Capital Structure and the Design of Managerial Compensation PDF Download
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Author: Dilip B. Madan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This paper provides an optimal design of managerial compensation in the presence of an exogenous capital structure with its associated debt agency costs. The model entails the analysis of a three-party conflict between debtholders, equity holders, and management. Equityholders, as principals owning a production technology, design a compensation contract for managers. Management is engaged solely in the choice of project risk with risky return outcomes along a production frontier. It is shown that, in the absence of debt, risk averse managers would tend to risk-shift downwards, realizing suboptimal firm value. In the presence of a senior debt claim equity holders find it advantageous to choose higher risk projects and it is possible that for sufficiently high debt levels, the agency costs of debt and managerial risk aversion counterbalance each other, with the final outcome coinciding with first best risk choices. The empirical relationship between capital structure and compensation is also studied, as are the implications of debt and risk aversion for the pay- performance relations.
Author: Dilip B. Madan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This paper provides an optimal design of managerial compensation in the presence of an exogenous capital structure with its associated debt agency costs. The model entails the analysis of a three-party conflict between debtholders, equity holders, and management. Equityholders, as principals owning a production technology, design a compensation contract for managers. Management is engaged solely in the choice of project risk with risky return outcomes along a production frontier. It is shown that, in the absence of debt, risk averse managers would tend to risk-shift downwards, realizing suboptimal firm value. In the presence of a senior debt claim equity holders find it advantageous to choose higher risk projects and it is possible that for sufficiently high debt levels, the agency costs of debt and managerial risk aversion counterbalance each other, with the final outcome coinciding with first best risk choices. The empirical relationship between capital structure and compensation is also studied, as are the implications of debt and risk aversion for the pay- performance relations.
Author: Riccardo Calcagno
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Book Description
We show that the relative seniority of debt and managerial compensation has important implications on the design of remuneration contracts. Whereas the traditional literature assumes that debt is senior to remuneration, we show that this is frequently not the case according to bankruptcy regulation and as observed in practice. We theoretically show that including risky debt changes the incentive to provide the manager with stronger performance-related incentives (quot;contract substitutionquot; effect). If managerial compensation has priority over the debt claims, higher leverage produces lower power-incentive schemes (lower bonuses) and a higher base salary. With junior compensation, we expect more emphasis on pay-for-performance incentives. The empirical findings are in line with the regime of remuneration seniority as the base salary is significantly higher and the performance bonus is lower in financially distressed firms.
Author: Yossi Spiegel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 50
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Book Description
We investigate the interaction between financial structure and managerial compensation in the context of a managerial entrenchment model in the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny (1989). We show that risky debt affects both the probability of managerial replacement and the manager's wage if he is retained by the firm. Our model yields a rich set of predictions including the following:The market values of equity and debt decrease if the manager is replaced. Moreover, the expected cash flow of firms that retain their managers exceeds that of firms that replace their managers.Firms that publicly announce the adoption of a new managerial compensation plan should experience positive price reactions in the capital market as well as strong positive performance following the adoption.Managers of firms with risky debt outstanding are promised lower severance payments (golden parachute) than managers of firms that do not have risky debt.Controlling for firm's size, leverage, managerial compensation, and the cash flow of firms that retain their managers are positively correlated.Controlling for firm's size, the probability of managerial turnover and firm value are negatively correlated.
Author: Riccardo Calcagno
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Elazar Berkovitch
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 68
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Author: Hernan Ortiz-Molina
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
I examine how CEO compensation is related to firms' capital structures. My tests address the simultaneity of these decisions and distinguish between debt types with different theoretical implications for managerial incentives. Pay-performance sensitivity decreases in straight-debt leverage, but is higher in firms with convertible debt. Furthermore, stock option policy is the component of CEO pay that is most sensitive to differences in capital structure. The results strongly support the hypothesis that firms trade-off shareholder-manager incentive alignment in order to mitigate shareholder-bondholder conflicts of interest. The hypothesis that debt reduces manager-shareholder conflicts can explain some but not all of the results.
Author: Kostas Koufopoulos
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 27
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Book Description
We consider project financing when the project quality is private information of the manager and, given its inherent quality, the project viability depends on the manager exerting unobservable effort. We show that capital structure matters even though managerial contracts are optimally designed. We also provide an explanation of why good firms issue both debt and underpriced equity (even if the bankruptcy and agency costs of debt are zero). Finally, we show that the optimal financial contract can be implemented by a combination of debt and equity. Our results have a number of testable implications.
Author: Angel N. Salinas González
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 434
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Author: Adilah Azhari
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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The aim of this research is to examine the relationship between CEO pay and firm's financial policies. According to agency theory, manager-shareholder conflicts of interest can be alleviated (and managerial compensation can be influenced) by debt. Debt lowers the level of free cash flow which managers are able to obtain because monitoring increases. This means that when the risk of bankruptcy appears, managers must consider the best financial interests of shareholders. Under agency theory, pay-performance sensitivity is smaller for high-debt companies when alternatives are available for high alignment incentives and high debt. The research objectives focus on three empirical chapters to explore the association between CEO pay and firm's financial policies for UK firms. The first study investigates the relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and debt as the explanatory variables. In the second study, the link between CEO compensation and corporate payout policy by segregating between total payouts, dividends and share repurchases are explored. Finally, the last objective examines the interaction between CEO pay packages and cash holdings of the firm. The research sample consists of 183 publicly traded companies listed on the FTSE 350 from 1999 to 2008. The estimates in the pay-performance study show mixed support for pay-performance and leverage because the negative coefficients for market debt have weak significance overall when median regressions are employed. Thus, it can be concluded that a firm's leverage has little effect on pay-performance sensitivity as a mechanism to align the interests of the firm's CEO and debt holders. However, there is strong support for the hypothesis that CEO pay-performance sensitivity increases with a firm's growth opportunities, which suggests that firms award higher equity compensation to attract managers with more talent. The second study in this research investigates how corporate payout policy is influenced by CEO share ownership, CEO stock options and CEO long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) in UK firms from 1999 to 2008 using Tobit regressions (for total payouts, dividends and share repurchases) and logistic regressions for the propensity of firms paying out to shareholders. The results show that CEO share ownership LTIPs have positive effects on corporate payout policy. In contrast, corporate governance characteristics do not show conclusive results which affect changes in payout policy. Dividend payout is significantly influenced by CEO share ownership compared to share repurchase payout. The findings support the notion that CEOs' share equity ownership is used to align managerial interest with shareholders in terms of cash payouts to shareholders. In the final empirical chapter, the study focuses on the effect of CEO pay and corporate governance on cash holdings. The study investigates the determinants of cash holdings based on free cash flow and the agency model using cash ratios (cash to sales, cash to assets, cash to market value and log of cash) as dependent variables. The analysis documents that CEO ownership and log LTIPs both have positive and strong relationships with cash ratios. The results support the hypothesis that equity compensation can be used to align managers' interests with those of shareholders.
Author: Tom Copeland
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 111816105X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 295
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Book Description
CEOs and managers live and die by delivering superior performance to shareholders. This is why expectations-based management has been developed. Outperform with Expectations-Based Management (EBM) introduces a revolutionary new performance metric that links performance standards, performance measurement, and the achievement of performance. It's easy to say that if a CEO can get performance measurement right, then performance improvement will follow. But what is the "right" measure of performance, and how do you use it to improve performance? Authors Tom Copeland and Aaron Dolgoff answer these questions and many more, as they show you how to find the measure of performance that has the strongest link to the creation of wealth for the owners of both public and private companies. They answer the puzzle of why growth in earnings is not correlated with shareholder returns and explain the under- and over-investment traps. And they explain how clear communications to investors and managers alike improve value. The bottom line is that share prices go up when companies exceed expectations -- short-term and long-term -- of income statement and balance sheet performance and daily operating value drivers. Gain a complete understanding of EBM and discover how to do this, and much more, while staying competitive in an unforgiving business environment.
