Causes, Agents, Explanations, and Free Will PDF Download
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Author: Martin Gerwin
Publisher: Archway Publishing
ISBN: 1480856835
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 300
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Book Description
Many have thought that if everything is caused, human free will must be an illusion. This kind of determinism, however, is seemingly antithetical to our lived experience of the world. In Causes, Agents, Explanations, and Free Will, philosopher Martin Gerwin argues that there is no reason to doubt that we have free will rather, the illusion is that everything is caused in the same deterministic way. Our very idea of cause and effect is rooted in our experience of being agents who make things happen. But from this experience we derive not a single, unified idea of causation, but an idea with different variants. Gerwin traces the evolution of this agency view of causality in Western philosophy over the past three centuries. He explores its relation to the canons of scientific explanation and the findings of quantum mechanics. He also offers a brief formal development of a tensed modal logic that serves to articulate the distinctive sense of I can stemming from the experience of agency. The result is a fresh, innovative defence of the possibility of free will.
Author: Martin Gerwin
Publisher: Archway Publishing
ISBN: 1480856835
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 300
Get Book Here
Book Description
Many have thought that if everything is caused, human free will must be an illusion. This kind of determinism, however, is seemingly antithetical to our lived experience of the world. In Causes, Agents, Explanations, and Free Will, philosopher Martin Gerwin argues that there is no reason to doubt that we have free will rather, the illusion is that everything is caused in the same deterministic way. Our very idea of cause and effect is rooted in our experience of being agents who make things happen. But from this experience we derive not a single, unified idea of causation, but an idea with different variants. Gerwin traces the evolution of this agency view of causality in Western philosophy over the past three centuries. He explores its relation to the canons of scientific explanation and the findings of quantum mechanics. He also offers a brief formal development of a tensed modal logic that serves to articulate the distinctive sense of I can stemming from the experience of agency. The result is a fresh, innovative defence of the possibility of free will.
Author: Alfred R. Mele
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190659971
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 265
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Book Description
Mele develops a view of paradigmatically free actions--including decisions--as indeterministically caused by their proximal causes. He mounts a masterful defense of this thesis that includes solutions to problems about luck and control widely discussed in the literature on free will and moral responsibility.
Author: Kadri Vihvelin
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199795185
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 295
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Book Description
This book rescues compatibilists from the familiar charge of 'quagmire of evasion' by arguing that the problem of free will and determinism is a metaphysical problem with a metaphysical solution. There is no good reason to think that determinism would rob us of the free will we think we have.
Author: Christian List
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674979583
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 225
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Book Description
A crystal-clear, scientifically rigorous argument for the existence of free will, challenging what many scientists and scientifically minded philosophers believe. Philosophers have argued about the nature and the very existence of free will for centuries. Today, many scientists and scientifically minded commentators are skeptical that it exists, especially when it is understood to require the ability to choose between alternative possibilities. If the laws of physics govern everything that happens, they argue, then how can our choices be free? Believers in free will must be misled by habit, sentiment, or religious doctrine. Why Free Will Is Real defies scientific orthodoxy and presents a bold new defense of free will in the same naturalistic terms that are usually deployed against it. Unlike those who defend free will by giving up the idea that it requires alternative possibilities to choose from, Christian List retains this idea as central, resisting the tendency to defend free will by watering it down. He concedes that free will and its prerequisites—intentional agency, alternative possibilities, and causal control over our actions—cannot be found among the fundamental physical features of the natural world. But, he argues, that’s not where we should be looking. Free will is a “higher-level” phenomenon found at the level of psychology. It is like other phenomena that emerge from physical processes but are autonomous from them and not best understood in fundamental physical terms—like an ecosystem or the economy. When we discover it in its proper context, acknowledging that free will is real is not just scientifically respectable; it is indispensable for explaining our world.
Author: Randolph Clarke
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780195306422
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 276
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Book Description
This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent causation and nondeterministic event causation. He defends this view from a number of objections but argues that we should find the substance causation required by any agent-causal account to be impossible. Clarke concludes that if a broad thesis of incompatibilism is correct - one on which both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism - then no libertarian account is entirely adequate.
Author: Carolina Sartorio
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0191063770
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 197
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Book Description
Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. Although this simple view of freedom clashes with most theories of responsibility, including the most prominent 'actual sequence' theories currently on offer, Sartorio argues for its truth. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence of actual reasons and the absence of other (counterfactual) reasons. So acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes and simpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic. The book connects two different debates, the one on causation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways.
Author: Timothy O'Connor
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198030509
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 152
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Book Description
This provocative book refurbishes the traditional account of freedom of will as reasons-guided "agent" causation, situating its account within a general metaphysics. O'Connor's discussion of the general concept of causation and of ontological reductionism v. emergence will specially interest metaphysicians and philosophers of mind.
Author: Christopher Evan Franklin
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190682787
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 249
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Book Description
In this book, Christopher Evan Franklin develops and defends a novel version of event-causal libertarianism. This view is a combination of libertarianism--the view that humans sometimes act freely and that those actions are the causal upshots of nondeterministic processes--and agency reductionism--the view that the causal role of the agent in exercises of free will is exhausted by the causal role of mental states and events (e.g., desires and beliefs) involving the agent. Franklin boldly counteracts a dominant theory that has similar aims, put forth by well-known philosopher Robert Kane. Many philosophers contend that event-causal libertarians have no advantage over compatibilists when it comes to securing a distinctively valuable kind of freedom and responsibility. To Franklin, this position is mistaken. Assuming agency reductionism is true, event-causal libertarians need only adopt the most plausible compatibilist theory and add indeterminism at the proper juncture in the genesis of human action. The result is minimal event-causal libertarianism: a model of free will with the metaphysical simplicity of compatibilism and the intuitive power of libertarianism. And yet a worry remains: toward the end of the book, Franklin reconsiders his assumption of agency reductionism, arguing that this picture faces a hitherto unsolved problem. This problem, however, has nothing to do with indeterminism or determinism, or even libertarianism or compatibilism, but with how to understand the nature of the self and its role in the genesis of action. Crucially, if this problem proves unsolvable, then not only is event-causal libertarianism untenable, so also is event-causal compatibilism.
Author: Sam Harris
Publisher: Simon and Schuster
ISBN: 1451683405
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 96
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Book Description
From the New York Times bestselling author of The End of Faith, a thought-provoking, "brilliant and witty" (Oliver Sacks) look at the notion of free will—and the implications that it is an illusion. A belief in free will touches nearly everything that human beings value. It is difficult to think about law, politics, religion, public policy, intimate relationships, morality—as well as feelings of remorse or personal achievement—without first imagining that every person is the true source of his or her thoughts and actions. And yet the facts tell us that free will is an illusion. In this enlightening book, Sam Harris argues that this truth about the human mind does not undermine morality or diminish the importance of social and political freedom, but it can and should change the way we think about some of the most important questions in life.
Author: Derk Pereboom
Publisher: Hackett Publishing
ISBN: 160384886X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 405
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Book Description
A unique anthology featuring contributions to the dispute over free will from Aristotle to the twenty-first century, Derk Pereboom's volume presents the most thoughtful positions taken in this crucial debate and discusses their consequences for free will's traditional corollary, moral responsibility. The Second Edition retains the organizational structure that made its predecessor the leading anthology of its kind, while adding major new selections by such philosophers as Spinoza, Reid, John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Galen Strawson, and Timothy O'Connor. Hackett Readings in Philosophy is a versatile series of compact anthologies, each devoted to a topic of traditional interest. Selections include classical, modern, and contemporary writings chosen for their elegance of exposition and success at stimulating thought and discussion.
