Central Bank Financial Strength, Policy Constraints and Inflation PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Central Bank Financial Strength, Policy Constraints and Inflation PDF full book. Access full book title Central Bank Financial Strength, Policy Constraints and Inflation by Peter Stella. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Peter Stella
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Get Book
Book Description
Central bank financial strength is positively associated with good policy performance. Financially weak central banks generate losses which undermine macroeconomic stability and call into question the credibility of their policies. In assessing central bank financial strength a careful examination of the policy regime and the volatility of the economic environment is necessary. Conventional measures of private enterprise financial strength- profitability and capital-can be very misleading when applied to central banks. The way in which a central bank balance sheet is strengthened matters. Providing the central bank with marketable government debt that can be used to develop a money market that in turn may become the locus of central bank monetary operations serves both to directly strengthen the institution and improve the quality of the environment in which it operates, thereby facilitating the attainment of its ultimate performance objectives.
Author: Peter Stella
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Get Book
Book Description
Central bank financial strength is positively associated with good policy performance. Financially weak central banks generate losses which undermine macroeconomic stability and call into question the credibility of their policies. In assessing central bank financial strength a careful examination of the policy regime and the volatility of the economic environment is necessary. Conventional measures of private enterprise financial strength- profitability and capital-can be very misleading when applied to central banks. The way in which a central bank balance sheet is strengthened matters. Providing the central bank with marketable government debt that can be used to develop a money market that in turn may become the locus of central bank monetary operations serves both to directly strengthen the institution and improve the quality of the environment in which it operates, thereby facilitating the attainment of its ultimate performance objectives.
Author: Peter Stella
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Get Book
Book Description
A central bank is financially strong if it possesses resources sufficient to attain its fundamental policy objective(s). Once endowed with those resources, relations between government and central bank should be designed so that significant changes in central bank financial strength do not occur unless necessitated by changes in policy objectives. The level of strength required depends on the array of policy objectives (for example, the exchange rate regime) as well as the constraints and risks presented by the operational environment. Attaining credibility is facilitated if the public can easily determine the financial strength of the bank, yet for a variety of reasons this is often difficult. Transparency requires institutional arrangements that ensure the central bank generates profit in most states of the world, is subject to strict ex post independent audit, and transfers regularly all profits, after provisions, to the treasury.
Author: Ulrich H. Klueh
Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
ISBN: 9781451870343
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 45
Get Book
Book Description
The financial health of central banks and its relation to policy outcomes has recently been recognized as an important policy issue. While case study evidence clearly indicates that weak central bank finances can hamper effective policy implementation, the question of whether central bank financial strength influences policy performance remains controversial. This is due, in part, to a lack of econometric evidence. The paper presents a first step toward filling this gap, by providing a quantitative evaluation of the relationship between measures of central bank financial strength and policy performance, in particular inflation. The paper's major finding is that there indeed is a negative relationship between central bank financial strength and inflation outcomes. This relationship appears to be robust to the choice of alternative country samples, control variables, estimation strategies, and conceptualizations of central bank financial strength.
Author: David Archer
Publisher:
ISBN: 9789291979318
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 90
Get Book
Book Description
Author: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780894991967
Category : Banks and Banking
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book
Book Description
Provides an in-depth overview of the Federal Reserve System, including information about monetary policy and the economy, the Federal Reserve in the international sphere, supervision and regulation, consumer and community affairs and services offered by Reserve Banks. Contains several appendixes, including a brief explanation of Federal Reserve regulations, a glossary of terms, and a list of additional publications.
Author: Mr.Mark R. Stone
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451842929
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 31
Get Book
Book Description
Inflation targeting lite (ITL) countries float their exchange rate and announce an inflation target, but are not able to maintain the inflation target as the foremost policy objective. This paper identifies 19 emerging market countries as practitioners of ITL. They seem to focus mainly on bringing inflation into the single digits and maintaining financial stability. ITL can be viewed as a transitional regime aimed at buying time for the implementation of the structural reforms needed for a single credible nominal anchor. The important policy challenges for an ITL central bank include whether or not to precommit to a single anchor.
Author: Mr.Kenichi Ueda
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1475502915
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 27
Get Book
Book Description
We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social optimum to reduce the real value of private debt. This inefficient outcome arises when macro-prudential policies cannot be adjusted as frequently as monetary. Importantly, this result arises even when the central bank is politically independent. We then consider the role of political pressures in the spirit of Barro and Gordon (1983). We show that if either the macro-prudential regulator or the central bank (or both) are not politically independent, separation of price and financial stability objectives does not deliver the social optimum.
Author: de Haan, Jakob
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1839104872
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 125
Get Book
Book Description
Written by two expert economists, this comprehensive Advanced Introduction provides a thorough and up-to-date analysis of central banks and monetary policy, analysing the ways in which views about monetary policy have developed and changed.
Author: Joanna Niedźwiedzińska
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1000421899
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 383
Get Book
Book Description
Over the last three decades, inflation targeting (IT) has become the most popular monetary policy framework among larger economies. At the same time, its constituting features leave room for different interpretations, translating into various central banks’ institutional set-ups. Against this backdrop, this book investigates the importance of institutional arrangements for policy outcomes. In particular, the book answers the question of whether there are significant differences in IT central banks’ institutional set-ups, and—if yes—whether they influence the ability of monetary authorities to meet their policy goals. The book examines around 70 aspects related to independence, accountability and transparency of 42 IT central banks over the last 30 years. Based on the analysis, it can be concluded that the quality of the institutional set-ups materially affects monetary policy effectiveness. In fact, a visible improvement of institutional arrangements resulting from pursuing an inflation targeting strategy can be treated as its lasting contribution to central banking. Thus, despite the recent critique of the framework, its prospects continue to be rather favourable. Overall, for the advocates of inflation targeting, the findings of the book can be seen as identifying the sources of IT strengths, while for IT opponents, they may be viewed as indicating which elements of IT institutional set-ups should be kept even if the need to replace this strategy with another regime will, indeed, result in a change. Given the role monetary policy plays within the economy, such knowledge may have significant implications. Therefore, the book will be relevant for different audiences, including scholars and researchers of monetary economics and monetary policy, and will be essential reading for central banks already pursuing an IT strategy or those preparing to adopt one. Importantly, the book includes supplementary indices of proposed institutional arrangements that assess a range of aspects related to IT central bank’s independence, accountability, and transparency. Readers thus have access to the author’s full database, which covers individual indices for all monetary authorities investigated across the given period of analysis.
Author: Mr.Christian H. Beddies
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451844360
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 26
Get Book
Book Description
This paper considers the interaction between the private sector, the monetary authority, and the fiscal authority, and concludes that unrestricted central bank independence may not be an optimal way to collect seigniorage revenues or stabilize supply shocks. Moreover, the paper shows that the implementation of an optimal inflation target results in optimal shares of government finances—seigniorage, taxes, and the spending shortfall—from society’s point of view but still involves suboptimal stabilization. Even if price stability is the sole central bank objective, a positive inflation target has important implications for the government’s finances, as well as for stabilization.
