Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality PDF Download
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Author: Ben Polak
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Games of strategy (Mathematics)
Languages : en
Pages : 4
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Book Description
Author: Ben Polak
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Games of strategy (Mathematics)
Languages : en
Pages : 4
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Book Description
Author: Ben Polak
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Book Description
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 74
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Book Description
Author: Andrés Perea
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107008913
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 581
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Book Description
The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.
Author: Eduardo Zambrano
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Book Description
In this paper I show that, just as with Nash Equilibrium, there are sparse conditions, not involving common knowledge of rationality, that lead to (correlated) rationalizability. The basic observation is that, if the actual world belongs to a set of states where the set Z of action profiles is played, each player knows her own payoffs, everyone is rational and it is mutual knowledge that the action profiles played are in Z, then the actions played at the actual world are rationalizable actions. Alternatively, if at the actual world the support of the conjecture of player i is Di, there is mutual knowledge of: (i) the game being played, (ii) that the players are rational, and (iii) that for every i the support of the conjecture of player i is contained in Di, then every strategy in the support of the conjectures is rationalizable. The results do not require common knowledge of anything, are valid for games with any number of players, and extend to refinements of rationalizability such as independent rationalizability and rationalizable conjectural equilibrium.
Author: Paul Weirich
Publisher: MDPI
ISBN: 3038424226
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 189
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Book Description
This book is a printed edition of the Special Issue "Epistemic Game Theory and Modal Logic" that was published in Games
Author: M. Bacharach
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 146131139X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 392
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Book Description
The convergence of game theory and epistemic logic has been in progress for two decades and this book explores this further by gathering specialists from different professional communities, i.e., economics, mathematics, philosophy, and computer science. This volume considers the issues of knowledge, belief and strategic interaction, with each contribution evaluating the foundational issues. In particular, emphasis is placed on epistemic logic and the representative topics of backward induction arguments and syntax/semantics and the logical omniscience problem. Part I of this collection deals with iterated knowledge in the multi-agent context, and more particularly with common knowledge. The first two papers in Part II of the collection address the so-called logical omniscience problem, a problem which has attracted much attention in the recent epistemic logic literature, and is pertinent to some of the issues discussed by decision theorists under the heading 'bounded rationality'. The remaining two chapters of section II provide two quite different angles on the strength of S5 (or the partitional model of information)- and so two different reasons for eschewing the strong form of logical omniscience implicit in S5. Part III gives attention to application to game theory and decision theory.
Author: Alfred R. Mele
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 9780198033240
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 498
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Book Description
Rationality has long been a central topic in philosophy, crossing standard divisions and categories. It continues to attract much attention in published research and teaching by philosophers as well as scholars in other disciplines, including economics, psychology, and law. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality is an indispensable reference to the current state of play in this vital and interdisciplinary area of study. Twenty-two newly commissioned chapters by a roster of distinguished philosophers provide an overview of the prominent views on rationality, with each author also developing a unique and distinctive argument.
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: World Scientific Economic Theo
ISBN: 9789811227325
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Robert J Aumann has received numerous prizes, including the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for 2005.With his 1976 paper, 'Agreeing to Disagree', Robert Aumann pioneered the subject of interactive epistemology: the study of what people know, and what they know about what others know. Since then, the discipline has burgeoned enormously. This book documents Aumann's work leading to the 1976 paper and his subsequent contributions to the discipline. The scientific controversies emanating from his work are also included.
Author: Cristina Bicchieri
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0195117158
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 208
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Book Description
Edited by three leading figures in the field, this exciting volume presents cutting-edge work in decision theory by a distinguished international roster of contributors. These mostly unpublished papers address a host of crucial areas in the contemporary philosophical study of rationality and knowledge. Topics include causal versus evidential decision theory, game theory, backwards induction, bounded rationality, counterfactual reasoning in games and in general, analyses of the famous common knowledge assumptions in game theory, and evaluations of the normal versus extensive form formulations of complex decision problems.
