Author:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design
Author:
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design
Author: Péter Ernő Eső
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 129
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 129
Book Description
Three Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design
Author: Luke Hu
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783844025132
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 89
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783844025132
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 89
Book Description
Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design
Author: Kwanghyun Kim
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Three Essays on Mechanism Design and Auctions
Author: Ilaria Cingottini
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 85
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 85
Book Description
Three Essays on Mechanism Design and Multi-object Auctions
Author: Veronika Grimm
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783832211387
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 101
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783832211387
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 101
Book Description
Essays on Auctions and Mechanism Design
Author: Alessandro Pavan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 209
Book Description
Four essays in the theory of auctions and mechanism design. Chapter one introduces a Markovian revelation principle for common agency games ; chapter two derives the optimal disclosure policy ; chapter three considers a monopolist who sells a durable good, which is subsequently traded in a secondary market ; chapter four considers auctions for divisible goods, like Treasury securities.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 209
Book Description
Four essays in the theory of auctions and mechanism design. Chapter one introduces a Markovian revelation principle for common agency games ; chapter two derives the optimal disclosure policy ; chapter three considers a monopolist who sells a durable good, which is subsequently traded in a secondary market ; chapter four considers auctions for divisible goods, like Treasury securities.
Essays on Auctions, Mechanism Design, and Repeated Games
Author: Krittanai Laohakunakorn
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Essays on Sequential Auctions and Dynamic Mechanism Design
Author: Maher Riyad Said
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 238
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 238
Book Description
Three Essays
Author: Rong Chen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 368
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 368
Book Description