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Author: Rasim Burak Uras
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic dissertations
Languages : en
Pages : 156
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Book Description
This dissertation consists of three essays that study the economic implications of financial frictions on entrepreneurial investment decision making and aggregate economic performance. The first essay studies investment horizon choice of a distribution of entrepreneurs when a fraction of the financiers within the economy consists of impatient type of lenders. The second essay studies the effects of financial contract enforcement in promoting productive entrepreneurship and economic development. The third essay studies the link between financial development and entrepreneurial capital-labor management. In the first essay, I study the effects of incomplete insurance in financial contracts on risk taking, investment horizon choice and productivity of a distribution of heterogeneous entrepreneurs. I develop a highly-stylized three-period OLG model in which young financiers are heterogeneous in terms of their liquidity needs. As a result, in the model only a fraction of financiers are patient enough to consider their long term lending opportunities. The lending options of financiers are short and long term and any combination of both which result in either short term or long term investment projects undertaken by entrepreneurs. In this setting, equilibrium investment composition (short term vs. long term) and productivity levels of entrepreneurs are determined by their intrinsic entrepreneurial ability distribution, as well as by the fraction of the patient type of financiers in the economy. When productivity improves, entrepreneurial firms increase their capital investment; however, whether they shift to long term oriented projects or not is strongly linked with the liquidity needs of the financiers. Cross-country data shows a positive correlation between a nation's contract enforcement level and its ability to adopt modern technologies. In the second essay of my dissertation, I study the role entrepreneurial incentives play in shaping this empirical observation. I develop and solve a life-cycle model with limited financial contract enforcement, entrepreneurial heterogeneity (ability and financial pledgeability) and technology choice. In the model production processes can be undertaken using either the Traditional or the Modern technology. Depending on the entrepreneurial ability, the modern technology can be more productive relative to the traditional technology, but the former requires a long-term investment making entrepreneur's pledgeability important in his choice. In equilibrium the level of contract enforcement and entrepreneurial characteristics endogenously determine (1) the investment size and (2) the technology choice. Key results of the paper indicate that when financial contract enforcement is weak, the investment size and the intensity of modern technology use of entrepreneurial firms are positively correlated with financial pledgeability. Collateral-building associated with short term investment is important for the results. I calibrate the model to study its quantitative properties. Quantitative experiments illustrate sizeable positive effects of financial contract enforcement on aggregate output and aggregate modern technology adoption for the U.S. economy. Furthermore, counterfactual analysis shows that if financial contract enforcement in Turkey (a low enforcement economy) improves to the U.S. level (a high enforcement economy), output rises by 13-15%; and one third of this change is due to the increase in the rate of modern technology adoption. The third essay in my dissertation provides a quantitative analysis on the effects of firm level financial characteristics in explaining the observed industry-wide productivity heterogeneity in U.S. firm level data. In the first part of the essay, I develop a model in which the interplay between capital and financial market frictions endogenously determine capital-labor ratio decisions of entrepreneurial firms. In this economy capital is costly to rent to some producers due to investment related moral hazard. Therefore, it is beneficial for such entrepreneurs to purchase the capital good instead of renting it. Entrepreneurs can internalize the cost of capital by borrowing in the financial market. However, the amount which can be borrowed is constrained by an entrepreneurs financial market reputation (pledgeability) and his financial asset liquidity (collateral). In equilibrium, firms with lower pledgeability and/or lower liquidity become more labor intensive relative to firms with higher pledgeability and/or liquidity. Distortions to capital rental rates augment the sensitivity of capital-labor choice with respect to firm level financial pledgeability and liquidity. In the second part of the essay, the analytical results are tested in a panel data analysis. Using proxies for "labor intensive production", "financial pledgeability", and "financial asset liquidity" for a large sample of U.S. firms from Compustat North America, I show that low pledgeability and low asset liquidity are associated with labor intensive production. The third part of the essay provides a quantitative analysis. I choose seven major industries in the U.S. economy. For these industries, I show that ability to borrow against financial pledgeability and asset liquidity mitigate the distortionary effects of non-uniform capital rental rates and decrease intra-industry productivity dispersion while increasing industry total factor productivity by quantitatively important proportions. However, there are differential effects of financial pledgeability and financial asset liquidity on aggregate industry performance. My results suggest that the way sectoral firms benefit from the presence of financial pledgeability and asset liquidity depend on sector specific characteristics.
Author: Rasim Burak Uras
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic dissertations
Languages : en
Pages : 156
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Book Description
This dissertation consists of three essays that study the economic implications of financial frictions on entrepreneurial investment decision making and aggregate economic performance. The first essay studies investment horizon choice of a distribution of entrepreneurs when a fraction of the financiers within the economy consists of impatient type of lenders. The second essay studies the effects of financial contract enforcement in promoting productive entrepreneurship and economic development. The third essay studies the link between financial development and entrepreneurial capital-labor management. In the first essay, I study the effects of incomplete insurance in financial contracts on risk taking, investment horizon choice and productivity of a distribution of heterogeneous entrepreneurs. I develop a highly-stylized three-period OLG model in which young financiers are heterogeneous in terms of their liquidity needs. As a result, in the model only a fraction of financiers are patient enough to consider their long term lending opportunities. The lending options of financiers are short and long term and any combination of both which result in either short term or long term investment projects undertaken by entrepreneurs. In this setting, equilibrium investment composition (short term vs. long term) and productivity levels of entrepreneurs are determined by their intrinsic entrepreneurial ability distribution, as well as by the fraction of the patient type of financiers in the economy. When productivity improves, entrepreneurial firms increase their capital investment; however, whether they shift to long term oriented projects or not is strongly linked with the liquidity needs of the financiers. Cross-country data shows a positive correlation between a nation's contract enforcement level and its ability to adopt modern technologies. In the second essay of my dissertation, I study the role entrepreneurial incentives play in shaping this empirical observation. I develop and solve a life-cycle model with limited financial contract enforcement, entrepreneurial heterogeneity (ability and financial pledgeability) and technology choice. In the model production processes can be undertaken using either the Traditional or the Modern technology. Depending on the entrepreneurial ability, the modern technology can be more productive relative to the traditional technology, but the former requires a long-term investment making entrepreneur's pledgeability important in his choice. In equilibrium the level of contract enforcement and entrepreneurial characteristics endogenously determine (1) the investment size and (2) the technology choice. Key results of the paper indicate that when financial contract enforcement is weak, the investment size and the intensity of modern technology use of entrepreneurial firms are positively correlated with financial pledgeability. Collateral-building associated with short term investment is important for the results. I calibrate the model to study its quantitative properties. Quantitative experiments illustrate sizeable positive effects of financial contract enforcement on aggregate output and aggregate modern technology adoption for the U.S. economy. Furthermore, counterfactual analysis shows that if financial contract enforcement in Turkey (a low enforcement economy) improves to the U.S. level (a high enforcement economy), output rises by 13-15%; and one third of this change is due to the increase in the rate of modern technology adoption. The third essay in my dissertation provides a quantitative analysis on the effects of firm level financial characteristics in explaining the observed industry-wide productivity heterogeneity in U.S. firm level data. In the first part of the essay, I develop a model in which the interplay between capital and financial market frictions endogenously determine capital-labor ratio decisions of entrepreneurial firms. In this economy capital is costly to rent to some producers due to investment related moral hazard. Therefore, it is beneficial for such entrepreneurs to purchase the capital good instead of renting it. Entrepreneurs can internalize the cost of capital by borrowing in the financial market. However, the amount which can be borrowed is constrained by an entrepreneurs financial market reputation (pledgeability) and his financial asset liquidity (collateral). In equilibrium, firms with lower pledgeability and/or lower liquidity become more labor intensive relative to firms with higher pledgeability and/or liquidity. Distortions to capital rental rates augment the sensitivity of capital-labor choice with respect to firm level financial pledgeability and liquidity. In the second part of the essay, the analytical results are tested in a panel data analysis. Using proxies for "labor intensive production", "financial pledgeability", and "financial asset liquidity" for a large sample of U.S. firms from Compustat North America, I show that low pledgeability and low asset liquidity are associated with labor intensive production. The third part of the essay provides a quantitative analysis. I choose seven major industries in the U.S. economy. For these industries, I show that ability to borrow against financial pledgeability and asset liquidity mitigate the distortionary effects of non-uniform capital rental rates and decrease intra-industry productivity dispersion while increasing industry total factor productivity by quantitatively important proportions. However, there are differential effects of financial pledgeability and financial asset liquidity on aggregate industry performance. My results suggest that the way sectoral firms benefit from the presence of financial pledgeability and asset liquidity depend on sector specific characteristics.
Author: Jorge Salvador Bravo Tamayo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 296
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Book Description
The first chapter proposes a general equilibrium model with two interrelated costly-state verification frictions à la Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). First between entrepreneurs and the financial sector. Second, between the financial sector and a money market for short term debt. The model generates endogenous spreads between financial intermediaries borrowing costs and the risk free rate, and between the borrowing costs of financial intermediaries and entrepreneurs. The net worth of the domestic financial sectors, as well as the net worth of entrepreneurs, matter for the model's dynamics.
Author: Elton Dusha
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Stanley L. Engerman
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107009553
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 449
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Book Description
Examines differences in the rates of economic growth in Latin America and mainland North America since the seventeenth century.
Author: Diego Vera Cossio
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 233
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Book Description
A fundamental concern in development economics is the presence of institutional and labor market failures that interact with frictions in financial markets, which may prevent economic growth. This dissertation studies the importance of these interactions in a series of three papers. Chapter 1 studies the extent to which by allowing grassroots organizations--as opposed to banks--to allocate publicly-funded credit, it is possible to overcome existing financial frictions and deliver resources the community members who need it the most: poor, high-productivity households. Using a long panel dataset I find evidence of misallocation: credit was provided to households with poor credit history, which were richer and less productive than non-borrowers. Instead, resources were delivered to households with connections to local political leaders. The results highlight the limitation of community-based approaches to allocating public resources in developing countries. Chapter 2 shows that a cash-transfer program targeted to children in Bolivian public schools boosted employment among mothers of beneficiary children by providing extra-liquidity in a context of fixed costs to work. Chapter 3 exploits rich data from Thailand to show that estimates of total factor productivity can be used to predict business success in the aftermath of credit-expansion programs.
Author: Francisco Javier Buera
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economic development
Languages : en
Pages : 39
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Book Description
We review both the theoretical and empirical literature on entrepreneurship and financial frictions, with an emphasis on the heterogeneous and dynamic micro-level implications of financial frictions for macro development.
Author: Antonio Antunes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper studies the effect of financial repression and contract enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development. We construct and solve a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, occupational choice and two financial frictions: intermediation costs and financial contract enforcement. Occupational choice and firm size are determined endogenously, and depend on agent type (wealth and ability) and the credit market frictions. The model shows that differences across countries in intermediation costs and enforcement generate differences in occupational choice, firm size, credit, output and inequality. Counterfactual experiments are performed for Latin American, European, transition and high growth Asian countries. We use empirical estimates of each country's financial frictions, and United States values for all other parameters. The results allow us to isolate the quantitative effect of these financial frictions in explaining the performance gap between each country and the United States. The results depend critically on whether a general equilibrium factor price effect is operative, which in turn depends on whether financial markets are open or closed. This yields a positive policy prescription: If the goal is to maximize steady-state efficiency, financial reforms should be accompanied by measures to increase financial capital mobility.
Author: Yu Shi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 154
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Book Description
In the first chapter, I propose that the nonfinancial component of financial firms' assets, in particular the growth opportunities associated with business operations, drives most of the variation in their equity valuation. I document this fact for a large class of intermediaries: life insurance companies. In particular, I decompose insurers' market equity returns into net financial asset returns and net business asset returns and show that these two components have very different risk exposures and are negatively correlated outside of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The variation in life insurers' net business asset returns drives 81\% of the aggregate time series variation and 100\% of the cross-sectional variation in their market equity returns. For this reason, the current intense regulation on life insurers' net financial assets may be insufficient as a great deal of risk is derived from their net business assets which are comparatively under-regulated. In the second chapter (with Andrea Eisfeldt), we review the advances in the literature studying the causes and consequences of capital reallocation (or lack thereof). Capital reallocation is procyclical, despite measured productive reallocative opportunities being acyclical, or even countercyclical. We provide a comprehensive set of capital reallocation stylized facts for the US, and an illustrative model of capital reallocation in equilibrium. We relate capital reallocation to the broader literatures on business cycles with financial frictions, and on resource misallocation and aggregate productivity. Finally, we provide directions for future research. This article has been published in Annual Review of Financial Economics.
Author: N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher: Macmillan
ISBN: 1429253673
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 642
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Book Description
Watch this video interview with Greg Mankiw and Larry Ball discussing the future of the intermediate macroeconomics course and their new text. Check out preview content for Macroeconomics and the Financial System here. The financial crisis and subsequent economic downturn of 2008 and 2009 was a dramatic reminder of what economists have long understood: developments in the overall economy and developments in the financial system are inextricably intertwined. Derived and updated from two widely acclaimed textbooks (Greg Mankiw’s Macroeconomics, Seventh Edition and Larry Ball’s Money, Banking, and the Financial System), this groundbreaking text is the first and only intermediate macroeconomics text that provides substantial coverage of the financial system.
Author: Jeremy Rastouil
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
During the Great Recession, the interactions between housing, labor and entry highlight the existence of narrow propagation channels between these markets. The aim of this thesis is to shed a light on labor market interactions with firm entry and financial business cycles, by building on the recent theoretical and empirical of DSGE models. In the first chapter, we have found evidence of the key role of the net entry as an amplifying mechanism for employment dynamics. Introducing search and matching frictions, we have studied from a new perspective the cyclicality of the mark-up compared to previous researches that use Walrasian labor market. We found a less countercyclical markup due to the acyclical aspect of the marginal cost in the DMP framework and a reduced role according to firm's entry in the cyclicality of the markup. In the second chapter, we have linked the borrowing capacity of households to their employment situation on the labor market. With this new microfoundation of the collateral constraint, new matches on the labor market translate into more mortgages, while separation induces an exclusion from financial markets for jobseekers. As a result, the LTV becomes endogenous by responding procyclically to employment fluctuations. We have shown that this device is empirically relevant and solves the anomalies of the standard collateral constraint. In the last chapter, we extend the analysis developed in the previous one by integrating collateral constrained firms in order to have a more complete financial business cycle. The first result is that an entrepreneur collateral constraint integrating capital, real commercial estate and wage bill in advance is empirically relevant compared to the collateral literature associated to the labor market which does not consider these three assets. The second finding is the role of the housing price and credit squeezes in the rise of the unemployment rate during the Great Recession. The last two chapters have important implications for economic policy. A structural deregulation reform in the labor market induces a significant rise in the debt level for households and housing price, combined with a substantial rise of firm debt. Our approach allows us to reveal that a macroprudential policy aiming to tighten the LTV ratio for household borrowers has positive effects in the long run for output and employment, while tightening LTV ratios for entrepreneurs leads to the opposite effect.
