Dynamic Pricing of New Experience Goods

Dynamic Pricing of New Experience Goods PDF Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
We develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent private valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in terms of a simple dichotomy. In a mass market, prices are declining over time. In a niche market, the optimal prices are initially low followed by higher prices that extract surplus from the buyers with a high willingness to pay. We consider extensions of the model to integrate elements of social rather than private learning and turnover among buyers.

Dynamic Pricing of New Experience Goods

Dynamic Pricing of New Experience Goods PDF Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
We develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent private valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in terms of a simple dichotomy. In a mass market, prices are declining over time. In a niche market, the optimal prices are initially low followed by higher prices that extract surplus from the buyers with a high willingness to pay. We consider extensions of the model to integrate elements of social rather than private learning and turnover among buyers.

Strategic Waiting for Consumer-Generated Quality Information

Strategic Waiting for Consumer-Generated Quality Information PDF Author: Man Yu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 43

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Book Description
In this paper, we study the impact of consumer-generated quality information (e.g., consumer reviews) on a firm's dynamic pricing strategy in presence of strategic consumers. Such information is useful, not only to the consumers that have not yet purchased the product, but also to the firm. The informativeness of the consumer-generated quality information depends, however, on the volume of consumers who share their opinions and, thus, depends on the initial sales volume. Hence, via its initial price, the firm not only influences its revenue but also controls the quality information flow over time. The firm may either enhance or dampen the quality information flow via increasing or decreasing initial sales. The corresponding pricing strategy to steer the quality information flow is not always intuitive. Compared to the case without consumer-generated quality information, the firm may reduce the initial sales and lower the initial price. Interestingly, the firm may get strictly worse off due to the consumer-generated quality information. Even when the firm benefits from consumer-generated quality information, it may prefer less accurate information. Finally, consumer surplus can also decrease due to the consumer-generated quality information, contrary to the conventional wisdom that word-of-mouth should help consumers.

Dynamic Pricing of Experience Goods in Markets with Demand Uncertainty

Dynamic Pricing of Experience Goods in Markets with Demand Uncertainty PDF Author: Yu-Hung Chen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38

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Book Description
This paper studies a firm's optimal dynamic pricing strategies for its new experience goods inmarkets where the distribution of consumers' valuations is ex ante unknown. We examine whetherand how the firm facing information asymmetry and demand uncertainty can signal its high qualityand learn market demand through its pricing strategy. First, we find that a high-quality firm cancredibly reveal its true quality in the early period with either a skimming-pricing strategy or apenetration-pricing strategy under different conditions. Second, though a high-quality firm canbenefit more from learning market demand than a low-quality firm, the high-quality firm may inequilibrium adopt a penetration-pricing strategy to forgo the benefit of learning demand in orderto separate from the low-quality firm, who would adopt a skimming strategy to learn marketdemand. Third, although consumers have higher willing-to-pay for a high-quality product, thehigh-quality firm may in equilibrium charge a lower initial price than the low-quality firm. Fourth,interestingly, the high-quality firm may earn higher profits when its initial price is made underdemand uncertainty than under no uncertainty. Lastly, with perfect social learning (i.e., in the laterperiod, all consumers can learn the firm's quality from earlier customers), the high-quality firmcan in equilibrium signal its quality and learn market demand by adopting a skimming strategy.

2021 33rd Chinese Control and Decision Conference (CCDC)

2021 33rd Chinese Control and Decision Conference (CCDC) PDF Author: IEEE Staff
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781665431293
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
Chinese Control and Decision Conference (CCDC) is an annual international conference, covering both theories and applications in all areas of control, system, and decision Its purpose is to create a forum for scientists, engineers and practitioners from all over the world to present the latest developments in control, decision, robotics, automation, and other emerging technologies

Gamification: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications

Gamification: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications PDF Author: Management Association, Information Resources
Publisher: IGI Global
ISBN: 1466682019
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 2250

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Book Description
Serious games provide a unique opportunity to engage students more fully than traditional teaching approaches. Understanding the best way to utilize games and play in an educational setting is imperative for effectual learning in the twenty-first century. Gamification: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications investigates the use of games in education, both inside and outside of the classroom, and how this field once thought to be detrimental to student learning can be used to augment more formal models. This four-volume reference work is a premier source for educators, administrators, software designers, and all stakeholders in all levels of education.

Behavioral Consequences of Dynamic Pricing

Behavioral Consequences of Dynamic Pricing PDF Author: David Prakash
Publisher: BoD – Books on Demand
ISBN: 3756863514
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 155

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Book Description
Digital technologies are driving the application of dynamic pricing. Today, this pricing strategy is used not only for perishable products such as flights or hotel rooms, but for almost any product or service category. With dynamic pricing, retailers frequently adjust their prices over time to respond to factors such as demand, their supply and that of competitors, or the time of sale. Additionally, dynamic pricing allows retailers to take advantage of a large share of consumers' willingness to pay while avoiding losses from unsold products. Ultimately, this can lead to an increase in revenue and profit. However, the application of dynamic pricing comes with great challenges. In addition to the technological implementation, companies have to take into account that dynamic pricing can cause complex and unintended behavioral consequences on the consumer side. The key objective of this dissertation is to provide a deeper understanding of the impact of dynamic pricing on consumer behavior. To this end, this dissertation presents insights from four perspectives. First, how reference prices as a critical component in purchase decisions are operationalized. Second, how customers search for products priced dynamically, differentiated by business and private customers, as well as by different devices used for the search. Third, whether and how dynamic pricing influences the impact of internal reference prices on purchase decisions. Finally, this dissertation demonstrates that consumers perceive price changes as personalized in different purchase contexts, leading to reduced perceptions of fairness and undesirable behavioral consequences.

Computer-Mediated Marketing Strategies: Social Media and Online Brand Communities

Computer-Mediated Marketing Strategies: Social Media and Online Brand Communities PDF Author: Bowen, Gordon
Publisher: IGI Global
ISBN: 1466665963
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 428

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Book Description
For years, technology has been the impetus for progress in various processes, systems, and businesses; it shows no sign of ceasing further development. The application of technology-driven processes in promotionally-oriented environments has become more and more common in today’s business world. Computer-Mediated Marketing Strategies: Social Media and Online Brand Communities brings together marketing approaches and the application of current technology, such as social networking arenas, to show how this interaction creates a successful competitive advantage. Focusing on qualitative research, various technological tools, and diverse Internet environments, this book is a necessary reference source for academics, management practitioners, students, and professionals interested in the application of technology in promotionally-oriented processes.

An Aspect of New Product Planning

An Aspect of New Product Planning PDF Author: Abel P. Jeuland
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 33

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Book Description


Essays on Economics and Marketing

Essays on Economics and Marketing PDF Author: Yu-Hung Chen (Economics scholar)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic dissertations
Languages : en
Pages : 122

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Book Description
Chapter 1: Dynamic Pricing and Price Commitment of New Experience Goods An important problem for a firm selling new experience goods is how to credibly signal its high quality. This chapter develops a dynamic model to examine how a firm with a non-durable experience good can signal its quality with dynamic spot-pricing or future-price commitment. I find that when consumers do not believe the firms price commitment to be credible, the high-quality firms most profitable equilibrium outcome is to pool in the first period and separate in the second period. In contrast, when price commitment is credible, the high-quality firm may signal its quality with either a lower-than-first-best first-period price or a higher-than-first-best second-period price. Credible price commitment will benefit the high-quality firm by lowering its signaling cost and hurt the low-quality firm, but can either increase or decrease consumer surplus and social welfare depending on the quality difference between the two types of firms. Chapter 2: Dynamic Pricing of Experience Goods in Markets with Demand Uncertainty This chapter studies a firms optimal dynamic pricing strategies for its experience goods in markets, where the distribution of consumers valuations is ex ante unknown. I find several interesting findings. First, a high-quality firm can signal its quality with either a skimming-pricing strategy or a penetration-pricing strategy in the early period. Second, though a firm with higher quality benefits more from learning market demand, in equilibrium the low-quality firm not the high-quality firm will learn demand if consumers have very different willingness to pay. Third, although consumers have higher willingness to pay for the high-quality product, in the first period the high-quality firm may actually charge a lower price than the low-quality firm. Lastly, the firm may earn higher profits when its initial pricing decision is made under demand uncertainty than under no demand uncertainty. The underlying reason is that the presence of demand uncertainty can sufficiently lower the high-quality firms signaling cost, allowing it to make higher profits by setting future prices based on its high quality. Chapter 3: Who Benefits from Big Data Collected by In-Vehicle Data Recorders? The car insurance market is plagued with problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. In-vehicle data recorders can collect massive amount of information (or "big data") about the drivers risk factors and driving behaviors. This monitoring technology allows the firm to set its insurance premium based on better estimates of the drivers risk factors, alleviating the adverse selection problem. In addition, the firm can charge a premium based on the customers recorded driving behaviors; this helps to reduce the drivers moral hazard. I provide an analytical framework to examine the impact of such monitoring technology on the insurance firms and the consumers. My analysis shows that in a duopoly one firms adoption of the monitoring technology may benefit both firms because of the less severe competition in the market. Finally, I show that if one firm has adopted the monitoring technology, its competitor may have no incentive to adopt that technology even if it is free.

Experience Goods, Customer Loyalty, and Sticky Prices in a Dynamic Market

Experience Goods, Customer Loyalty, and Sticky Prices in a Dynamic Market PDF Author: Steven A. Sharpe
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Pricing
Languages : en
Pages : 49

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Book Description