Does Rational Learning Lead to Nash Equilibrium in Finitely Repeated Games? PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Does Rational Learning Lead to Nash Equilibrium in Finitely Repeated Games? PDF full book. Access full book title Does Rational Learning Lead to Nash Equilibrium in Finitely Repeated Games? by Alvaro Sandroni. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Alvaro Sandroni
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Alvaro Sandroni
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262011471
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 372
Get Book Here
Book Description
The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Author: Alfred R. Mele
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 9780198033240
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 498
Get Book Here
Book Description
Rationality has long been a central topic in philosophy, crossing standard divisions and categories. It continues to attract much attention in published research and teaching by philosophers as well as scholars in other disciplines, including economics, psychology, and law. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality is an indispensable reference to the current state of play in this vital and interdisciplinary area of study. Twenty-two newly commissioned chapters by a roster of distinguished philosophers provide an overview of the prominent views on rationality, with each author also developing a unique and distinctive argument.
Author: Patrick M. Emerson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Energy policy
Languages : en
Pages : 1136
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262061940
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 304
Get Book Here
Book Description
This work explains that equilibrium is the long-run outcome of a process in which non-fully rational players search for optimality over time. The models they e×plore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.
Author: H. Peyton Young
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199269181
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 178
Get Book Here
Book Description
Table of contents
Author: F. H. Hahn
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521203265
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 52
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Nimrod Megiddo
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461226481
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 209
Get Book Here
Book Description
This volume presents a collection of papers on game theory dedicated to Michael Maschler. Through his dedication and contributions to game theory, Maschler has become an important figure particularly in the area of cooperative games. Game theory has since become an important subject in operations research, economics and management science. As befits such a volume, the main themes covered are cooperative games, coalitions, repeated games, and a cost allocation games. All the contributions are authoritative surveys of a particular topic, so together they will present an invaluable overview of the field to all those working on game theory problems.
Author: Robert Axelrod
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400822300
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 247
Get Book Here
Book Description
Robert Axelrod is widely known for his groundbreaking work in game theory and complexity theory. He is a leader in applying computer modeling to social science problems. His book The Evolution of Cooperation has been hailed as a seminal contribution and has been translated into eight languages since its initial publication. The Complexity of Cooperation is a sequel to that landmark book. It collects seven essays, originally published in a broad range of journals, and adds an extensive new introduction to the collection, along with new prefaces to each essay and a useful new appendix of additional resources. Written in Axelrod's acclaimed, accessible style, this collection serves as an introductory text on complexity theory and computer modeling in the social sciences and as an overview of the current state of the art in the field. The articles move beyond the basic paradigm of the Prisoner's Dilemma to study a rich set of issues, including how to cope with errors in perception or implementation, how norms emerge, and how new political actors and regions of shared culture can develop. They use the shared methodology of agent-based modeling, a powerful technique that specifies the rules of interaction between individuals and uses computer simulation to discover emergent properties of the social system. The Complexity of Cooperation is essential reading for all social scientists who are interested in issues of cooperation and complexity.
