The Political Economy of Central-bank Independence PDF Download
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Author: Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger
Publisher: International Finance Section Department of Econ Ton Univers
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 100
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Book Description
Author: Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger
Publisher: International Finance Section Department of Econ Ton Univers
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 100
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Book Description
Author: Mark Crosby
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking, Central
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
Author: Alex Cukierman
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262031981
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 532
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Book Description
This book brings together a large body of Cukierman's research and integrates it with recent developments in the political economy of monetary policy.
Author: Francesco Lippi
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781782542971
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 180
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Book Description
This book integrates new political and economic elements into the analysis of monetary policy credibility and central bank independence. The author considers imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues and uncertainty about future policy objectives in his welfare analysis of central banking. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is also assessed. A distinction is made between central bank independence and targets offering new insights into how a more inflation averse monetary policy may actually be achieved. Finally, explanations for the variation of central bank independence and conservatism across different countries are provided. This book will appeal to researchers, academics and policy makers in the fields of monetary policy, financial economics, money and banking and political economy.
Author: Davide Debortoli
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484311752
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 56
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Book Description
Yes, it makes a lot of sense. This paper studies how to design simple loss functions for central banks, as parsimonious approximations to social welfare. We show, both analytically and quantitatively, that simple loss functions should feature a high weight on measures of economic activity, sometimes even larger than the weight on inflation. Two main factors drive our result. First, stabilizing economic activity also stabilizes other welfare relevant variables. Second, the estimated model features mitigated inflation distortions due to a low elasticity of substitution between monopolistic goods and a low interest rate sensitivity of demand. The result holds up in the presence of measurement errors, with large shocks that generate a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and resource utilization, and also when ensuring a low probability of hitting the zero lower bound on interest rates.
Author: B. Laurens
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230282121
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 290
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Book Description
This book explores three key areas of central banking and governance - autonomy, accountability and transparency. It looks at links between the areas, as well as assessing the impact of central bank autonomy on macroeconomic performance. The issues are approached from theoretical and empirical perspectives.
Author: Mr.Eric Le Borgne
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451856466
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 47
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Book Description
We propose a theory to explain why, and under what circumstances, a politician gives up rent and delegates policy tasks to an independent agency. We apply this theory to monetary policy by extending a standard dynamic "New-Keynesian" stochastic general equilibrium model. This model gives a new theory of central bank independence that is unrelated to the standard inflation bias problem. We derive several new predictions and show that they are consistent with the data. Finally, we show that while instrument independence of the central bank is desirable, goal independence is not.
Author: Mr.Jan Kees Martijn
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 145185840X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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Book Description
The U.K. monetary policy framework, which combines inflation targeting with operational independence, provides a suitable arrangement for focused and credible monetary policy. However, potential weaknesses could result from features that have not yet been fully tested: the credibility and transparency of the inflation forecasts, which form the core of policy decisions, have diminished as a result of independence; and the framework could encourage excessive activism and frequent changes in interest rates. Although policy coordination could also suffer from independence, the new partly rules-based fiscal and monetary regimes will promote overall macroeconomic stability.
Author: Christopher Adolph
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 110703261X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 389
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Book Description
Adolph illustrates the policy differences between central banks run by former bankers relative to those run by bureaucrats.
Author: Charles Freedman
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 145187233X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 27
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Book Description
This is the second chapter of a forthcoming monograph entitled "On Implementing Full-Fledged Inflation-Targeting Regimes: Saying What You Do and Doing What You Say." We begin by discussing the costs of inflation, including their role in generating boom-bust cycles. Following a general discussion of the need for a nominal anchor, we describe a specific type of monetary anchor, the inflation-targeting regime, and its two key intellectual roots-the absence of long-run trade-offs and the time-inconsistency problem. We conclude by providing a brief introduction to the way in which inflation targeting works.
