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Author: Andrew Sweeting
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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We generalize recent models of dynamic price competition where sellers benefit from learning-by-doing by allowing for long-lived strategic buyers, with a single parameter capturing the extent to which each buyer internalizes future buyer surplus. Many of the equilibria that exist when buyers are atomistic or myopic are eliminated when buyers internalize even a modest share of their effects on future surplus. The equilibria that survive tend to be those where long-run market competition is preserved.
Author: Andrew Sweeting
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
We generalize recent models of dynamic price competition where sellers benefit from learning-by-doing by allowing for long-lived strategic buyers, with a single parameter capturing the extent to which each buyer internalizes future buyer surplus. Many of the equilibria that exist when buyers are atomistic or myopic are eliminated when buyers internalize even a modest share of their effects on future surplus. The equilibria that survive tend to be those where long-run market competition is preserved.
Author: Gary Biglaiser
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition, Imperfect
Languages : en
Pages : 43
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Author: James Anton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: David Besanko
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Book Description
We study industries where the price that a firm sets serves as an investment into lower cost or higher demand. We assess the welfare implications of the ensuing competition for the market using analytical and numerical approaches to compare the equilibria of a learning-by-doing model to the first-best planner solution. We show that dynamic competition leads to low deadweight loss. This cannot be attributed to similarity between the equilibria and the planner solution. Instead, we show how learning-by-doing causes the various contributions to deadweight loss to either be small or partly offset each other.
Author: Fouad Sabry
Publisher: One Billion Knowledgeable
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 374
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Book Description
What is Price Discrimination Price discrimination is a microeconomic pricing strategy where identical or largely similar goods or services are sold at different prices by the same provider in different market segments. Price discrimination is distinguished from product differentiation by the more substantial difference in production cost for the differently priced products involved in the latter strategy. Price differentiation essentially relies on the variation in the customers' willingness to pay and in the elasticity of their demand. For price discrimination to succeed, a firm must have market power, such as a dominant market share, product uniqueness, sole pricing power, etc. All prices under price discrimination are higher than the equilibrium price in a perfectly competitive market. However, some prices under price discrimination may be lower than the price charged by a single-price monopolist. Price discrimination is utilized by the monopolist to recapture some deadweight loss. This Pricing strategy enables firms to capture additional consumer surplus and maximize their profits while benefiting some consumers at lower prices. Price discrimination can take many forms and is prevalent in many industries, from education and telecommunications to healthcare. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Price discrimination Chapter 2: Monopoly Chapter 3: Monopolistic competition Chapter 4: Oligopoly Chapter 5: Perfect competition Chapter 6: Imperfect competition Chapter 7: Deadweight loss Chapter 8: Two-part tariff Chapter 9: Pricing Chapter 10: Barriers to entry Chapter 11: Yield management Chapter 12: Market power Chapter 13: Non-price competition Chapter 14: Market structure Chapter 15: Pricing strategies Chapter 16: Dynamic pricing Chapter 17: Revenue management Chapter 18: Value-based pricing Chapter 19: Rental value Chapter 20: Profit (economics) Chapter 21: Monopoly price (II) Answering the public top questions about price discrimination. (III) Real world examples for the usage of price discrimination in many fields. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Price Discrimination.
Author: Carine Anne Marie Simon
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 204
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Book Description
(cont.) Finally, we consider closed-loop strategies in a duopoly market when demand is stochastic. Unlike open-loop policies (such policies are computed once and for all at the beginning of the time horizon), closed loop policies are computed at each time period, so that the firm can take advantage of having observed the past random disturbances in the market. In a closed-loop setting, subgame perfect equilibrium is the relevant notion of equilibrium. We investigate the existence and uniqueness of a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy, as well as approximations of the problem in order to be able to compute such policies more efficiently.
Author: Oksana Loginova
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Book Description
A two-period model in which a monopolist endeavors to learn about the permanent demand parameter of a specific repeat buyer is investigated. The buyer may strategically reject the seller's first-period offer for one of two reasons. First, in order to conceal information (i.e., to pool), a high-valuation buyer may reject high prices that would never be accepted by a low-valuation buyer. Second, in order to reveal information (i.e., to signal), a low-valuation buyer may reject low prices that would always be accepted by a high-valuation buyer. Given this, the seller often finds it optimal to post prices that reveal no useful information. Indeed, in the equilibrium where there is no signaling, the seller never charges an informative first-period price. Learning may occur in the equilibrium where there is maximal signaling, but the scope for learning is quite limited even in this case. Indeed, in order to preempt information transmission through signaling, the seller may be induced to set a first-period price strictly below the buyer's lowest possible valuation.
Author: Abraham Neyman
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401001898
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 466
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Book Description
This volume is based on lectures given at the NATO Advanced Study Institute on "Stochastic Games and Applications," which took place at Stony Brook, NY, USA, July 1999. It gives the editors great pleasure to present it on the occasion of L.S. Shapley's eightieth birthday, and on the fiftieth "birthday" of his seminal paper "Stochastic Games," with which this volume opens. We wish to thank NATO for the grant that made the Institute and this volume possible, and the Center for Game Theory in Economics of the State University of New York at Stony Brook for hosting this event. We also wish to thank the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, for providing continuing financial support, without which this project would never have been completed. In particular, we are grateful to our editorial assistant Mike Borns, whose work has been indispensable. We also would like to acknowledge the support of the Ecole Poly tech nique, Paris, and the Israel Science Foundation. March 2003 Abraham Neyman and Sylvain Sorin ix STOCHASTIC GAMES L.S. SHAPLEY University of California at Los Angeles Los Angeles, USA 1. Introduction In a stochastic game the play proceeds by steps from position to position, according to transition probabilities controlled jointly by the two players.
Author: Gianluigi Vernasca
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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Book Description
Author: David Besanko
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 0470373601
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 595
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Book Description
In today's global recession, strong management of firms and organizations are of the utmost importance. Best-selling Economics of Strategy focuses on the key economic concepts students must master in order to develop a sound business strategy. Bringing economic theory and strategic analysis to life in an engaging and uniquely modern way, Besanko et al. have collaborated for over 15 years to build an introductory business course that combines basic concepts from economic theory of the firm and industrial organization with ideas from modern strategy literature. The newly revised 5th edition offers more real-world applications to make materials studied in undergraduate Managerial Economics, Business Strategy, and Industrial Organization courses relevant. Armed with general principles, today's students—tomorrow's future managers—will be prepared to adjust their firms' business strategies to the demands of the ever-changing environment.
