Business Meetings on Congressional Reform Legislation PDF Download
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Author: United States. Congress. Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 732
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Book Description
Author: United States. Congress. Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 732
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Book Description
Author: John V. Sullivan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 72
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Book Description
Author: United States. Congress
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 1378
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Book Description
The Congressional Record is the official record of the proceedings and debates of the United States Congress. It is published daily when Congress is in session. The Congressional Record began publication in 1873. Debates for sessions prior to 1873 are recorded in The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (1789-1824), the Register of Debates in Congress (1824-1837), and the Congressional Globe (1833-1873)
Author: United States. Congress. Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 724
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Book Description
Author: E. Scott Adler
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 0226007561
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 276
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Book Description
For decades, advocates of congressional reforms have repeatedly attempted to clean up the House committee system, which has been called inefficient, outmoded, unaccountable, and even corrupt. Yet these efforts result in little if any change, as members of Congress who are generally satisfied with existing institutions repeatedly obstruct what could fairly be called innocuous reforms. What lies behind the House's resistance to change? Challenging recent explanations of this phenomenon, Scott Adler contends that legislators resist rearranging committee powers and jurisdictions for the same reason they cling to the current House structure—the ambition for reelection. The system's structure works to the members' advantage, helping them obtain funding (and favor) in their districts. Using extensive evidence from three major reform periods—the 1940s, 1970s, and 1990s—Adler shows that the reelection motive is still the most important underlying factor in determining the outcome of committee reforms, and he explains why committee reform in the House has never succeeded and probably never will.
Author: United States. Congress. Senate
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Legislation
Languages : en
Pages : 18
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Book Description
Author: United States. Congress. House. House Information Systems
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bills, Legislative
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Book Description
Author: Thomas E. Mann
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0195368711
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 289
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Book Description
Two nationally renowned congressional scholars review the evolution of Congress from the early days of the republic to 2006, arguing that extreme partisanship and a disregard for institutional procedures are responsible for the institution's current state
Author: R. Douglas Arnold
Publisher: Yale University Press
ISBN: 9780300056594
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 298
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Book Description
Congress regularly enacts laws that benefit particular groups or localities while imposing costs on everyone else. Sometimes, however, Congress breaks free of such parochial concerns and enacts bills that serve the general public, not just special interest groups. In this important and original book, R. Douglas Arnold offers a theory that explains not only why special interests frequently triumph but also why the general public sometimes wins. By showing how legislative leaders build coalitions for both types of programs, he illuminates recent legislative decisions in such areas as economic, tax, and energy policy. Arnold's theory of policy making rests on a reinterpretation of the relationship between legislators' actions and their constituents' policy preferences. Most scholars explore the impact that citizens' existing policy preferences have on legislators' decisions. They ignore citizens who have no opinions because they assume that uninformed citizens cannot possibly affect legislators' choices. Arnold examines the influence of citizens' potential preferences, however, and argues that legislators also respond to these preferences in order to avoid future electoral problems. He shows how legislators estimate the political consequences of their voting decisions, taking into account both the existing preferences of attentive citizens and the potential preferences of inattentive citizens. He then analyzes how coalition leaders manipulate the legislative situation in order to make it attractive for legislators to support a general interest bill.
Author: Timothy M. LaPira
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 022670257X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 341
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Book Description
Congress today is falling short. Fewer bills, worse oversight, and more dysfunction. But why? In a new volume of essays, the contributors investigate an underappreciated reason Congress is struggling: it doesn’t have the internal capacity to do what our constitutional system requires of it. Leading scholars chronicle the institutional decline of Congress and the decades-long neglect of its own internal investments in the knowledge and expertise necessary to perform as a first-rate legislature. Today’s legislators and congressional committees have fewer—and less expert and experienced—staff than the executive branch or K Street. This leaves them at the mercy of lobbyists and the administrative bureaucracy. The essays in Congress Overwhelmed assess Congress’s declining capacity and explore ways to upgrade it. Some provide broad historical scope. Others evaluate the current decay and investigate how Congress manages despite the obstacles. Collectively, they undertake the most comprehensive, sophisticated appraisal of congressional capacity to date, and they offer a new analytical frame for thinking about—and improving—our underperforming first branch of government.
