Author: Dr. Edward J. Drea
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1782894578
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 188
Book Description
Illustrated with 32 maps, 8 Illustrations and 4 charts. On the night of 10-11 July 1944, several thousand Japanese infantrymen attacked and broke through U.S. Army covering force units defending the Driniumor River about twenty miles east of Aitape, New Guinea. For the next month U.S. Army troops were locked in a battle of attrition with the Japanese, as the Americans fought to restore the breakthrough line and destroy the Japanese attackers. This Leavenworth Paper describes the events leading up to the Japanese breakthrough and the subsequent American counterattacks to restore the original defensive positions. This Leavenworth Paper provides a day-by-day account of the course of the battle. Naturally not every moment was spent fighting, so commensurate attention is given to tactical planning, logistics, combat support-those oft-times overlooked functions that are only noticeable by their absence. There is sufficient detail for an in-depth analysis of both combatants’ doctrine, effectiveness of training, tactics, leadership, and unit cohesion...The combatants created their doctrine and applied it in combat isolated from the "Big Picture." Their concern was more basic, to survive. Training, previous combat experience, and leadership seem to have been the ingredients that most contributed to unit cohesion in the struggle. Those naturally developed unit bonds provided the underpinning for morale factors essential in protracted battle in a harsh natural environment. By the same token, one should not infer that tactics were therefore flawless and leadership bold and imaginative. In most cases, the opposite appears true. The reasons for this apparent contradiction unfold with the developing battle. By approaching these questions from the small unit perspective, one gains a fresh insight into the U.S. Army’s historic jungle warfare campaigns as well as a tactical appreciation of the enormous difficulties both sides experienced in the jungled terrain.
DEFENDING THE DRINIUMOR: Covering Force Operations in New Guinea, 1944 [Illustrated Edition]
Defending the Driniumor
Author: Edward J. Drea
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Papua New Guinea
Languages : en
Pages : 182
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Papua New Guinea
Languages : en
Pages : 182
Book Description
Hell in Hürtgen Forest
Author: Robert Sterling Rush
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
ISBN: 0700613609
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 423
Book Description
Some of the most brutally intense infantry combat in World War II occurred within Germany's Hrtgen Forest. Focusing on the bitterly fought battle between the American 22d Infantry Regiment and elements of the German LXXIV Korps around Grosshau, Rush chronicles small-unit combat at its most extreme and shows why, despite enormous losses, the Americans persevered in the Hrtgenwald "meat grinder," a battle similar to two punch-drunk fighters staggering to survive the round. On 16 November 1944, the 22d Infantry entered the Hürtgen Forest as part of the U.S. Army's drive to cross the Roer River. During the next eighteen days, the 22d suffered more than 2,800 casualties-or about 86 percent of its normal strength of about 3,250 officers and men. After three days of fighting, the regiment had lost all three battalion commanders. After seven days, rifle company strengths stood at 50 percent and by battle's end each had suffered nearly 140 percent casualties. Despite these horrendous losses, the 22d Regiment survived and fought on, due in part to army personnel policies that ensured that unit strengths remained high even during extreme combat. Previously wounded soldiers returned to their units and new replacements, "green" to battle, arrived to follow the remaining battle-hardened cadre. The attack halted only when no veterans remained to follow. The German units in the Hrtgenwald suffered the same horrendous attrition, with one telling difference. German replacement policy detracted from rather than enhanced German combat effectiveness. Organizations had high paper strength but low manpower, and commanders consolidated decimated units time after time until these ever-dwindling bands of soldiers disappeared forever: killed, wounded, captured, or surrendered. The performance of American and German forces during this harrowing eighteen days of combat was largely a product of their respective backgrounds, training, and organization. This pre-battle aspect, not normally seen in combat history, helps explain why the Americans were successful and the Germans were not. Rush's work underscores both the horrors of combat and the resiliency of American organizations. While honoring the sacrifice and triumph of the common soldier, it also compels us to reexamine our views on the requisites for victory on the battlefield.
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
ISBN: 0700613609
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 423
Book Description
Some of the most brutally intense infantry combat in World War II occurred within Germany's Hrtgen Forest. Focusing on the bitterly fought battle between the American 22d Infantry Regiment and elements of the German LXXIV Korps around Grosshau, Rush chronicles small-unit combat at its most extreme and shows why, despite enormous losses, the Americans persevered in the Hrtgenwald "meat grinder," a battle similar to two punch-drunk fighters staggering to survive the round. On 16 November 1944, the 22d Infantry entered the Hürtgen Forest as part of the U.S. Army's drive to cross the Roer River. During the next eighteen days, the 22d suffered more than 2,800 casualties-or about 86 percent of its normal strength of about 3,250 officers and men. After three days of fighting, the regiment had lost all three battalion commanders. After seven days, rifle company strengths stood at 50 percent and by battle's end each had suffered nearly 140 percent casualties. Despite these horrendous losses, the 22d Regiment survived and fought on, due in part to army personnel policies that ensured that unit strengths remained high even during extreme combat. Previously wounded soldiers returned to their units and new replacements, "green" to battle, arrived to follow the remaining battle-hardened cadre. The attack halted only when no veterans remained to follow. The German units in the Hrtgenwald suffered the same horrendous attrition, with one telling difference. German replacement policy detracted from rather than enhanced German combat effectiveness. Organizations had high paper strength but low manpower, and commanders consolidated decimated units time after time until these ever-dwindling bands of soldiers disappeared forever: killed, wounded, captured, or surrendered. The performance of American and German forces during this harrowing eighteen days of combat was largely a product of their respective backgrounds, training, and organization. This pre-battle aspect, not normally seen in combat history, helps explain why the Americans were successful and the Germans were not. Rush's work underscores both the horrors of combat and the resiliency of American organizations. While honoring the sacrifice and triumph of the common soldier, it also compels us to reexamine our views on the requisites for victory on the battlefield.
War in the Pacific
Author: Bernard C. Nalty
Publisher: University of Oklahoma Press
ISBN: 9780806131993
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 312
Book Description
The collective effort of ten military historians describes World War II's Pacific campaign, describing each step of the conflict with clarity and in exhaustive detail. Color maps. Photos, many in color.
Publisher: University of Oklahoma Press
ISBN: 9780806131993
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 312
Book Description
The collective effort of ten military historians describes World War II's Pacific campaign, describing each step of the conflict with clarity and in exhaustive detail. Color maps. Photos, many in color.
Defending the Driniumor
Author: Edward J. Drea
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 196
Book Description
The planning and maneuvering that brought Japanese and American forces to the Driniumor River serve as the focus for the first part of this study. As the battle raged, however, the respective commanders had to depend on the collective skills of their individual soldiers and hope that their operational deployments, training, and tactical doctrine would bring them victory. The tactical struggle, or second phase, then, was as removed from the strategic and operational phase as the experience of the officers and men on the front line was from the abstract map symbols that represented their units at higher headquarters. This paper seeks to integrate American and Japanese strategic, operational, tactical, and human dimensions into a narrative form. The focus is on the 112th Cavalry Regiment because that unit played a significant role in defeating a numerically superior Japanese force that tried to outflank an American covering force. Ultra adds the intelligence dimension to American decision making.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 196
Book Description
The planning and maneuvering that brought Japanese and American forces to the Driniumor River serve as the focus for the first part of this study. As the battle raged, however, the respective commanders had to depend on the collective skills of their individual soldiers and hope that their operational deployments, training, and tactical doctrine would bring them victory. The tactical struggle, or second phase, then, was as removed from the strategic and operational phase as the experience of the officers and men on the front line was from the abstract map symbols that represented their units at higher headquarters. This paper seeks to integrate American and Japanese strategic, operational, tactical, and human dimensions into a narrative form. The focus is on the 112th Cavalry Regiment because that unit played a significant role in defeating a numerically superior Japanese force that tried to outflank an American covering force. Ultra adds the intelligence dimension to American decision making.
Rangers
Author: Michael Julius King
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 102
Book Description
This Leavenworth Paper is a critical reconstruction of World War II Ranger operations conducted at or near Djebel el Ank, Tunisia; Porto Empedocle, Sicily; Cisterna, Italy; Zerf, Germany; and Cabanatuan in the Philippines. It is not intended to be a comprehensive account of World War II Ranger operations, for such a study would have to include numerous minor actions that are too poorly documented to be studied to advantage. It is, however, representative for it examines several types of operations conducted against the troops of three enemy nations in a variety of physical and tactical environments. As such, it draws a wide range of lessons useful to combat leaders who may have to conduct such operations or be on guard against them in the future. Many factors determined the outcomes of the operations featured in this Leavenworth Paper, and of these there are four that are important enough to merit special emphasis. These are surprise, the quality of opposing forces, the success of friendly forces with which the Rangers were cooperating, and popular support.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 102
Book Description
This Leavenworth Paper is a critical reconstruction of World War II Ranger operations conducted at or near Djebel el Ank, Tunisia; Porto Empedocle, Sicily; Cisterna, Italy; Zerf, Germany; and Cabanatuan in the Philippines. It is not intended to be a comprehensive account of World War II Ranger operations, for such a study would have to include numerous minor actions that are too poorly documented to be studied to advantage. It is, however, representative for it examines several types of operations conducted against the troops of three enemy nations in a variety of physical and tactical environments. As such, it draws a wide range of lessons useful to combat leaders who may have to conduct such operations or be on guard against them in the future. Many factors determined the outcomes of the operations featured in this Leavenworth Paper, and of these there are four that are important enough to merit special emphasis. These are surprise, the quality of opposing forces, the success of friendly forces with which the Rangers were cooperating, and popular support.
Multi-Domain Battle in the Southwest Pacific Theater of World War II
Author: Combat Studies Institute Press
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781086087291
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 188
Book Description
"Multi-Domain Battle in the Southwest Pacific Theater of World War II" provides a historical account of how US forces used synchronized operations in the air, maritime, information, and land domains to defeat the Japanese Empire. This work offers a historical case that illuminates current thinking about future campaigns in which coordination among all domains will be critical for success.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781086087291
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 188
Book Description
"Multi-Domain Battle in the Southwest Pacific Theater of World War II" provides a historical account of how US forces used synchronized operations in the air, maritime, information, and land domains to defeat the Japanese Empire. This work offers a historical case that illuminates current thinking about future campaigns in which coordination among all domains will be critical for success.
The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation
Author: James F. Gebhardt
Publisher: Militarybookshop.CompanyUK
ISBN: 9781780392677
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 202
Book Description
Originally published in 1989, this a volume from the Combat Studies Institute "Leavenworth Papers" series. In the fall of 1944, some 56,000 German troops of the XIX Mountain Corps were occupying a strongpoint line just 70 kilometers northwest of Murmansk, about 200 miles north of the Arctic Circle. To clear these enemy forces from Soviet territory, STA VKA ordered General K. A. Meretskov's Karelian Front to plan and conduct an offensive, which was to be supported by Admiral A. G. Golovko's Northern Fleet. This Leavenworth Paper explains the planning and conduct of this offensive, known in Soviet military historiography as the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation. The Soviet force of approximately 96,000 men was organized into a main attack force of two rifle corps, a corps- size economy-of-force formation, and two envelopment forces, one consisting of two naval infantry brigades and the other of two light rifle corps of two brigades each. The Soviets employed over 2,100 tubes of artillery and mortars, used 110 tanks and self-propelled guns, and enjoyed overwhelming air superiority. Engineer special-purpose troops infiltrated up to fifty kilometers behind German forward positions to conduct reconnaissance before the battle. On 7 October 1944, the Soviets began the offensive with a 97,000-round artillery preparation, followed by an infantry attack.
Publisher: Militarybookshop.CompanyUK
ISBN: 9781780392677
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 202
Book Description
Originally published in 1989, this a volume from the Combat Studies Institute "Leavenworth Papers" series. In the fall of 1944, some 56,000 German troops of the XIX Mountain Corps were occupying a strongpoint line just 70 kilometers northwest of Murmansk, about 200 miles north of the Arctic Circle. To clear these enemy forces from Soviet territory, STA VKA ordered General K. A. Meretskov's Karelian Front to plan and conduct an offensive, which was to be supported by Admiral A. G. Golovko's Northern Fleet. This Leavenworth Paper explains the planning and conduct of this offensive, known in Soviet military historiography as the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation. The Soviet force of approximately 96,000 men was organized into a main attack force of two rifle corps, a corps- size economy-of-force formation, and two envelopment forces, one consisting of two naval infantry brigades and the other of two light rifle corps of two brigades each. The Soviets employed over 2,100 tubes of artillery and mortars, used 110 tanks and self-propelled guns, and enjoyed overwhelming air superiority. Engineer special-purpose troops infiltrated up to fifty kilometers behind German forward positions to conduct reconnaissance before the battle. On 7 October 1944, the Soviets began the offensive with a 97,000-round artillery preparation, followed by an infantry attack.
Dragon Operations
Author: Thomas P Odom
Publisher: www.Militarybookshop.CompanyUK
ISBN: 9781780390024
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 238
Book Description
In August 1964, thousands of Simba rebels attacked and captured the city of Stanleyville in the newly independent Republic of the Congo and took more than 1,600 European and American residents as hostages, threatening to kill them if any attempt was made to recapture the city. In November of that year, after months of increasingly tense and complex discussions among the governments whose nationals were being held, an airborne assault by Belgian paracommandos dropped by American Air Force planes, combined with a CIA-piloted air strike against the Stanleyville airport, liberated most of the hostages, but only after a Simba-initiated massacre. "Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965" provides both the political background to these events and a detailed account of the actual operations: Dragon Rouge, the operations in Stanleyville, and Dragon Noir, focused on the city of Paulis, several hundred miles away. The book highlights the difficulties in organizing an international rescue effort with insufficient joint planning and inadequate command and control among the Belgian and American forces, as well as their differing political ideas and goals. The ad hoc nature of the planning was exemplified by an initial American Special Forces plan to air drop its forces east of Stanleyville and float down the river to Stanleyville. This plan was aborted when it was pointed out that the existence of Stanley Falls between the drop zone and the city was an insuperable obstacle. The operation also suffered from the Belgian commander's colonial-era contempt for the numerical strength of the Simbas and American fears of what was in reality a non-existent Communist element in the rebel movement."Dragon Operations" demonstrates that, despite the slapdash nature of their planning and communications aspects, as well as the distance involved, the austere support, the large number of hostages, and a lack of intelligence data, they were remarkably successful in rescuing most of the hostages. Although less than ideal, the operations worked better than expected, given the conditions under which they were conducted. This important study of an almost forgotten episode of the Cold War has much to offer to military strategists and tacticians, political scientists and students of contemporary history alike. Orginally published in 1988: 236 p. maps. ill.
Publisher: www.Militarybookshop.CompanyUK
ISBN: 9781780390024
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 238
Book Description
In August 1964, thousands of Simba rebels attacked and captured the city of Stanleyville in the newly independent Republic of the Congo and took more than 1,600 European and American residents as hostages, threatening to kill them if any attempt was made to recapture the city. In November of that year, after months of increasingly tense and complex discussions among the governments whose nationals were being held, an airborne assault by Belgian paracommandos dropped by American Air Force planes, combined with a CIA-piloted air strike against the Stanleyville airport, liberated most of the hostages, but only after a Simba-initiated massacre. "Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965" provides both the political background to these events and a detailed account of the actual operations: Dragon Rouge, the operations in Stanleyville, and Dragon Noir, focused on the city of Paulis, several hundred miles away. The book highlights the difficulties in organizing an international rescue effort with insufficient joint planning and inadequate command and control among the Belgian and American forces, as well as their differing political ideas and goals. The ad hoc nature of the planning was exemplified by an initial American Special Forces plan to air drop its forces east of Stanleyville and float down the river to Stanleyville. This plan was aborted when it was pointed out that the existence of Stanley Falls between the drop zone and the city was an insuperable obstacle. The operation also suffered from the Belgian commander's colonial-era contempt for the numerical strength of the Simbas and American fears of what was in reality a non-existent Communist element in the rebel movement."Dragon Operations" demonstrates that, despite the slapdash nature of their planning and communications aspects, as well as the distance involved, the austere support, the large number of hostages, and a lack of intelligence data, they were remarkably successful in rescuing most of the hostages. Although less than ideal, the operations worked better than expected, given the conditions under which they were conducted. This important study of an almost forgotten episode of the Cold War has much to offer to military strategists and tacticians, political scientists and students of contemporary history alike. Orginally published in 1988: 236 p. maps. ill.
Chemical Warfare in World War I
Author: Charles E Heller
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781727402100
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 118
Book Description
This Leavenworth Paper chronicles the introduction of chemical agents in World War I, the U.S. Army's tentative preparations for gas warfare prior to and after American entry into the war, and the AEF experience with gas on the Western Front. Chemical warfare affected tactics and almost changed the outcome of World War I. The overwhelming success of the first use of gas caught both sides by surprise. Fortunately, the pace of hostilities permitted the Allies to develop a suitable defense to German gas attacks and eventually to field a considerable offensive chemical capability. Nonetheless, from the introduction of chemical warfare in early 1915 until Armistice Day in November, 1918, the Allies were usually one step behind their German counterparts in the development of gas doctrine and the employment of gas tactics and procedures. In his final report to Congress on World War I, General John J. Pershing expressed the sentiment of contemporary senior officers when he said, "Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question." General Pershing was the last American field commander actually to confront chemical agents on the battlefield. Today, in light of a significant Soviet chemical threat and solid evidence of chemical warfare in Southeast and Southwest Asia, it is by no means certain he will retain that distinction. Over 50 percent of the Total Army's Chemical Corps assets are located within the United States Army Reserve. This Leavenworth Paper was prepared by the USAA Staff Officer serving with the Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC, after a number of requests from USAA Chemical Corps officers for a historical study on the nature of chemical warfare in World War I. Despite originally being published in 1984, this Leavenworth Paper also meets the needs of the Total Army in its preparations to fight, if necessary, on a battlefield where chemical agents might be employed.
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781727402100
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 118
Book Description
This Leavenworth Paper chronicles the introduction of chemical agents in World War I, the U.S. Army's tentative preparations for gas warfare prior to and after American entry into the war, and the AEF experience with gas on the Western Front. Chemical warfare affected tactics and almost changed the outcome of World War I. The overwhelming success of the first use of gas caught both sides by surprise. Fortunately, the pace of hostilities permitted the Allies to develop a suitable defense to German gas attacks and eventually to field a considerable offensive chemical capability. Nonetheless, from the introduction of chemical warfare in early 1915 until Armistice Day in November, 1918, the Allies were usually one step behind their German counterparts in the development of gas doctrine and the employment of gas tactics and procedures. In his final report to Congress on World War I, General John J. Pershing expressed the sentiment of contemporary senior officers when he said, "Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question." General Pershing was the last American field commander actually to confront chemical agents on the battlefield. Today, in light of a significant Soviet chemical threat and solid evidence of chemical warfare in Southeast and Southwest Asia, it is by no means certain he will retain that distinction. Over 50 percent of the Total Army's Chemical Corps assets are located within the United States Army Reserve. This Leavenworth Paper was prepared by the USAA Staff Officer serving with the Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC, after a number of requests from USAA Chemical Corps officers for a historical study on the nature of chemical warfare in World War I. Despite originally being published in 1984, this Leavenworth Paper also meets the needs of the Total Army in its preparations to fight, if necessary, on a battlefield where chemical agents might be employed.