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Author: Gerald Gaus
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 0804774641
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 391
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Book Description
This volume brings together distinguished philosophers with interdisciplinary expertise to show how the resources of philosophy can be employed in the tasks of evaluating economics and fostering policy debates. Contributors offer analyses of basic ideas in economics, such as the notion of efficiency, "economic man", incentives, self-interest, and utility maximization. They discuss key concepts in political theory such as desert, compensation, autonomy, equality, consent or fairness. The book then offers examples of how philosophical resources can be applied to specific, timely debates, such as discrimination, affirmative action, and ethical considerations in Social Security. These applications demonstrate how philosophy, politics, and economics can be fruitfully combined, while the more theoretical chapters clarify fundamental relationships across these related disciplines. Ultimately, the text guides students and scholars in expanding their perspectives as they approach the necessarily complex research questions of today and tomorrow.
Author: Gerald Gaus
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 0804774641
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 391
Get Book Here
Book Description
This volume brings together distinguished philosophers with interdisciplinary expertise to show how the resources of philosophy can be employed in the tasks of evaluating economics and fostering policy debates. Contributors offer analyses of basic ideas in economics, such as the notion of efficiency, "economic man", incentives, self-interest, and utility maximization. They discuss key concepts in political theory such as desert, compensation, autonomy, equality, consent or fairness. The book then offers examples of how philosophical resources can be applied to specific, timely debates, such as discrimination, affirmative action, and ethical considerations in Social Security. These applications demonstrate how philosophy, politics, and economics can be fruitfully combined, while the more theoretical chapters clarify fundamental relationships across these related disciplines. Ultimately, the text guides students and scholars in expanding their perspectives as they approach the necessarily complex research questions of today and tomorrow.
Author: Mandar Prafullachandra Oak
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 236
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Book Description
Author: John Stuart Mill
Publisher: Cosimo, Inc.
ISBN: 1596052406
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 477
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Book Description
Can national growth be sustained indefinitely? How much should government intervene in a competitive market economy? The questions John Stuart Mill raised a century and a half ago, in 1848's Principles of Political Economy, and the answers he found, are just as critical-and just as contentiously debated-today. Through a lens of what the philosopher himself termed "philosophical radicalism"-and what some today call "democratic liberalism"-Mill takes a fresh look at Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations and other influential works of political thought of his time, and recasts them from a more scientific viewpoint, suggesting that such realities as the unequal distribution of wealth were not "natural" but rather a matter of human choice... choices we continue to have to make in our ever more complicated economy. Also available from Cosimo Classics: Selected Writings of John Stuart Mill and On Liberty. English philosopher and politician JOHN STUART MILL (1806-1873) was one of the foremost figure of Western intellectual thought in the late 19th century. He served as an administrator in the East Indian Company from 1823 to 1858, and as a member of parliament from 1865 to 1868. Among his essays on a wide range of political and social thought are On Liberty (1859), Considerations on Representative Government (1861), and The Subjection of Women (1869).
Author: Sanny Xiao Yang Liao
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 180
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Book Description
Chapter 1: In the last two decades, public agencies have started to include performance pay into their compensation structure. Using a survey data of all law enforcement agencies in the Unites States, this chapter investigates: (1) if the adoption of performance pay by agencies affected their ability to fight crime and (2) whether agencies responded to performance pay adoption by shifting their policing strategies to game the change? We find that despite increases in the pay gap, performance pay adoption resulted in no change in the police's ability to fight crime. We find little evidence that adopting agencies attempted to game the incentive structure by shifting efforts away from less profitable tasks. Chapter 2: There has been much debate over whether interest groups act as ideologues or investor when they contribute to candidates. In a seminal work, Snyder (1990) finds that economic interest groups behave as investors and there is a one to one correlation between candidates' share of contribution from economic interest groups and their probability of winning. This chapter expands on Snyder's work by proposing a new strategy to empirically identify investor interest groups, that is, by examining whether an interest group has ever given to competing parties in a race, we call this group "diversifiers". We find that there is indeed a significant correlation between diversifier contribution share and election outcome. Furthermore, the correlation between diversifiers contribution share to date and election outcome remains significant as early as approximately 48 weeks before election day. Chapter 3: Participation of interest groups in public policy making is ubiquitous and unavoidable. In this final chapter, we try to understand the mechanisms through which interest groups attempt to influence the implementation of public policies from an Institutional Economics perspective. We recognize that while it is legislatures that enact and supervise statures, it is often bureaucracies that implement policies. We survey a collection of papers that analyze how the vast power invested in bureaucracies influence the strategic choice of interest group in means to exert influence - buying, lobbying and suing. We further generalize our analysis to understand how differences in the institutional environment impact the role of interest groups in public policy making.
Author: Samuel Brittan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 300
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Book Description
Author: Frédéric Bastiat
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781835918098
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
"Essays on Political Economy" by Frédéric Bastiat is a seminal collection of essays that offers a lucid and insightful analysis of economic principles from a classical liberal perspective. Originally published in the mid-19th century, Bastiat's work remains highly relevant and influential in contemporary discussions on economics and public policy. Through a series of engaging essays, Bastiat tackles key economic concepts such as free trade, taxation, regulation, and the role of government in the economy. He eloquently argues for the virtues of free markets, individual liberty, and limited government intervention, asserting that these principles are essential for fostering economic prosperity and human flourishing. One of the central themes of Bastiat's essays is the idea of opportunity cost and the unseen consequences of government intervention in the economy. He famously illustrates this concept in "The Broken Window Fallacy," where he exposes the fallacy of viewing destruction as a net economic benefit due to the subsequent demand for reconstruction. Bastiat's writing is characterized by its clarity, wit, and logical rigor. He employs simple yet powerful analogies and examples to elucidate complex economic ideas, making them accessible to readers of all backgrounds. His passionate advocacy for free markets and individual freedom continues to inspire economists, policymakers, and advocates for liberty around the world. Whether you're a student of economics, a policymaker, or simply a curious reader interested in understanding the principles of political economy, "Essays on Political Economy" offers timeless wisdom and invaluable insights into the workings of the economy and the importance of protecting individual rights and freedoms. Join Frédéric Bastiat on a journey of intellectual exploration and discover the enduring relevance of his ideas for shaping a more prosperous and free society.
Author: Horace Greeley
Publisher: Philadelphia, Porter
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 400
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Book Description
Author: Ali Toossi Ardakani
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 234
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Book Description
Author: Michael Kitson
Publisher: Psychology Press
ISBN: 9780415204965
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 218
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Book Description
This volume offers an original perspective on the relationship between economic theory and policy. It discusses the lessons of economic theory and policy from a broad political economy perspective.
Author: Cheng Li
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This dissertation consists of three essays in the field of political economics and public policy. The first essay provides a novel theory as to why campaign finance regulation, in the form of campaign contribution limits, may improve constituent welfare. The argument is developed in a game theoretic model of policymaking and lobbying. The model involves a three stage game played between a politician and two special interest groups. First, a policymaker can collect information or acquire expertise, which enables her to better compare the merits of alternative policy choices. Second, interest groups observe the policymaker's level of expertise and can offer political contributions in exchange for their preferred policy. Third, the policymaker chooses one of the policies. In equilibrium, expected political contributions are strictly decreasing in the policymaker's information. The analysis shows that the more information the policymaker acquires, the lower the expected payments from interest groups. A fully uninformed policymaker is unable to distinguish between policies and therefore makes her decision based only on contributions, maximizing competition between and payments from interest groups. The monetary benefits of remaining uninformed can dominate the costs associated with worse policy, and the policymaker prefers to remain fully uninformed about a range of issues, even when acquiring information is costless. The analysis also highlights a novel benefit of contribution limits, showing that they can improve policy by decreasing incentives for a policymaker to remain uninformed. The second essay studies the optimal law enforcement policy at borders and airports. At borders and airports, law enforcement targets major, planned crime such as smuggling and terrorism. Such crime tends to be planned by a strategic criminal organization that can recruit agents to attempt crime on its behalf. In this essay, we model major criminal activity as a game in which a law enforcement officer chooses the rate at which to screen different population groups, and a criminal organization (e.g. drug cartel, terrorist cell) chooses the observable characteristics of its recruits. The analysis shows that the most effective law enforcement policy imposes only moderate restrictions on the officer's ability to profile. In contrast to models of decentralized crime, requiring equal treatment never improves the effectiveness of law enforcement. The third essay examines the deterrence effects of higher pleading standards in litigation. In a recent decision, the U.S. Supreme Court increases pre-discovery pleading standards, which increase the standard of plausibility that a lawsuit must meet before proceeding to discovery and trial. In this essay, we develop a game theoretic model of litigant behavior to study the impact of higher pleading standards on choices to engage in illegal or negligent activity. The analysis shows how increasing pleading standards tends to increase illegal activity, and can increase litigation costs. These results provide a counterpoint to the Supreme Court's argument that increased plausibility requirements will decrease the costs of litigation.
