Essays in Information and Contracts in Financial Markets PDF Download
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Author: Gregory William Weitzner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 166
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Book Description
My dissertation contains two chapters. In chapter one I explore the relationship between debt maturity and information production in a theoretical model. In my model, long-term financing creates an excessive tendency for financiers to acquire information and screen out lower quality borrowers. In contrast, short-term financing deters information production at origination but induces it when firms are forced to liquidate, depressing the market value of assets due to adverse selection. Through the feedback effect between firms' maturity structures and asset prices, increases in uncertainty can impair the aggregate volume of short-term financing and investment. The analysis can jointly rationalize i) the widespread use of short-term debt by financial firms, ii) periodic disruptions in short-term funding markets and iii) regulations that curb short-term funding markets in normal times and support them in periods of market stress. In the second chapter, I analyze information externalities in the interbank market. In the model, banks use their information to adjust the size of loans rather than the prices they offer to counterparties because of adverse selection. Each banks' individual rationing decision creates an information externality that increases the efficiency of trade. This information externality occurs even though information is not shared and banks compete with each other. However, banks do not internalize the cost their contracts impose on other banks through the counterparty's likelihood of default, which creates a counteracting negative externality that exacerbates as the number banks increases. The model provides a microfoundation for interbank discipline and has implications for the optimal structure of interbank markets
Author: Gregory William Weitzner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 166
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Book Description
My dissertation contains two chapters. In chapter one I explore the relationship between debt maturity and information production in a theoretical model. In my model, long-term financing creates an excessive tendency for financiers to acquire information and screen out lower quality borrowers. In contrast, short-term financing deters information production at origination but induces it when firms are forced to liquidate, depressing the market value of assets due to adverse selection. Through the feedback effect between firms' maturity structures and asset prices, increases in uncertainty can impair the aggregate volume of short-term financing and investment. The analysis can jointly rationalize i) the widespread use of short-term debt by financial firms, ii) periodic disruptions in short-term funding markets and iii) regulations that curb short-term funding markets in normal times and support them in periods of market stress. In the second chapter, I analyze information externalities in the interbank market. In the model, banks use their information to adjust the size of loans rather than the prices they offer to counterparties because of adverse selection. Each banks' individual rationing decision creates an information externality that increases the efficiency of trade. This information externality occurs even though information is not shared and banks compete with each other. However, banks do not internalize the cost their contracts impose on other banks through the counterparty's likelihood of default, which creates a counteracting negative externality that exacerbates as the number banks increases. The model provides a microfoundation for interbank discipline and has implications for the optimal structure of interbank markets
Author: Haina Ding
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This dissertation contains three independent essays. The first two essays look at the informational role of stock prices and its impact on the real economy. The last one explores the relationship between managerial incentive and product market competition. In the first essay, two firms compete in a product market and have an opportunity to invest in a risky technology either early on as a leader or later once stock prices reveal the value of the technology. Information leakage thus introduces an option of waiting, which enhances production efficiency. A potential leader may nevertheless be discouraged from investing upfront, when anticipating its competitor to invest later in response to good news. I show that an increase in product market competition increases the option value of waiting but has an ambiguous effect on information production. It may thus be the case that intense competition leads to more leakage such that no firm would invest, especially so in a smaller market. Given a moderate level of competition, price informativeness may improve investment outcome when investment profitability and the market size are relatively large. The second essay examines the feedback effects of certifications in financial markets. A firm has to decide whether to monitor (or to ascertain) internally the prospect of a potential investment or to delegate this task to a certifier who reveals his evaluations to the outsiders. The investment decision is then taken based on all of the information available in the market. The information asymmetry between the firm and lenders is alleviated under delegation, and hence the firm enjoys a lower cost of capital at the financing stage. Delegation however reduces the information advantage of speculators who then make less effort to acquire information. This results in a potential information crowding-out effect. We show that the firm may prefer to delegate when the prior belief about the investment prospect is relatively high, and to choose in-house information production when its own signal is more precise and when its current assets in place generate a higher expected payoff. The third essay considers a spatial competition model with horizontal and vertical differentiation. Two firms are assigned to exogenous locations on a circular city. Consumers, distributed on the circle, need to pay a transportation cost for purchasing. Anticipating a future uncertainty in product quality, firms simultaneously offer incentive contracts to managers to induce an optimal effort level. I show that competition may adversely affects incentives, as a lower transportation cost impairs a firm's local market power and consequently reduces a firm's marginal benefit from producing a high quality product, particularly when its competitor also produces a high quality product. On the other hand, greater competition reduces a firm's profit if it fails to improve product quality. This effect increases the optimal effort level and becomes dominant if the quality improvement is relatively large compared to the effort cost. Moreover, a large decrease in the transportation cost may change the market structure, such that the firm with better quality goods attracts all the demand, and thus the positive effect of competition on managerial effort becomes more significant.
Author: Charl Kengchon
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 334
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Book Description
Author: Robert Lee Heinkel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 362
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Author: Baogui Wang
Publisher: National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada
ISBN:
Category : Contracts, Agricultural
Languages : en
Pages : 106
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Author: Kevin Dowd
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136371818
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 241
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Book Description
Kevin Dowd asserts that state intervention into financial and monetary systems has failed, and that we would be better off if financial markets were left to regulate themselves. This collection will appeal to students, researchers and policy makers in the monetary and financial area.
Author: Iván Blanco
Publisher: Ed. Universidad de Cantabria
ISBN: 8481028770
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 90
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Book Description
Do financial derivatives enhance or impede innovation? We aim to answer this question by examining the relationship between equity options markets and standard measures of firm innovation. Our baseline results show that firms with more options trading activity generate more patents and patent citations per dollar of R&D invested. We then investigate how more active options markets affect firms' innovation strategy. Our results suggest that firms with greater trading activity pursue a more creative, diverse and risky innovation strategy. We discuss potential underlying mechanisms and show that options appear to mitigate managerial career concerns that would induce managers to take actions that boost short-term performance measures. Finally, using several econometric specifications that try to account for the potential endogeneity of options trading, we argue that the positive effect of options trading on firm innovation is causal.
Author: Kwanho Kim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Euro-dollar market
Languages : en
Pages : 312
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Author: Don M. Chance
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1118160649
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 403
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Book Description
In the updated second edition of Don Chance’s well-received Essays in Derivatives, the author once again keeps derivatives simple enough for the beginner, but offers enough in-depth information to satisfy even the most experienced investor. This book provides up-to-date and detailed coverage of various financial products related to derivatives and contains completely new chapters covering subjects that include why derivatives are used, forward and futures pricing, operational risk, and best practices.
Author: Luigi Iovino
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 148
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Book Description
This thesis studies how information imperfections affect financial markets and the macroeconomy. Chapter 1 considers an economy where investors delegate their investment decisions to financial institutions that choose across multiple investment opportunities featuring different levels of idiosyncratic risk and different degrees of correlation with the aggregate of the economy. Investors solve an optimal contracting problem to induce financial institutions to allocate their investment optimally. We then study how investment decisions are affected when financial securities are introduced that allow agents to trade their risks. Investors do not have the necessary information to understand these securities, but give incentives to financial institutions to hedge certain risks. We show that hedging idiosyncratic risks ameliorates the agency problem between investors and financial institutions and reduces aggregate volatility. On the contrary, when aggregate risk can be hedged the agency problem worsens and aggregate volatility increases. Finally, we study the efficiency properties of the equilibrium and the potential role for financial regulation. Chapter 2 studies the welfare effects of the information contained in macroeconomic statistics, central-bank communications, or news in the media? We address this question in a business-cycle framework that nests the neoclassical core of modem DSGE models. Earlier lessons that were based on "beauty contests" (Morris and Shin, 2002) are found to be inapplicable. Instead, the social value of information is shown to hinge on essentially the same conditions as the optimality of output stabilization policies. More precise information is unambiguously welfare-improving as long as the business cycle is driven primarily by technology and preference shocks-but can be detrimental when shocks to markups and wedges cause sufficient volatility in "output gaps". Finally, chapter 3 studies how market signals-such as stock prices-can help alleviate the severity of the asymmetric information problem in credit and liquidity management. Asymmetric information hinders the ability of borrowers (firms, investment banks, etc) to undertake profitable investment opportunities and to insure themselves against liquidity shocks. On the equilibrium path, creditors need not learn anything from market signals because they can use a menu of contracts to screen the different types of borrowers. Nevertheless, by conditioning liquidity insurance on ex post price signals, creditors are able to provide the borrowers with better incentives for truth-telling. At the same time, prices depend on the liquidity that creditors offer to the borrowers. This two-way feedback impacts the design of the optimal contract and potentially generates multiple equilibria in financial markets.
