailers, and each retailer is endowed with private information about the potential market demand. I first examine the incentives of the retailers to share information when the shared information is verifiable, and I demonstrate that the retailers have an incentive to share information with each other but conceal this information from the manufacturer. However, when the retailers share non-verifiable information, I show that by means of pure communication (cheap talk) no information can be exchanged. In order to overcome the problem of sharing non-verifiable information and induce the retailers to share information truthfully as their strategic choice, two signaling games are analyzed. In the first one, information is shared only between the retailers, and in the second, information is shared in a credible manner with the manufacturer as well. The emphasis of this paper is to understand the effect of exposing the manufacturer to the shared information on the ability of the retailers to reach an information sharing equilibrium. I show that under some conditions, when the retailers share non-verifiable information, they prefer to share this information with the manufacturer. As opposed to conventional wisdom, I also demonstrate that the supply chain can be better-off under settings of asymmetric information when the retailers choose to share their private information with the manufacturer. The second essay, in chapter 3, explores the value of observing demand information in a repeated procurement model between a manufacturer and his supplier. In many supply chain relationships that last over multiple periods, information about hidden properties of the supply chain partners can be revealed during the course of the relationship. This essay examines how the availability of such information affects the contracting scheme between a supplier and his manufacturer in a relationship that lasts over two selling seasons. At the beginning of the first selling season the manufacturer observes private information about the demand distribution, whereas the supplier who is less familiar with the market is endowed only with the prior distribution of the market condition. When the supplier cannot observe the demand realization during the first selling period, under many circumstances he offers a contract that induces the manufacturer to reveal the market condition in the first selling season. In contrast with the case in which no information is available to the supplier, the opportunity to observe demand realization during the first selling season can result in the supplier offering the manufacturer a contract that does not induce the manufacturer to reveal his private information during the first selling season and then offer a second period contract which is based on the first selling season demand realization. I show that when the supplier chooses to offer such a contract the manufacturer becomes worse off, and it has an ambiguous effect on the performance of the supply chain. Although sharing demand information with the supplier makes the manufacturer worse off, the manufacturer is always willing to share such information with his supplier. The third essay, in chapter 4, examines the incentives of retailers, looking to establish a cartel, to share information with their mutual manufacturer. Many researchers have emphasized the importance of communication to establish a cartel. Sharing information among the cartel members allows the cartel to coordinate on the optimal pricing scheme and monitor for possible deviations from the cartel strategy. Anti-trust authorities view information sharing practices as a possible signal for collusion, and economists asked whether information sharing between competing firms should be banned. In this essay I demonstrate how, even without direct information sharing between the cartel members, the retailers are able to exchange information about the market condition by sharing information with their mutual manufacturer. When the retailers share information with their manufacturer, the manufacturer uses the shared information to set the wholesale price to match the market condition. The retailers use the posted wholesale price to solve their coordination problem and set the monopoly price. When the manufacturer faces the decision whether to receive information from the retailers he weighs the trade-off between receiving information about the market, which helps him to set the wholesale price, and assisting the retailers to establish a cartel, which limits his sold quantity. When the retailers need to make this decision they weigh the fact that the posted wholesale price can solve their coordination problems against providing the manufacturer with better information. I demonstrate that there are cases in which both the retailers and the manufacturer are better-off sharing information, and that vertical information sharing can facilitate horizontal tacit collusion.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 594
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Qin Geng
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780549095477
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 118
Get Book Here
Book Description
This dissertation consists of three essays, each of which models a specific business scenario characterized by a two-party supply chain structure. As a set, they nestle neatly into the literature defined broadly as the study of supply chain management within a newsvendor framework. We first study a price-setting newsvendor's product design problem within the context of a centralized supply chain. We find that as a general rule, the newsvendor should lower quality facing demand uncertainty. In contrast, the change of price decision depends on how randomness affects demand. We then extend the analysis into a decentralized manufacturer-retailer supply chain characterized by a two stage decision model: the manufacturer designs a product by choosing its quality level and offers it for sale to the retailer by announcing its wholesale price, followed by the retailer choosing a purchase quantity and a selling price in anticipation of random demand. We explore the manufacturer's optimal product design decision and evaluate it from the retailer's perspective. We find that the manufacturer over provides quality, and as a result, the wholesale price and retail price are all higher than the retailer would prefer. The third essay studies the problem of inventory allocation in a multi-channel structure in which a manufacturer is both the supplier to, and competitor of, an independent retailer. We identify the existence of an equilibrium in which the manufacturer does not necessarily exhaust its capacity but still denies retailer's order request. Our results also indicate that a mild capacity may make both parties better off as compared with the case of infinite capacity. A reverse revenue sharing contract is developed to coordinate the decentralized supply chain.
Author: Mehmet Gumus
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
