Credit Markets with Imperfect Information and Economic Development

Credit Markets with Imperfect Information and Economic Development PDF Author: Ernesto Sepuĺveda
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 222

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Credit Markets with Imperfect Information and Economic Development

Credit Markets with Imperfect Information and Economic Development PDF Author: Ernesto Sepuĺveda
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 222

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Banks, Informal Money Lenders and Asymmetric Information

Banks, Informal Money Lenders and Asymmetric Information PDF Author: Patrick Avato
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3656180865
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 29

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Seminar paper from the year 2005 in the subject Economics - Monetary theory and policy, grade: A= 1,0, Johns Hopkins University (School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)), course: Theories and Models of Economic Development, 29 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: Credit markets in developing countries differ substantially from their counterparts in OECD countries. Apart from the obvious differences in institutional development, technology and productivity which are both measures for and causes of underdevelopment, typ ical LDC credit markets have two main characteristics. Firstly, their financial systems are very small compared those in industrial economies. Secondly, developing countries are characterized by very big informal financial sectors that coexist with formal credit institutions. Interestingly, credit contracts differ highly between these two sectors and there seems to be only very limited inter-sector competition. The following paper ventures to explain the persistence of these peculiarities in rural credit markets1 using the model of asymmetric information in credit markets developed by Stiglitz and Weiss. By applying the model specifically to LDC credit markets I show that asymmetric information is among the major reasons for the underdevelopment of rural credit markets. Building on these findings I then explain how Microfinance Institutions (MFI) have lately been able to overcome some of the problems of imperfect information and strive in markets formerly dominated by informal money lenders. The first part of this paper provides an overview of the typical characteristics of credit markets in developing countries, concentrating on the limited size of LDC credit markets and on the apparent dichotomy between formal and informal finance sectors. Then, the importance of financial systems for economic development is briefly outlined in order to explain the relevance of the topic of this essay. The main part of the paper then pre

Banks, Informal Money Lenders and Asymmetric Information

Banks, Informal Money Lenders and Asymmetric Information PDF Author: Patrick Avato
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3638386848
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 23

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Book Description
Seminar paper from the year 2005 in the subject Economics - Monetary theory and policy, grade: A= 1,0, Johns Hopkins University (School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)), course: Theories and Models of Economic Development, language: English, abstract: Credit markets in developing countries differ substantially from their counterparts in OECD countries. Apart from the obvious differences in institutional development, technology and productivity which are both measures for and causes of underdevelopment, typ ical LDC credit markets have two main characteristics. Firstly, their financial systems are very small compared those in industrial economies. Secondly, developing countries are characterized by very big informal financial sectors that coexist with formal credit institutions. Interestingly, credit contracts differ highly between these two sectors and there seems to be only very limited inter-sector competition. The following paper ventures to explain the persistence of these peculiarities in rural credit markets1 using the model of asymmetric information in credit markets developed by Stiglitz and Weiss. By applying the model specifically to LDC credit markets I show that asymmetric information is among the major reasons for the underdevelopment of rural credit markets. Building on these findings I then explain how Microfinance Institutions (MFI) have lately been able to overcome some of the problems of imperfect information and strive in markets formerly dominated by informal money lenders. The first part of this paper provides an overview of the typical characteristics of credit markets in developing countries, concentrating on the limited size of LDC credit markets and on the apparent dichotomy between formal and informal finance sectors. Then, the importance of financial systems for economic development is briefly outlined in order to explain the relevance of the topic of this essay. The main part of the paper then presents the model of asymmetric information in credit markets pioneered by Stiglitz/Weiss as a possible explanation for the causal origins of these characteristics. The last part shows how successful microfinance institutions may succeed in operating in rural credit markets by their ability to overcome problems of imperfect information.

The Role of Credit Markets in a Transition Economy with Incomplete Public Information

The Role of Credit Markets in a Transition Economy with Incomplete Public Information PDF Author: Mr.Jorge Roldos
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451922779
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 26

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Book Description
In this paper we explore some of the informational problems that constrain the development of credit markets in transition economies. We characterize investment patterns under uncertainty and high costs of entry, when agents learn about the ultimate value of enterprises through production in a Bayesian way. Inefficiencies due to the lack of public information reduce the average return to capital. Under asymmetric information, credit would go to activities that can provide enough co-finance. Credit markets may fail to develop for a while if there is not enough individual wealth to complement credit. Once they operate, credit markets may magnify distortions in equity markets, such as those due to spontaneous privatization. An argument for the sequencing of capital market liberalization is provided.

Three Essays on Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Credit Markets

Three Essays on Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Credit Markets PDF Author: Basab Dasgupta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 282

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Rural Informal Credit Markets and the Effectiveness of Policy Reform

Rural Informal Credit Markets and the Effectiveness of Policy Reform PDF Author: Alexander Sarris
Publisher: Food & Agriculture Org.
ISBN: 9789251037850
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 148

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Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information

Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information PDF Author: Gerhard Clemenz
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642456146
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 223

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Imperfect Information, Money, and Economic Growth

Imperfect Information, Money, and Economic Growth PDF Author: Wai-Ming Ho
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
This paper develops an endogenous growth model with financial market imperfections to study the effects of money on economic growth and to examine the role of informational imperfections in the determination of the equilibrium growth path. The findings are summarized as follows. First, economic growth is slower when there is imperfect information. Second, changes in money growth have qualitatively similar effects on economies with and without private information. Third, contrary to the popular view that informational imperfections in credit markets or borrowing constraints tend to amplify the impact of policy interventions, economies with private information are less responsive to changes in monetary policy.

The Role of Credit Markets in a Transition Economy with Incomplete Public Information

The Role of Credit Markets in a Transition Economy with Incomplete Public Information PDF Author: Kenneth M. Kletzer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26

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Book Description
In this paper we explore some of the informational problems that constrain the development of credit markets in transition economies. We characterize investment patterns under uncertainty and high costs of entry, when agents learn about the ultimate value of enterprises through production in a Bayesian way. Inefficiencies due to the lack of public information reduce the average return to capital. Under asymmetric information, credit would go to activities that can provide enough co-finance. Credit markets may fail to develop for a while if there is not enough individual wealth to complement credit. Once they operate, credit markets may magnify distortions in equity markets, such as those due to spontaneous privatization. An argument for the sequencing of capital market liberalization is provided.

The Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurial Finance

The Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurial Finance PDF Author: Douglas Cumming
Publisher: OUP USA
ISBN: 0195391241
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 937

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Book Description
Provides a comprehensive picture of issues dealing with different sources of entrepreneurial finance and different issues with financing entrepreneurs. The Handbook comprises contributions from 48 authors based in 12 different countries.