Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union PDF Download
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Author: Mark Hallerberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Budget deficits
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Book Description
A rough consensus has emerged that states with proportional representation systems are likely to run larger deficits than plurality states. We argue that electoral institutions matter because they restrict the type of budgetary institution at the governmental phase which a state has at its disposal. Cabinet members may willingly delegate authority to a finance minister who can monitor spending ministers and punish those who "defect" in a process we label "delegation, " and this procedure is feasible in states where one-party governments are the norm. Such states usually have plurality electoral systems. In multi-party governments, which are common in states with proportional representation, the coalition members are not willing to delegate to one actor the ability to monitor and punish the others. Negotiated targets in the form of fiscal contracts provide an alternative in multi-party governments. Pooled time series regression results for the current European Union states in the period 1981-94 support our contention that it is the presence or absence of one of these budgetary institutions, rather than the plurality/proportional representation dichotomy, which has the greatest impact on debt levels.
Author: Mark Hallerberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Budget deficits
Languages : en
Pages : 52
Get Book Here
Book Description
A rough consensus has emerged that states with proportional representation systems are likely to run larger deficits than plurality states. We argue that electoral institutions matter because they restrict the type of budgetary institution at the governmental phase which a state has at its disposal. Cabinet members may willingly delegate authority to a finance minister who can monitor spending ministers and punish those who "defect" in a process we label "delegation, " and this procedure is feasible in states where one-party governments are the norm. Such states usually have plurality electoral systems. In multi-party governments, which are common in states with proportional representation, the coalition members are not willing to delegate to one actor the ability to monitor and punish the others. Negotiated targets in the form of fiscal contracts provide an alternative in multi-party governments. Pooled time series regression results for the current European Union states in the period 1981-94 support our contention that it is the presence or absence of one of these budgetary institutions, rather than the plurality/proportional representation dichotomy, which has the greatest impact on debt levels.
Author: J. Ayuso-i-Casals
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230271790
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 367
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Book Description
This volume contributes to empirical research on the role of national fiscal rules and institutions in shaping fiscal policies. It provides original, policy-oriented analysis on a number of questions and gives illuminating conclusions about the devices which promote sound and sustainable policy. Contributors are leading experts.
Author: Christopher L. Hughes
Publisher: Nova Publishers
ISBN: 9781600211577
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 172
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Book Description
New Research on Politics & Economics of Europe
Author: Rolf R. Strauch
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461545552
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 273
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Book Description
Rolf R. Strauch and Jiirgen von Hagen Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI), University of Bonn; ZEI, University of Bonn, Indiana University, and CEPR The large and persistent deficits, rising levels of debt and growing levels of public spending observed in many DECO economies during the past 25 years have stimulated much theoretical and empirical research on the political economy of public finance. Although a number of issues have been studied extensively, certain areas are still at an exploratory stage and need further theorizing and thorough empirical research. During the last two decades, the theoretical debate on budgeting has been dominated by the controversy between partisan and institutionalist approaches. Within the more political-science oriented, institutionalist literature, a controversy exists between the distributive and the informational perspectives, each setting forth a distinctive organizational rationale of parliaments with different fiscal implications. The papers in this volume cover these different perspectives, extend previous models, and test their empirical validity. The papers were originally written for a conference on "Institutions, Politics, and Fiscal Policy" organized by the Center for European Integration Studies at the University of Bonn, Germany, in July 1998. The book is organized in three parts each focusing on a distinctive aspect. The first part is dedicated to the partisan perspective. The second part focuses on budget institutions. The third part consists of three case studies of institutional reform of the budget process. This book is directed to academics and practitioners alike.
Author: Eisaku Ide
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317575873
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 286
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Book Description
Since the global financial crisis, government debt has soared globally by 40 percent and now exceeds an astonishing $100 trillion. Not all countries, though, have fared the same. Indeed, even prior to the financial crisis, the fiscal fates of countries have been diverging, despite predictions that pressures from economic globalization push countries toward more convergent fiscally conservative policies. Featuring the work of an international interdisciplinary team of scholars, this volume explains patterns of fiscal performance (persistent patterns of budget deficits and government debt) from the 1970s to the present across seven countries – France, Italy, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, and the United States. Employing a comparative case study approach, seldom employed in studies of fiscal performance, contributions illuminate the complex causal factors often overlooked by quantitative studies and advances our theoretical understanding of fiscal performance. Among other things, the cases highlight the role of taxpayer consent, tax structure, the welfare state, organization of interests, and labor and financial markets in shaping fiscal outcomes. A necessary resource to understand a broader array of factors that shape fiscal outcomes in specific national contexts, this book will reinvigorate the study of fiscal performance.
Author: Mr.Alberto Alesina
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451847203
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
By discussing the available theoretical and empirical literature, this paper argues that budget procedures and budget institutions do influence budget outcomes. Budget institutions include both procedural rules and balanced budget laws. We critically assess theoretical contributions in this area and suggest several open and unresolved issue. We also examine the empirical evidence drawn from studies on samples of OECD countries, Latin American countries and the United States. We conclude with a discussion of the normative implications of this literature and with some concrete proposals.
Author: Mark Hallerberg
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 9780801442711
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 268
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Book Description
Under European Monetary Union, member states lose the ability to steer their economies by manipulating monetary policy. Domestic Budgets in a United Europe, which explains the content, evolution, and effectiveness of fiscal institutions, will be the definitive account of European budget reform in the late twentieth century.Mark Hallerberg examines the making of budgets in EU countries from 1973 to 2000 and explores why those countries introduced fiscal rules when they did. In 1993, when the fiscal-policy criteria for monetary union were first announced, only Luxembourg and the Republic of Ireland would have qualified. In 1997, only Greece failed. Various explanations have been advanced for this rapid turnaround, including luck (a favorable economic climate reduced pressures on local budgets), accounting tricks, and the increasing pressures caused by international capital mobility. Underlying these various explanations is a basic skepticism about whether countries in the European Union actively worked to reform their national budgeting procedures. In rich case studies, Hallerberg shows that the member-states did indeed reform their budget institutions. Many of them, he finds, had started that process long before the formal signing of the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, making domestic changes that allowed them to qualify individually under EMU criteria.
Author: Sarah Sinram
Publisher: LIT Verlag Münster
ISBN: 3643911173
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 226
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Book Description
The book takes a look at social expenditure in affluent democracies in times of fiscal austerity. The study analyzes expenditure changes in nine social policy areas between 1980 - 2010, from an intra-cabinet perspective by considering the partisan affiliation of responsible spending ministers and effects of budgeting reforms. Thus, the analysis contributes to the question of whether parties or institutions matter.
Author: Johannes Lindvall
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0191079464
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 223
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Book Description
It is often said that effective government requires a concentration of power. If we want our political leaders to adjust public policies to changing economic, social, and political circumstances, we should, in this view, leave our leaders alone: we should put in place electoral procedures that identify a clear winner in each election, and then we should let the winning political party govern without having to cooperate with others. The argument of this book is that this view is mistaken, since it seriously underestimates the ability of political decision makers to overcome democratic paralysis by compensating losers (groups that stand to lose from a reform). Reform capacity - the ability of political decision makers to adopt and implement policy changes that benefit society as a whole - can therefore be achieved in both power-concentration systems (which enable governments to ignore losers) and power-sharing systems (where governments build support for reform by compensating losers). If political decision makers are able to solve the bargaining problems that sometimes complicate negotiations between winners and losers, power-sharing systems have certain advantages over power-concentration systems. The book argues that power sharing can lead to high reform capacity in societies where interest groups are powerful enough to block reforms; the book also argues that power sharing can lead to high reform capacity when reforms have short-term costs and long-term benefits, since power sharing helps to correct some of the short-sightedness that is inherent in democratic policymaking.
Author: Christopher R. Berry
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521764734
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 273
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Book Description
Special purpose jurisdictions, such as school districts, water districts, and transit authorities, constitute the most common form of local government in the United States today. This book offers the first political theory of special purpose jurisdictions and provides extensive empirical analyses of the politics and finances of these often overlooked but increasingly influential governments.
