Essays on Market Design and Strategic Behaviour in Short-term Power Markets PDF Download
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Author: Johannes Viehmann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Johannes Viehmann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Stefan Lorenczik
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Hung-po Chao
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461555477
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 213
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The authors are prominent economists, operation researchers, and engineers who have been instrumental in the development of the conceptual framework for electric power restructuring both in the United States and in other countries. Rather than espousing a particular market design for the industry's future, each author focuses on an important issue or set of issues and tries to frame the questions for designing electricity markets using an international perspective. The book focuses on the economic and technical questions important in understanding the industry's long-term development rather than providing immediate answers for the current political debates on industry competition.
Author: Eric Samuel Mayefsky
Publisher: Stanford University
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 106
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I explore fundamental behavioral aspects of several market design environments in a variety of projects using both theoretical models and laboratory experiments. I show that human tendencies can drastically shift potential outcomes away from those which would result if individuals were fully 'rational' and unbiased in decision problems similar to those found frequently in the field. I explore two common classes of centralized matching mechanisms--Deferred Acceptance and Priority--which have wildly different success rates in practice despite both being open to manipulation by agents who have incomplete information about the other participants in the match. For this reason, theory predicts both mechanisms in equilibrium will yield match outcomes which are unstable, meaning some agents will desire to renegotiate with one another after receiving their match assignments, and thus reduce participants' confidence in using the match. I provide laboratory evidence that out-of-equilibrium truth telling by agents is substantially more frequent in the Deferred Acceptance environment and thus Deferred Acceptance matches will generally be more stable in practice than matches using a Priority mechanism. This may explain why Deferred Acceptance mechanisms appear to be more viable in the field. I also explore two different models of decentralized two-sided matching environments where establishing scarce signaling methods can improve market outcomes. In a laboratory experiment, I show that allowing potential receiving job offers to send a single signal to their favorite potential employer before job offers are made increases overall match rates in the market, but is potentially damaging to the firms making offers when compared to the market without such a signal. Then, in a theoretical model where pre-offer communication takes the form of an interview process where workers have natural limits on the number of interviews in which they can participate, I show that in many cases firms can benefit themselves and the market as a whole by voluntarily restricting the number of interviews they offer to participate in. While not traditionally thought of as market design problems, voting mechanisms are fundamentally goods allocation problems as well and have many of the same issues as traditional markets do. I explore the effects of voter bias on outcomes in an otherwise standard voting model and find that even slight external pressure on individuals in a committee tasked with coming to a collective decision can destroy the ability of that committee to arrive at the correct result, even when individuals have good information about the best decision to make. Furthermore, the quality of the decision made by such a committee can actually degrade as the committee size increases, in contrast with the canonical Condorcet Jury Theorem which predicts that a committee's ability to choose the right outcome increases quickly as more members are added.
Author: Joseph E. Duggan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 119
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The third chapter of the dissertation studies a one sided many-to-many matching model called the Stable Fixtures problem. First studied by Irving and Scott (2007), the Stable Fixtures Problem is a generalization of the Stable Roommates problem. A pair-wise stable matching is not guaranteed to exist for a given instance of the fixtures problem. In this chapter, a psychologically motivated class of preferences that guarantees the existence of a pair-wise stable matching are explored and potential applications of this model for electricity markets are discussed.
Author: Nir Vulkan
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191668435
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 706
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Book Description
Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets. Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessons learned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominent economists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run There is now a large number of applications and a growing theoretical literature. The Handbook of Market Design brings together the latest research from leading experts to provide a comprehensive description of applied market design over the last two decades In particular, it surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as medical residents and hospitals, law clerks and judges, or patients and kidney donors It also examines a number of applications related to electronic markets, e-commerce, and the effect of the Internet on competition between exchanges.
![Alternative Models to Analyze Market Power and Financial Transmission Rights in Electricity Markets [electronic Resource] PDF](https://books.google.com/books/content/images/frontcover/Z8nLjwEACAAJ?fife=w80-h100)
Author: Bautista Alderete, Guillermo
Publisher: University of Waterloo
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 166
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One of the main concerns with the introduction of competition in the power sector is the strategic behaviour of market participants. Computable models of strategic behaviour are becoming increasingly important to understand the complexities of competition. Such models can help analyze market designs and regulatory policies. In this thesis, further developments on the modelling and analysis of strategic behaviour in electricity markets are presented. This thesis work has been conducted along three research lines. In the first research line, an oligopolistic model of a joint energy and spinning reserve market is formulated to analyze imperfect competition. Strategic behaviour is introduced by means of conjectured functions. With this integrated formulation for imperfect competition, the opportunity cost between generation and spinning reserve has been analytically derived. Besides, inter-temporal and energy constraints, and financial transmission rights are taken into account. Under such considerations, competition in electricity markets is modelled with more realism. The oligopolistic model is formulated as an equilibrium problem in terms of complementarity conditions. In the second research line, a methodology to screen and mitigate the potential exacerbation of market power due to the ownership of financial transmission rights is presented. Hedging position ratios are computed to quantify the hedging level of financial transmission rights. They are based on the actual impact that each participant has in the energy market, and on the potential impact that it would have with the ownership of financial transmission rights. Thus, hedging position ratios are used to identify the potential gambling positions from the transmission rights bidders, and, therefore, used to prioritize critical positions in the auction for transmission rights. In the last research line, alternative equilibrium models of markets for financial transmission rights are formulated. The proposed equilibrium framework is more natural and flexible for modelling markets than the classic cost-minimization markets. Different markets for financial transmission rights are modelled, namely: i) forwards, ii) options, and iii) joint forwards and options. Moreover, one-period, multi-period and multi-round markets for forwards are derived. These equilibrium models are proposed to analyze the bidding strategies of market participants. The potential impact of bidders on congestion prices is modelled by means of conjectured transmission price functions.
Author: Nodir Adilov
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 316
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Author: Joachim Bertsch
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Ruoyang Li
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 105
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The evolution of policy objectives and emergence of new technologies continually challenge the existing wholesale electricity market design. In the framework of standard market design based on locational marginal pricing (LMP) and two-settlement electricity markets, this dissertation investigates two topics for existing and future power systems -- Convergence Bidding (CB) and distribution locational marginal pricing (DLMP). The central theme that connects these two topics is market design -- determining how to create proper incentives to compensate market participants that ensures efficiency and reliability of the power grid. We first empirically test whether the California Independent System Operator's (CAISO) existing two-settlement electricity markets are efficient, and if not, to what extent CB improves market efficiency. We examine the theoretical and empirical tools intended for other financial markets to help us understand the efficacy of CB in the forward and spot electricity markets. In the light of the efficient market hypothesis, Jensen uses the zero-profit competitive equilibrium to describe the condition for market efficiency. This definition of market efficiency directly converts the test of market efficiency into the assessment of return behavior. Following this methodology, we empirically test for market efficiency by evaluating the performance of trading strategies based on market data in the CAISO electric power markets. Our backtest results show that profitable trading opportunities continue to exist in the post-CB period, but the profitability decreases substantially. The decrease in profitability in the post-CB period indicates the improvement of market efficiency, and demonstrates the benefit of CB. The profitability in the post-CB period, however, conveys empirical implications that can be interpreted differently, depending on the level of competition and the level of risk aversion of virtual traders. We further examine the use of DLMP to improve system efficiency in future power systems. DLMP is a modified form of LMP to alleviate congestion induced by electric vehicle (EV) loads on the distribution network. The distribution system operator (DSO) determines distribution locational marginal prices (DLMPs) by solving the social welfare optimization for both the conventional household demand and the EV demand with marginal costs exogenously set to LMPs. We show mathematically that the socially optimal charging schedule can be implemented through a decentralized mechanism where retailers and EV aggregators respond autonomously to the posted DLMPs by maximizing their individual net surplus in the perfectly competitive local DSO market. We further investigate the problem of designing pricing mechanism when LMPs are uncertain. A robust DLMP method is developed for EV charging management under price uncertainty. The efficacy of the proposed use of DLMP is demonstrated by means of case studies using the Bus 4 distribution system of the Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS) and the Danish driving data.
