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Author: Susan C. Stokes
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107042208
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 343
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Book Description
Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism studies distributive politics: how parties and governments use material resources to win elections. The authors develop a theory that explains why loyal supporters, rather than swing voters, tend to benefit from pork-barrel politics; why poverty encourages clientelism and vote buying; and why redistribution and voter participation do not justify non-programmatic distribution.
Author: Susan C. Stokes
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107042208
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 343
Get Book Here
Book Description
Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism studies distributive politics: how parties and governments use material resources to win elections. The authors develop a theory that explains why loyal supporters, rather than swing voters, tend to benefit from pork-barrel politics; why poverty encourages clientelism and vote buying; and why redistribution and voter participation do not justify non-programmatic distribution.
Author: Susan C. Stokes
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9781107042209
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 344
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Book Description
Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in distributive politics. Why is it acceptable for parties to try to win elections by promising to make certain groups of people better off, but unacceptable - and illegal - to pay people for their votes? Why do parties often lavish benefits on loyal voters, whose support they can count on anyway, rather than on responsive swing voters? Why is vote buying and machine politics common in today's developing democracies but a thing of the past in most of today's advanced democracies? This book develops a theory of broker-mediated distribution to answer these questions, testing the theory with research from four developing democracies, and reviews a rich secondary literature on countries in all world regions. The authors deploy normative theory to evaluate whether clientelism, pork-barrel politics, and other non-programmatic distributive strategies can be justified on the grounds that they promote efficiency, redistribution, or voter participation.
Author: Isabela Mares
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 019883277X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 338
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Book Description
In many recent democracies, candidates compete for office using illegal strategies to influence voters. In Hungary and Romania, local actors including mayors and bureaucrats offer access to social policy benefits to voters who offer to support their preferred candidates, and they threaten others with the loss of a range of policy and private benefits for voting the "wrong" way. These quid pro quo exchanges are often called clientelism. How can politicians and their accomplices get away with such illegal campaigning in otherwise democratic, competitive elections? When do they rely on the worst forms of clientelism that involve threatening voters and manipulating public benefits? Conditionality and Coercion: Electoral Clientelism in Eastern Europe uses a mixed method approach to understand how illegal forms of campaigning including vote buying and electoral coercion persist in two democratic countries in the European Union. It argues that we must disaggregate clientelistic strategies based on whether they use public or private resources, and whether they involve positive promises or negative threats and coercion. We document that the type of clientelistic strategies that candidates and brokers use varies systematically across localities based on their underlying social coalitions. We also show that voters assess and sanction different forms of clientelism in different ways. Voters glean information about politicians' personal characteristics and their policy preferences from the clientelistic strategies these candidates deploy. Most voters judge candidates who use clientelism harshly. So how does clientelism, including its most odious coercive forms, persist in democratic systems? This book suggests that politicians can get away with clientelism by using forms of it that are in line with the policy preferences of constituencies whose votes they need. Clientelistic and programmatic strategies are not as distinct as previous have argued. Oxford Studies in Democratization is a series for scholars and students of comparative politics and related disciplines. Volumes concentrate on the comparative study of the democratization process that accompanied the decline and termination of the cold war. The geographical focus of the series is primarily Latin America, the Caribbean, Southern and Eastern Europe, and relevant experiences in Africa and Asia. The series editor is Laurence Whitehead, Senior Research Fellow, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
Author: Edward Aspinall
Publisher: NUS Press
ISBN: 9814722049
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 471
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Book Description
How do politicians win elected office in Indonesia? To find out, research teams fanned out across the country prior to Indonesia’s 2014 legislative election to record campaign events, interview candidates and canvassers, and observe their interactions with voters. They found that at the grassroots political parties are less important than personal campaign teams and vote brokers who reach out to voters through a wide range of networks associated with religion, ethnicity, kinship, micro enterprises, sports clubs and voluntary groups of all sorts. Above all, candidates distribute patronage—cash, goods and other material benefits—to individual voters and to communities. Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia brings to light the scale and complexity of vote buying and the many uncertainties involved in this style of politics, providing an unusually intimate portrait of politics in a patronage-based system.
Author: Daniel Corstange
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107106672
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 277
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Book Description
Some ethnic communities receive generous material rewards for their political support, whilst others only receive very modest payoffs.
Author: Alberto Diaz-Cayeros
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107140285
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 259
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Book Description
The Political Logic of Poverty Relief places electoral politics and institutional design at the core of poverty alleviation. The authors develop a theory with applications to Mexico about how elections shape social programs aimed at aiding the poor. They also assess whether voters reward politicians for targeted poverty alleviation programs.
Author: Susan C. Stokes
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107435757
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 343
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Book Description
Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in distributive politics. Why is it acceptable for parties to try to win elections by promising to make certain groups of people better off, but unacceptable - and illegal - to pay people for their votes? Why do parties often lavish benefits on loyal voters, whose support they can count on anyway, rather than on responsive swing voters? Why is vote buying and machine politics common in today's developing democracies but a thing of the past in most of today's advanced democracies? This book develops a theory of broker-mediated distribution to answer these questions, testing the theory with research from four developing democracies, and reviews a rich secondary literature on countries in all world regions. The authors deploy normative theory to evaluate whether clientelism, pork-barrel politics, and other non-programmatic distributive strategies can be justified on the grounds that they promote efficiency, redistribution, or voter participation.
Author: Simeon Nichter
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108428363
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 325
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Book Description
Explores the critical role citizens play in sustaining clientelism, despite threats of structural changes, institutional reforms, legal enforcement and partisan strategies.
Author: Didi Kuo
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108426085
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 181
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Book Description
In the United States and Britain, capitalists organized in opposition to clientelism and demanded programmatic parties and institutional reforms.
Author: Paula Muñoz Chirinos
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108422594
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 319
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Book Description
Develops a new theory of how politicians campaign and deploy electoral clientelism in weak party systems.
