Equilibrium and Adverse Selection PDF Download
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Author: Colin Rose
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
Author: Colin Rose
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
Author: William Jack
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Book Description
Author: Charles Wilson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Paolo Belli
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Adverse selection (Insurance)
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Book Description
There may be a price to pay (in terms of inefficient coverage) if competition among health insurers is encouraged as a way to give patients greater choice and to achieve better control over insurance providers.
Author: Tuomas Takalo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: Ben Lockwood
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Book Description
Author: Tuomas Takalo
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789524620406
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 45
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Book Description
We study a financial market adverse selection model where all agents are endowed with initial wealth and choose to invest as entrepreneurs or financiers, or not to invest. We show that often a lack of outside finance leads to the emergence of financial markets where availability of outside finance leads to autarky. We find that i) there exist Pareto-efficient and inefficient equilibria; ii) adverse selection has more severe consequences for poorer economies; iii) increasing initial wealth may cause a shift from Pareto-efficient to inefficient equilibrium; iv) increasing the proportion of agents with positive NPV projects causes a shift from inefficient to efficient equilibrium; v) equilibrium financial contracts are either equity-like or 'pure' debt contracts; vi) agents with negative (positive) NPV projects earn rents only in (non- )wealth-constrained economies; vii) agents earn rents only when employing pure debt contracts; and viii) removing storage technology destroys the only Pareto-efficient equilibrium in non-wealth-constrained economies. Our model enables analysis of various policies concerning financial stability, the need for sophisticated financial institutions, development aid, and the promotion of entrepreneurship.
Author: Gerald D. Jaynes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Lawrence A. Berger
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
Author: Jonathan A. K. Cave
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 9780833005540
Category : Adverse selection (Insurance)
Languages : en
Pages : 71
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Book Description
This report examines possible outcomes of greater competition in insurance markets. The report describes the nature of insurance offerings in equilibrium if firms offer multiple policies; but it replaces the conventional assumption that each policy must earn nonnegative profits with the more realistic requirement that the portfolio of policies offered by the firm earn nonnegative profits in the aggregate. Theorems regarding the existence, optimality, and uniqueness of the subsidy equilibrium are presented, together with a simple characterization of the subsidy equilibrium and a comparison with existing equilibrium notions. Because the subsidy patterns, from low to high, that emerge under this formulation appear to characterize multiple-option insurance plans such as the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan, this model may be more useful than conventional methods in the analysis of such plans.
