Essays in Corporate Finance Theory

Essays in Corporate Finance Theory PDF Author: Dan Luo (Researcher in corporate finance theory)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Get Book Here

Book Description
This dissertation consists of three pieces of research in theoretical corporate finance. The first one studies multi-agent design problems. Agents are concerned about each other's decisions and can communicate strategically with each other. The principal would like to motivate agents' participation decisions by affecting their communication. I employ such a multi-agent perspective on economic design to understand practices such as syndication. The second and the third ones take a more applied approach and study agency problems in specific corporate finance settings. They shed light on information design in corporate governance and dynamic interactions in special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), respectively.

Essays in Corporate Finance Theory

Essays in Corporate Finance Theory PDF Author: Dan Luo (Researcher in corporate finance theory)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Get Book Here

Book Description
This dissertation consists of three pieces of research in theoretical corporate finance. The first one studies multi-agent design problems. Agents are concerned about each other's decisions and can communicate strategically with each other. The principal would like to motivate agents' participation decisions by affecting their communication. I employ such a multi-agent perspective on economic design to understand practices such as syndication. The second and the third ones take a more applied approach and study agency problems in specific corporate finance settings. They shed light on information design in corporate governance and dynamic interactions in special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), respectively.

Essays in Corporate Finance Theory

Essays in Corporate Finance Theory PDF Author: Mr. Andrey Malenko
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Get Book Here

Book Description
This thesis consists of three essays that examine various problems in corporate finance. The central theme of all essays is information asymmetry between agents. The first essay features information asymmetry between the headquarters and the division manager about investment projects of the division and studies the best way to provide the manager with incentives to invest efficiently. The second essay studies implications of asymmetric information between the decision-maker and the outsiders on exercise decisions of real options in several settings. The third essay features asymmetric information between sellers of assets and potential buyers and studies what selling procedures arise in equilibrium in a market with multiple sellers and potential buyers. More specifically, in Chapter 1 of the dissertation, I study optimal design of a capital allocation system in a firm in which the division manager with empire-building preferences privately observes the arrival and properties of investment projects, and the headquarters is able to audit each project at a cost. I show that under certain conditions the optimal system takes the form of a budgeting mechanism with threshold division of authority. Specifically, the headquarters: (i) allocates a spending account to the manager at the initial date and accumulates it over time; (ii) sets a threshold on the size of individual projects, such that all projects below the threshold are delegated to the manager and financed out of her spending account, while all projects above the threshold are audited and financed fully by the headquarters. I extend the model in several directions, including multiple audit technologies, multiple project categories, and the possibility of renegotiation. In Chapter 2, which is the product of joint work with Steven R. Grenadier, forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies, we study games in which the decision to exercise an option is a signal of private information to outsiders, whose beliefs affect the utility of the decision-maker. In a general setting that accommodates a variety of applications we show that signaling incentives distort the timing of exercise, and the direction of distortion depends on whether the decision-maker's utility increases or decreases in the outsiders' belief about the payoff from exercise. In the former case, signaling incentives erode the value of the option to wait and speed up option exercise, while in the latter case option exercise is delayed. We demonstrate the implications of the general model through four corporate finance applications: investment under managerial myopia, venture capital grandstanding, investment under cash flow diversion, and product market competition. In Chapter 3, which is the product of joint work with\ Alexander S.\ Gorbenko, forthcoming in the American\ Economic Review, we study simultaneous security-bid second-price auctions with competition among sellers for potential bidders. The key difference from the prior literature on competition among auctioneers is that we allow bidders to make bids in the form of contingent claims on future payoffs of the assets. The sellers compete for bidders by designing ordered sets of securities that the bidders can offer as payment for the assets. Upon observing auction designs, potential bidders decide which auctions to enter. We characterize all symmetric equilibria and show that there always exist equilibria in which auctions are in standard securities or their combinations. In large markets the unique equilibrium is auctions in pure cash. We extend the model for competition in reserve prices and show that binding reserve prices never constitute equilibrium as long as equilibrium security designs are not call options.

Essays in Corporate Finance Theory and Principal-agent Theory

Essays in Corporate Finance Theory and Principal-agent Theory PDF Author: John R. Minahan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 186

Get Book Here

Book Description


Essays on Corporate Finance Theory and Dynamic Games

Essays on Corporate Finance Theory and Dynamic Games PDF Author: Jian Sun (Scientist in business management)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Get Book Here

Book Description
This dissertation consists of three chapters.

Essays on Corporate Finance Theory and Behavioral Asset Pricing

Essays on Corporate Finance Theory and Behavioral Asset Pricing PDF Author: Jieying Hong
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Get Book Here

Book Description
This thesis consists of three self-contained papers. The first two papers study how firms should be structured to facilitate their access to funds in the face of agency conflicts between borrowers (firms) and lenders (investors). Chapter 1 studies the relationship between firm scope and financial constraints. Chapter 2 uses an optimal contracting approach to analyze the development of an innovative product through strategic alliance by an entrepreneur and an incumbent. Chapter 3 analyzes whether traders' experience reduce their propensity to speculate?

Essays in Corporate Finance and Game Theory

Essays in Corporate Finance and Game Theory PDF Author: Armando Rodrigues Gomes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 250

Get Book Here

Book Description


Essays in Corporate Finance and Bargaining Theory

Essays in Corporate Finance and Bargaining Theory PDF Author: Mark Andrew Chen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 90

Get Book Here

Book Description


Essays on Corporate Finance and Performance

Essays on Corporate Finance and Performance PDF Author: Andriy Tsapin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 148

Get Book Here

Book Description


Essays in Banking Theory and Corporate Finance

Essays in Banking Theory and Corporate Finance PDF Author: Andrés Almazán
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 306

Get Book Here

Book Description


Applied Corporate Finance

Applied Corporate Finance PDF Author: Aswath Damodaran
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1118808932
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 663

Get Book Here

Book Description
Aswath Damodaran, distinguished author, Professor of Finance, and David Margolis, Teaching Fellow at the NYU Stern School of Business, has delivered the newest edition of Applied Corporate Finance. This readable text provides the practical advice students and practitioners need rather than a sole concentration on debate theory, assumptions, or models. Like no other text of its kind, Applied Corporate Finance, 4th Edition applies corporate finance to real companies. It now contains six real-world core companies to study and follow. Business decisions are classified for students into three groups: investment, financing, and dividend decisions.