Coordination in Split-award Auctions PDF Download
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Author: James J. Anton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 66
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Book Description
Author: James J. Anton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 66
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: James J. Anton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Book Description
In a number of observed procurements, the buyer has employed an auction format that allows for a split-award outcome. We focus on settings where the range of uncertainty regarding scale economies is large and, depending on cost realizations, the efficient allocations include split-award outcomes as well as sole-source outcomes (one active supplier). We examine the price performance and efficiency properties of split-award auctions under asymmetric information. In equilibrium, both award outcomes can occur: the split-award outcome occurs only when it minimizes total costs; sole-source outcomes, however, occur too often from an efficiency viewpoint. With respect to prices, equilibrium bids involve pooling at a common price for the split award, and separation for sole-source awards. The pooling region reduces bidding pressure and allows for relatively high sole-source prices. We provide conditions under which the buyer and suppliers all benefit from a split-award format relative to a winner-take-all unit auction format. We assess the predictions of the model and an extension with data on submitted 'step-ladder' bid prices for a US defense split-award procurement.
Author: Gian-Marco Kokott
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783843940061
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Nicolas Fugger
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: Martin K. Perry
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
The buyer of a homogeneous input divides his input requirements into two contracts that are awarded to different suppliers. He uses a sequential second-price auction to award a primary and a secondary contract. With a fixed number of suppliers the buyer pays a higher expected price than with a sole-source auction. The premium paid to the winner of the secondary contract must also be paid to the winner of the primary contract as an opportunity cost. When entry is endogenous, we identify the conditions under which a secondary contract can increase the number of suppliers and lower the expected price.
Author: Parente, Diane H.
Publisher: IGI Global
ISBN: 1599046385
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 402
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Book Description
Offers a systematic approach to the examination of online procurement auctions. Growth in online auctions reinforces the need for understanding the factors important in auctions and the caveats that both researchers and practitioners need to know in order to effectively study and use the auction tool.
Author: Paul Robert Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521536721
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 396
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Book Description
Table of contents
Author: Steven J. Brams
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521556446
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 292
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Book Description
Cutting a cake, dividing up the property in an estate, determining the borders in an international dispute - such problems of fair division are ubiquitous. Fair Division treats all these problems and many more through a rigorous analysis of a variety of procedures for allocating goods (or 'bads' like chores), or deciding who wins on what issues, when there are disputes. Starting with an analysis of the well-known cake-cutting procedure, 'I cut, you choose', the authors show how it has been adapted in a number of fields and then analyze fair-division procedures applicable to situations in which there are more than two parties, or there is more than one good to be divided. In particular they focus on procedures which provide 'envy-free' allocations, in which everybody thinks he or she has received the largest portion and hence does not envy anybody else. They also discuss the fairness of different auction and election procedures.
Author: Paul Klemperer
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 720
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Book Description
Author: Paul Klemperer
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691186294
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 263
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Book Description
Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of auction theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in auctions and their role in economics.
