Endogenous Formation of Research Coalitions with Efficiency Gains

Endogenous Formation of Research Coalitions with Efficiency Gains PDF Author: Sang-Seung Yi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 29

Get Book Here

Book Description

Endogenous Formation of Research Coalitions with Efficiency Gains

Endogenous Formation of Research Coalitions with Efficiency Gains PDF Author: Sang-Seung Yi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 29

Get Book Here

Book Description


Endogenous Formation of Research Coalitions with Complementary Assets

Endogenous Formation of Research Coalitions with Complementary Assets PDF Author: Sang Seung Yi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Research
Languages : en
Pages : 86

Get Book Here

Book Description


The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions

The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions PDF Author: Carlo Carraro
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781781009888
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 274

Get Book Here

Book Description
Some of the specific topics addressed include: advances in the theory of large co-operative games; non co-operative models of coalition formation; a survey of the partition function in the formation of coalitions; far-sightedness in coalition formation; coalition stability; coalition formation in industrialized economics, trade theory, environmental economics and public finance.

Endogenous Formation of Research Coalitions with Spillovers

Endogenous Formation of Research Coalitions with Spillovers PDF Author: Sang-Seung Yi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Get Book Here

Book Description
This paper argues that the sign of external effects of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in examining economic coalitions. In many interesting economic games, coalition formation creates either negativee externalities or positive externalities for nonmembers. Examples of negative externalities are research coalitions and customs unions. Examples of positive externalities include output cartels and public goods coalitions. I characterize and compare stable coalition structures under the following three rules of coalition formation: the Open Membership game of Yi and Shin 1995 , the Coalition Unanimity game of Bloch 1996 , and the Equilibrium Binding Agreements of Ray and Vohra 1994.

The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods

The Endogenous Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods PDF Author: David M. McEvoy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Get Book Here

Book Description
This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation requirements and these coalitions will form. However, we also demonstrate that if some players are averse to inequality they can cause inefficient outcomes. Inequality-averse players can limit free riding by implementing larger than efficient coalitions or by blocking efficient coalitions from forming. We test the theory with experimental methods and observe individual behavior and coalition formation consistent with a model of inequality-averse players.

Endogenous Formation of Research Coalitions with Spillovers

Endogenous Formation of Research Coalitions with Spillovers PDF Author: Sang-Seung Yi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Coalitions
Languages : en
Pages : 37

Get Book Here

Book Description


On the Endogenous Formation of Coalitions

On the Endogenous Formation of Coalitions PDF Author: Sergiu Hart
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Coalitions
Languages : en
Pages : 62

Get Book Here

Book Description


A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation

A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation PDF Author: Debraj Ray
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019920795X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 336

Get Book Here

Book Description
Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.

Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I

Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I PDF Author: Luis C. Corchón
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 178536328X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 567

Get Book Here

Book Description
The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.

Toward a New Climate Agreement

Toward a New Climate Agreement PDF Author: Todd Cherry
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136163581
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 329

Get Book Here

Book Description
Climate change is one of the most pressing problems facing the global community. Although most states agree that climate change is occurring and is at least partly the result of humans’ reliance on fossil fuels, managing a changing global climate is a formidable challenge. Underlying this challenge is the fact that states are sovereign, governed by their own laws and regulations. Sovereignty requires that states address global problems such as climate change on a voluntary basis, by negotiating international agreements. Despite a consensus on the need for global action, many questions remain concerning how a meaningful international climate agreement can be realized. This book brings together leading experts to speak to such questions and to offer promising ideas for the path toward a new climate agreement. Organized in three main parts, it examines the potential for meaningful climate cooperation. Part 1 explores sources of conflict that lead to barriers to an effective climate agreement. Part 2 investigates how different processes influence states’ prospects of resolving their differences and of reaching a climate agreement that is more effective than the current Kyoto Protocol. Finally, part 3 focuses on governance issues, including lessons learned from existing institutional structures. The book is unique in that it brings together the voices of experts from many disciplines, such as economics, political science, international law, and natural science. The authors are academics, practitioners, consultants and advisors. Contributions draw on a variety of methods, and include both theoretical and empirical studies. The book should be of interest to scholars and graduate students in the fields of economics, political science, environmental law, natural resources, earth sciences, sustainability, and many others. It is directly relevant for policy makers, stakeholders and climate change negotiators, offering insights into the role of uncertainty, fairness, policy linkage, burden sharing and alternative institutional designs.