C. D. Broad's Review of J. M. Keynes's A Treatise on Probability and the Role of William Ernest Johnson in that Book

C. D. Broad's Review of J. M. Keynes's A Treatise on Probability and the Role of William Ernest Johnson in that Book PDF Author: Michael Emmett Brady
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Get Book Here

Book Description
C. D. Broad presents an excellent, overall view of how the A Treatise on Probability (1921) was written and constantly checked by internationally recognized and acclaimed philosophers and mathematical logicians, such as Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead, John Nevile Keynes, C. D. Broad himself, and especially William Ernest Johnson. Broad was the only reviewer to explicitly reveal the substantial role played by the applied mathematician and philosopher W. E. Johnson.Broad also carefully assessed Keynes's weight of the argument (evidence) criteria in Chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability, as did F. Y. Edgeworth. Neither of them found any errors.

Reviewing the Reviewer's of Keynes's a Treatise on Probability

Reviewing the Reviewer's of Keynes's a Treatise on Probability PDF Author: Michael Brady
Publisher: Xlibris Corporation
ISBN: 1524544892
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 179

Get Book Here

Book Description
The standard view of the economics profession is that Keynes was a brilliant, intuitive, nonrigorous innovator. These essays show that Keynes backed up his intuitions with a rigorous mathematical and logical supporting analysis, which has been overlooked.

J. M. Keynes, Like Benoit Mandelbrot, Was Right. They (Econometricians, Statisticians) Do Not Know What They Are Doing

J. M. Keynes, Like Benoit Mandelbrot, Was Right. They (Econometricians, Statisticians) Do Not Know What They Are Doing PDF Author: Michael Emmett Brady
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Get Book Here

Book Description
S. Stigler's University of Chicago view of J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, that only its literary style recommends it to a potential reader, is based entirely on a completely worthless book review written by Ronald Fisher in 1923. However, Stigler is an excellent example of a profession that has lost its way by conflating, like Jerry Bentham and Frank Ramsey did before him, rationality with adherence to the strictly mathematical laws of the calculus of probability. Stigler, like Fisher before him, overlooked that Keynes's A Treatise on Probability (1921) was constantly being monitored, while Keynes was writing it, by the most illustrious names in the fields of philosophy and mathematical logic at the beginning of the 20th century, namely J Nevile Keynes, Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead, William Ernest Johnson, and CD Broad. Of course, everyone, except Broad and Edgeworth, overlooked the seminal role of George Boole, upon whose work in Chapters 16-21 of The Laws of Thought (1854) Keynes built the foundation for his logical theory of probability using interval valued probabilities. None of Stigler's conclusions, as regards his evaluation of Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, make any sense.

A Treatise on Probability

A Treatise on Probability PDF Author: John Maynard Keynes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Probabilities
Languages : en
Pages : 494

Get Book Here

Book Description


On Fisher's Review of J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability - A Fiasco

On Fisher's Review of J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability - A Fiasco PDF Author: Michael Emmett Brady
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Get Book Here

Book Description
J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability is built on the mathematical and logical foundations of G E Boole's 1854 The Laws of Thought. Boole introduced the first technical attempt (Adam Smith was the first to specify and solve two such indeterminate problems in The Wealth of Nations) at systematically solving indeterminate, probability problems (where, under uncertainty, relevant knowledge or evidence is missing) using interval valued probability. His systematic techniques were presented in chapters 16-21 of The Laws of Thought. Fisher's review of the A Treatise on Probability demonstrates an astounding degree of ignorance on his part. Fisher has no idea of what an indeterminate probability is. For Fisher, ALL probabilities MUST be point estimates. We will show that Fisher, a biologist wedded to the Limiting (Relative) Frequency interpretation of probability, had no idea about what Keynes was doing or talking about in Parts I-IV of the A Treatise on Probability. We will conclude that Fisher was foolish to attempt a review of the A Treatise on Probability knowing that he had not read Boole. This conclusion is then shown to apply to practically all modern, twentieth and twenty-first century writers on the A Treatise on Probability.

Raymond Pearl's Review of J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability

Raymond Pearl's Review of J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability PDF Author: Michael Emmett Brady
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Get Book Here

Book Description
R. Pearl's attempt to review J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability for Science is only a near fiasco compared with the failed attempt made by Ronald Fisher to review Keynes's book for the Eugenics Society. It provides the educated reader with minimal value. How this review made it through the referees, associate editors, and editors at the journal, Science, is a mystery worthy of investigation. Again, anyone attempting to read or review Keynes' A Treatise on Probability, without having any knowledge or familiarity of how J M Keynes made use in the A Treatise on Probability of George Boole's application of his logic to probability in chapters 16-21 of The Laws of Thought (1854), is foolish.

Harold Jeffreys on J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability

Harold Jeffreys on J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability PDF Author: Michael Emmett Brady
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Get Book Here

Book Description
Harold Jeffreys' overall assessment of J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, 1921, requires a reader to consider, not only his official review in Nature, 1922, but also the comments in his books, Scientific Inference, 1931 and Theory of Probability, 1939, as well as the second edition of Theory of Probability, 1947. Jeffreys' problem was that his approach to measurement required that all probabilities had to be measured by a single, precise number .This is tantamount to assuming that Keynes's weight of the evidence, w, or William Johnson's worth of the evidence, also denoted by w, are always equal to one. Jefferys obviously did not pick up this concept from his interactions with Johnson, as opposed to Keynes, who not only picked it up, but then connected it to Boole's earlier logical approach to probability. Boole expressed this concept in terms of interval valued probability. Only if the weight or the worth of the evidence is equal, approaching to, or approximated by 1 will precise numbers be able to measure the probability relation. Jefferys' failure to connect Boole to Keynes means that Jeffreys never understood what Keynes was doing in his A Treatise on Probability at any time during his life.

A Treatise on Probability

A Treatise on Probability PDF Author: John Maynard Keynes
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780333107331
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 514

Get Book Here

Book Description


A Treatise on Probability

A Treatise on Probability PDF Author: John Keynes
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781548119867
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 550

Get Book Here

Book Description
John Maynard Keynes's classic work on the study of probability.

On Edwin Bidwell Wilson's Erroneous Assessment of J M Keynes's Mathematical Capabilities

On Edwin Bidwell Wilson's Erroneous Assessment of J M Keynes's Mathematical Capabilities PDF Author: Michael Emmett Brady
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 22

Get Book Here

Book Description
A careful examination of Wilson's 1948 claim that it was clear that Keynes was not a good mathematician immediately crumbles into dust once Wilson's own recommended reviews of the A Treatise on Probability are examined, as well as the then unpublished Edgeworth - Wilson exchanges where Wilson admitted to Edgeworth that he had skipped Part II of the A Treatise on Probability in his 1923 review because he could not follow Keynes's mathematical analysis.Equally important is Wilson's disguised, secret, concealed, camouflaged, second review of the A Treatise on Probability that he published in a 1934 issue of the Journal of the American Statistical Society, titled “Boole's Challenge Problem”. In fact, the paper had nothing to do with Boole at all. Wilson was, in fact, well aware that Keynes was a very good mathematician, who had the aid and support of William Ernest Johnson, a mathematician who was superior to Wilson. Wilson was extremely jealous and envious of Keynes's fame. Due to this envy, he decided to try to misrepresent what Keynes had done in the A Treatise on Probability. This is best illustrated by his failure to mention his 1934 JASA article, where he had to grudgingly admit that Keynes's (and Boole's) analysis were correct, in his 1948 Quarterly Journal of Economics article. It had taken Wilson 11 years to figure out what Keynes had done in his A Treatise on Probability in Part II. Wilson's claim, that solving Boolean problems from chapters 16-21 of Boole's 1854 The Laws of Thought were easy and straightforward, directly contradicted his private, personal exchanges with Edgeworth, where he a stated that he could not follow Keynes's exposition.The only conclusion possible is that either Wilson was deceptive with Edgeworth in 1923 or he was deceptive with his readers in his 1934 JASA article.