Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006 (RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Paper 6). PDF Download
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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 49
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Book Description
The publication of a new COIN doctrine manual in late 2006 was widely heralded as an indication that the U.S. military was finally coming to understand the problems it has recently faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. This interpretation assumes a tight linkage between doctrine as written and operations conducted. As one way to test this proposition, this paper compares modern COIN doctrine and operations with those of the 1960s. In the 1960s, COIN doctrine as written by both the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps emphasized the role of the population (so-called hearts and minds), civil-military relations, small-unit operations, intelligence gathering, and related concepts. Yet operations seldom matched this written doctrine; instead, the military attempted to attrite the insurgency through large-scale operations and heavy reliance on firepower. In short, doctrine as written and operations conducted were not tightly linked. As at least a partial explanation for this weak linkage, this paper posits a deeper set of organizational concepts and beliefs that has a much greater influence on operations than written doctrine. While a set of beliefs can often be helpful to organizations in conducting their preferred missions, it can be detrimental in other contexts. Much of the U.S. military prefers high-intensity warfare, a mission for which the organization is mentally and materially well prepared. However, mental preparation for this mission makes the military poorly suited to COIN. Altering the set of beliefs oriented toward high-intensity warfare will require more than just new doctrine and some additional professional education. It will require significant reorientation of the services both mentally and materially. If correct, this paper casts doubt on the military's ability to truly be a full-spectrum force, because attempting to optimize for the full spectrum of conflict may produce a force that is not particularly good at any one aspect of that spectrum.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 49
Get Book Here
Book Description
The publication of a new COIN doctrine manual in late 2006 was widely heralded as an indication that the U.S. military was finally coming to understand the problems it has recently faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. This interpretation assumes a tight linkage between doctrine as written and operations conducted. As one way to test this proposition, this paper compares modern COIN doctrine and operations with those of the 1960s. In the 1960s, COIN doctrine as written by both the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps emphasized the role of the population (so-called hearts and minds), civil-military relations, small-unit operations, intelligence gathering, and related concepts. Yet operations seldom matched this written doctrine; instead, the military attempted to attrite the insurgency through large-scale operations and heavy reliance on firepower. In short, doctrine as written and operations conducted were not tightly linked. As at least a partial explanation for this weak linkage, this paper posits a deeper set of organizational concepts and beliefs that has a much greater influence on operations than written doctrine. While a set of beliefs can often be helpful to organizations in conducting their preferred missions, it can be detrimental in other contexts. Much of the U.S. military prefers high-intensity warfare, a mission for which the organization is mentally and materially well prepared. However, mental preparation for this mission makes the military poorly suited to COIN. Altering the set of beliefs oriented toward high-intensity warfare will require more than just new doctrine and some additional professional education. It will require significant reorientation of the services both mentally and materially. If correct, this paper casts doubt on the military's ability to truly be a full-spectrum force, because attempting to optimize for the full spectrum of conflict may produce a force that is not particularly good at any one aspect of that spectrum.
Author: Austin Long
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833045350
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 47
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Book Description
By comparing modern counterinsurgency doctrine and operations to those of 1960s, this paper tests and ultimately disproves the assumption that doctrine as written and operations as conducted are tightly linked. Ingrained organizational concepts and beliefs have a much greater influence on operations than written doctrine, and altering these beliefs will require the U.S. military to reorient itself mentally as well as physically.
Author: Austin G. Long
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833044702
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 47
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Book Description
"The publication of a new counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine manual in late 2006 was widely heralded as an indication that the U.S. military was finally coming to understand the problems it has recently faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, this interpretation assumes a tight linkage between doctrine as written and operations as actually conducted. By comparing modern counterinsurgency doctrine and operations to those of 1960s, this paper tests and ultimately disproves this proposition. An examination of COIN doctrine and operations in the 1960s reveals that operations seldom matched written doctrine. Instead of winning hearts and minds, improving civil-military relations, conducting small-unit operations, and gathering intelligence, most Vietnam War commanders and units attempted to defeat the insurgency through large-scale operations and overwhelming firepower. Modern U.S. COIN operations in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate a similar preference for high-intensity warfare and a similar inability to adapt technologically and mentally to the requirements of COIN. To help explain the discrepancy between written doctrine and actual operations, this paper posits that ingrained organizational concepts and beliefs have a much greater influence on operations than written doctrine. While embedded beliefs can help organizations as they conduct their preferred missions, they can be detrimental in other contexts. Mental and material preparation for high-intensity warfare has made the U.S. military poorly suited to COIN. Altering these beliefs will require more than just new doctrine and some additional professional education: The services must reorient themselves mentally as well as physically." -- provided by publisher.
Author: Gregory Daddis
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199316503
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 281
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Book Description
This groundbreaking study offers a major reinterpretation of American strategy during the first half of the Vietnam War. Gregory A. Daddis argues senior military leaders developed a comprehensive campaign strategy, one not confined to 'attrition' of enemy forces. This innovative work is a must for a genuine understanding of the Vietnam War.
Author: Thomas Rid
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136976051
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 281
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Book Description
This textbook offers an accessible introduction to counterinsurgency operations, a key aspect of modern warfare. Featuring essays by some of the world’s leading experts on unconventional conflict, both scholars and practitioners, the book discusses how modern regular armed forces react, and should react, to irregular warfare. The volume is divided into three main sections: Doctrinal Origins: analysing the intellectual and historical roots of modern Western theory and practice Operational Aspects: examining the specific role of various military services in counterinsurgency, but also special forces, intelligence, and local security forces Challenges: looking at wider issues, such as governance, culture, ethics, civil-military cooperation, information operations, and time. Understanding Counterinsurgency is the first comprehensive textbook on counterinsurgency, and will be essential reading for all students of small wars, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, strategic studies and security studies, both in graduate and undergraduate courses as well as in professional military schools.
Author: Aaron P. Jackson
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 1040150624
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 180
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Book Description
This book examines the newly emergent field of military design thinking, how it has been developed inside and outside of military doctrine, and the paradigms that underlie its key thinkers and methodologies. From the emergence of its initial methodologies in the late 1990s, military design thinking’s development rapidly accelerated in the mid-2000s in response to perceived failures of existing military doctrine and practice to adapt to the wars of the early 21st century. To establish a foundation for exploring the significance of the challenge military design thinking presented to dominant approaches to warfare, the early chapters in the book examine the ontology and epistemology of military doctrine, which is defined as a written expression of a military’s institutional belief system regarding how to wage war. They also explain how attempts to incorporate military design thinking into doctrine ultimately led to its assimilation into this belief system, requiring military design thinkers to continue to explore and develop the field outside of doctrine. Since the mid-2010s, non-doctrinal military design methodologies have become increasingly prominent within several Western militaries, including the US, Canada, UK, Australia, and several European militaries. Later chapters offer an exploration of the paradigms underlying non-doctrinal as well as doctrinal design methodologies. This book highlights how the field has evolved, shows how military design thinking differs from its ‘civilian’ equivalents developed in fields such as commerce and business management, and discusses how it may evolve in the near future. This book will be of much interest to students of military studies, security studies, and international relations, as well as to military professionals.
Author: Peter Bergen
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199893098
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 516
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Book Description
Essays by experts exploring the intersection of geography, religion, foreign policy, and terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Author: Beatrice Heuser
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107135044
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 399
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Book Description
A study of the evolving 'national styles' of conducting insurgencies and counter-insurgency, as influenced by transnational trends, ideas and practices.
Author: Benjamin R. Beede
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136989900
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 546
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Book Description
The Small Wars of the United States, 1899–2009 is the complete bibliography of works on US military intervention and irregular warfare around the world, as well as efforts to quell insurgencies on behalf of American allies. The text covers conflicts from 1898 to present, with detailed annotations of selected sources. In this second edition, Benjamin R. Beede revises his seminal work, bringing it completely up to date, including entries on the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. An invaluable research tool, The Small Wars of the United States, 1899–2009 is a critical resource for students and scholars studying US military history.
Author: Winifred Tate
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 0804795673
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 300
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Book Description
In 2000, the U.S. passed a major aid package that was going to help Colombia do it all: cut drug trafficking, defeat leftist guerrillas, support peace, and build democracy. More than 80% of the assistance, however, was military aid, at a time when the Colombian security forces were linked to abusive, drug-trafficking paramilitary forces. Drugs, Thugs, and Diplomats examines the U.S. policymaking process in the design, implementation, and consequences of Plan Colombia, as the aid package came to be known. Winifred Tate explores the rhetoric and practice of foreign policy by the U.S. State Department, the Pentagon, Congress, and the U.S. military Southern Command. Tate's ethnography uncovers how policymakers' utopian visions and emotional entanglements play a profound role in their efforts to orchestrate and impose social transformation abroad. She argues that U.S. officials' zero tolerance for illegal drugs provided the ideological architecture for the subsequent militarization of domestic drug policy abroad. The U.S. also ignored Colombian state complicity with paramilitary brutality, presenting them as evidence of an absent state and the authentic expression of a frustrated middle class. For rural residents of Colombia living under paramilitary dominion, these denials circulated as a form of state terror. Tate's analysis examines how oppositional activists and the policy's targets—civilians and local state officials in southern Colombia—attempted to shape aid design and delivery, revealing the process and effects of human rights policymaking.
