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Author: Colin S. Gray
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Strategy
Languages : en
Pages : 56
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Book Description
"The author explores the concept of victory in the war in terrorism, but he does so by placing it within the larger currents of change that are sweeping the global security environment. He contends that the time-tested idea of decisive victory is still an important one, but must be designed very carefully in this dangerous new world. To do so correctly can provide the foundation for an effective strategy. To fail to do so could be the first step toward strategic defeat."--SSI site.
Author: Colin S. Gray
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Strategy
Languages : en
Pages : 56
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Book Description
"The author explores the concept of victory in the war in terrorism, but he does so by placing it within the larger currents of change that are sweeping the global security environment. He contends that the time-tested idea of decisive victory is still an important one, but must be designed very carefully in this dangerous new world. To do so correctly can provide the foundation for an effective strategy. To fail to do so could be the first step toward strategic defeat."--SSI site.
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428910921
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Book Description
Author: Colin S. Gray
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781584870890
Category : Strategy
Languages : en
Pages : 45
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Book Description
Author: Colin S. Gray
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781312342286
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
The United States was thrust so suddenly into the war on terrorism that it was forced to deal with both immediate operational issues and broad strategic questions simultaneously. Even while the American military is consolidating battlefield success in Afghanistan, strategic thinkers and leaders are developing a long-term strategy. In this process, nothing is more important than defining victory. In this monograph, Dr. Colin Gray, one of the world's leading strategic thinkers, explores the concept of victory in the war in terrorism, but he does so by placing it within the larger currents of change that are sweeping the global security environment. He contends that the time-tested idea of decisive victory is still an important one, but must be designed very carefully in this dangerous new world. To do so correctly can provide the foundation for an effective strategy. To fail to do so could be the first step toward strategic defeat.
Author: Carl von Clausewitz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 388
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Book Description
Author: Brad Roberts
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781952565014
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
While the United States and its allies put their military focus on the post-9/11 challenges of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, Russia and China put their military focus onto the United States and the risks of regional wars that they came to believe they might have to fight against the United States. Their first priority was to put their intellectual houses in order-that is, to adapt military thought and strategic planning to the new problem. The result is a set of ideas about how to bring the United States and its allies to a "culminating point" where they choose to no longer run the costs and risks of continued war. This is the "red theory of victory." Beginning in the second presidential term of Obama administration, the U.S. military focus began to shift, driven by rising Russian and Chinese military assertiveness and outspoken opposition to the regional security orders on their peripheries. But U.S. military thought has been slow to catch up. As a recent bipartisan congressional commission concluded, the U.S. intellectual house is dangerously out of order for this new strategic problem. There is no Blue theory of victory. Such a theory should explain how the United States and its allies can strip away the confidence of leaders in Moscow and Beijing (and Pyongyang) in their "escalation calculus"-that is, that they will judge the costs too high, the benefits to low, and the risks incalculable. To develop, improve, and implement the needed new concepts requires a broad campaign of activities by the United States and full partnership with its allies.
Author: Marc I. Alderman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military planning
Languages : en
Pages : 56
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Book Description
The monograph evaluates the viability of quick decisive victory as a principle of U.S. military strategy. Modern concepts of quick decisive victory form the cornerstone of present U.S. military strategy. These concepts originated from the Weinberger Doctrine, but the principle of decisive force in the 1992 National Military Strategy Document, now establishes the framework for quick decisive victory. Today the U.S. military is using quick decisive victory to provide a clear focus while moving from a grand strategy based on a Cold War global context to a grand strategy based on a Post-Cold War regional context. Although the idea of quick decisive victory has strong support within the military services some political-military analysts claim ;it too narrowly defines-the limits of U.S. military power in a monopolar strategic environment. Therefore, this monograph examines the suitability of quick decisive victory as a defining element of U.S. military strategy. To accomplish this examination, the monograph first conducts a historical analysis of two decisive victories: the Ulm-Austerlitz campaign of 1805; and the 1940 campaign for France. This analysis identifies the strategic and operational conditions supporting quick decisive victory. Secondly, the monograph assesses the present strategic environment and compares present conditions with the historical analysis. Finally, the monograph evaluates the comparative assessment to determine possible benefits and risks for codifying quick decisive victory in U.S. military strategy.
Author: Christopher D. Kolenda
Publisher: University Press of Kentucky
ISBN: 0813152836
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 400
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Book Description
Why have the major post-9/11 US military interventions turned into quagmires? Despite huge power imbalances in the United States' favor, significant capacity-building efforts, and repeated tactical victories by what many observers call the world's best military, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq turned intractable. The US government's fixation on zero-sum, decisive victory in these conflicts is a key reason why military operations to overthrow two developing-world regimes failed to successfully achieve favorable and durable outcomes. In Zero-Sum Victory, retired US Army colonel Christopher D. Kolenda identifies three interrelated problems that have emerged from the government's insistence on zero-sum victory. First, the US government has no organized way to measure successful outcomes other than a decisive military victory, and thus, selects strategies that overestimate the possibility of such an outcome. Second, the United States is slow to recognize and modify or abandon losing strategies; in both cases, US officials believe their strategies are working, even as the situation deteriorates. Third, once the United States decides to withdraw, bargaining asymmetries and disconnects in strategy undermine the prospects for a successful transition or negotiated outcome. Relying on historic examples and personal experience, Kolenda draws thought-provoking and actionable conclusions about the utility of American military power in the contemporary world—insights that serve as a starting point for future scholarship as well as for important national security reforms.
Author: John D. Caldwell
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 153811478X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 569
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Book Description
This groundbreaking book provides the first systematic comparison of America’s modern wars and why they were won or lost. John D. Caldwell uses the World War II victory as the historical benchmark for evaluating the success and failure of later conflicts. Unlike WWII, the Korean, Vietnam, and Iraqi Wars were limited, but they required enormous national commitments, produced no lasting victories, and generated bitter political controversies. Caldwell comprehensively examines these four wars through the lens of a strategic architecture to explain how and why their outcomes were so dramatically different. He defines a strategic architecture as an interlinked set of continually evolving policies, strategies, and operations by which combatant states work toward a desired end. Policy defines the high-level goals a nation seeks to achieve once it initiates a conflict or finds itself drawn into one. Policy makers direct a broad course of action and strive to control the initiative. When they make decisions, they have to respond to unforeseen conditions to guide and determine future decisions. Effective leaders are skilled at organizing constituencies they need to succeed and communicating to them convincingly. Strategy means employing whatever resources are available to achieve policy goals in situations that are dynamic as conflicts change quickly over time. Operations are the actions that occur when politicians, soldiers, and diplomats execute plans. A strategic architecture, Caldwell argues, is thus not a static blueprint but a dynamic vision of how a state can succeed or fail in a conflict.
Author: Richard V. Barbuto
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781940804385
Category : Battles
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
