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Author: Michael Klein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Once a government has decided to award a concession by auction, it needs to decide what kind of auction to use. For concessions the standard is a first-price sealed bid auction in which bidders submit sealed envelopes containing their offer and the highest offer determines the price. The bidding may occur in one or two stages. In two-stage bidding the technical parameters of the bids are made comparable in the first stage, and only the main offer on the core bid parameter is submitted in the second. The main offer may relate to a price, a level of subsidy, a payment for net worth, or any other appropriate parameter; the discussion in this Note focuses on price.
Author: Michael Klein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Once a government has decided to award a concession by auction, it needs to decide what kind of auction to use. For concessions the standard is a first-price sealed bid auction in which bidders submit sealed envelopes containing their offer and the highest offer determines the price. The bidding may occur in one or two stages. In two-stage bidding the technical parameters of the bids are made comparable in the first stage, and only the main offer on the core bid parameter is submitted in the second. The main offer may relate to a price, a level of subsidy, a payment for net worth, or any other appropriate parameter; the discussion in this Note focuses on price.
Author: Michael Klein
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 27
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Book Description
En la última década ha sido práctica común la privatización de empresas gestoras de infraestructura, en sectores como el del transporte, las telecomunicaciones, la energía y el agua. Muy a menudo se adjudican a empresas privadas franquicias monopolistas, mediante concesiones a largo plazo. En este trabajo se analizan aquellas cuestiones relacionadas con el diseño de estos contratos de concesión y su adjudicación a empresas privadas.
Author: Michael Klein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Infrastructure concession contracts set out the performance obligations and rights of concessionaires and the incentives and risks under which they operate, including pricing arrangements. The clarity with which these terms can be defined determines whether there is likely to be renegotiations after contract award, which may undermine the significance of the initial auction. The design of incentives and risk allocation will affect first the intensity of competition and then the sustainability of the original contract. This Note examines these issues.
Author: Barry Johan Ubbels
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 25
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Book Description
Author: Claude Crampes
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Communication
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Book Description
Author: David J. Salant
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262028263
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 199
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Book Description
A guide to modeling and analyzing auctions, with the applications of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction decision making. Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions. This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.
Author: Luiz Maurer
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 082138824X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 181
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Book Description
Electricity-contract auctions have been getting increased attention as they have emerged as a successful mechanism to procure new generation capacity and. This book presents a comprehensive overview of international experiences in auction design and implementation.
Author: Luke Hu
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783844025132
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 89
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Book Description
Author: Uğur Emek
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789751932631
Category : Global system for mobile communications
Languages : en
Pages : 35
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Book Description
Author: Michael U. Klein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 27
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Book Description
When privatization transforms a public infrastructure monopoly into a private one by means of a long-term concession agreement, how should concession contracts be designed and awarded?In the past decade it has become popular to privatize infrastructure ventures in such sectors as energy, telecommunications, transport, and water. For good reasons or bad, private firms are often given monopoly franchises through long-term concession agreements (for example, build-operate-transfer schemes).Klein surveys issues associated with the design of such concession contracts and their award to private parties. The discussion focuses on:- Contract design (what is to be awarded).- Whether to use competitive bidding or negotiation to make the award.- How to structure competitive bidding.- Who conducts the auction and who monitors the concessionaires` performance.To encourage efficient performance and to minimize post-award renegotiation, it is crucial to consistently and comprehensively define performance specifications and the parameters of incentives and risk-sharing. As a rule the concession award should be made competitively, unless there are good reasons to do otherwise, such as excessive transactions costs (for the size of the contract) or special requirements for speed or innovation.Typically, competitive concession awards are made by first-price sealed bids. In a number of cases, however, there are strong arguments for open auctions. Concessions may also be re-awarded by way of auction, although somewhat arbitrary bid preferences may have to be set.Auctioneers for complex concession contracts should operate at arm's length from all interested parties, including politicians. It may make sense to let independent agencies that regulate the concession scheme run the auction.This paper - a product of the Private Participation in Infrastructure Division, Private Sector Development Department - s part of a larger effort in the department to analyze issues on private participation in infrastructure. The author may be contacted at
[email protected].
