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Author: Stefan Napel
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642561608
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 193
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Book Description
This book investigates bargaining between two agents. Its objective is to present, to extend, and to apply the present state of theoretical knowledge. A wide range of questions will be considered: First of all, will two parties reach efficient agreements? Traditional economic theory gives a generally affirma tive answer for perfectly rational agents, who can carry out complex calcu lations instantaneously and without cost. The book uses innovative methods to analyse the implications of less demanding assumptions. A practical ques tion related to bargaining is: How much power does the design of institutions such as the U. N. Security Council give to each of its members? Formally, non permanent members' votes are necessary to pass resolutions, but theoretical investigation of pre-voting negotiation attributes all power to the five perma nent members. Or one may ask whether a society should rather finance the education in higher mathematics for a talented person than remedial training for a retarded person? Different concepts of justice yield different answers. Which particular concept is implemented in a given society is also a matter of bargaining, and it is of special philosophical interest to investigate which bargain will be struck in an ideal society in which individual talents and resources are not yet known. Very generally, a bilateral bargaining situation is characterized by two agents - individuals, firms, governments, etc.
Author: Stefan Napel
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642561608
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 193
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book investigates bargaining between two agents. Its objective is to present, to extend, and to apply the present state of theoretical knowledge. A wide range of questions will be considered: First of all, will two parties reach efficient agreements? Traditional economic theory gives a generally affirma tive answer for perfectly rational agents, who can carry out complex calcu lations instantaneously and without cost. The book uses innovative methods to analyse the implications of less demanding assumptions. A practical ques tion related to bargaining is: How much power does the design of institutions such as the U. N. Security Council give to each of its members? Formally, non permanent members' votes are necessary to pass resolutions, but theoretical investigation of pre-voting negotiation attributes all power to the five perma nent members. Or one may ask whether a society should rather finance the education in higher mathematics for a talented person than remedial training for a retarded person? Different concepts of justice yield different answers. Which particular concept is implemented in a given society is also a matter of bargaining, and it is of special philosophical interest to investigate which bargain will be struck in an ideal society in which individual talents and resources are not yet known. Very generally, a bilateral bargaining situation is characterized by two agents - individuals, firms, governments, etc.
Author: Kalyan Chatterjee
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814447579
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 229
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Book Description
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market OCo Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining consists of selected research in bargaining carried out by Kalyan Chatterjee by himself and with various co-authors. Chatterjee has been one of the earliest researchers to work on noncooperative bargaining theory and has contributed to bilateral bargaining with parties having private information as well as multilateral coalition formation models. Some of his work in each of these areas finds place here.The main theme of this collection of papers is the nature of negotiations when participants have alternatives to continue negotiating, either by beginning negotiations with a different partner or set of partners or by engaging in time-consuming search for such partners. Chapters in this book include: a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining and features a laboratory experiment relevant to this theory as well as an extension to political negotiations, search for alternative partners, the effect of markets and bargaining on incentives of players to invest in the partnership and related papers on incentive compatibility, arbitration and a dynamic model of negotiation. The book also includes a new introduction that puts these papers in the context of the broader literature in the field.
Author: Sidney Siegel
Publisher: Greenwood-Heinemann Publishing
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 152
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Book Description
Author: Edward Coen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Academic theses
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: William F. Samuelson
Publisher: Forgotten Books
ISBN: 9780365866565
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 78
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Book Description
Excerpt from The Winner's Curse in Bilateral Negotiations The economic theory of bargaining is built on the cornerstone of self-interest: when the Opportunity arises, profit-seeking individuals will negotiate and attain mutually beneficial agreements. Indeed, negotiation is often viewed as an analogue of or substitute for competitive markets that is, under the right conditions bargaining will generate Pareto efficient economic allocations, as will perfectly competitive markets.1 But perfect negotiations presuppose a number of conditions, in particular, that negotiators are perfectly rational and have perfect information about the bargaining situation. However, Bazerman and Neale (1983; Bazerman, 1983) have provided substantial evidence that negotiators deviate from rationality in systematically predictable ways. Short of the ideal of fully rational behavior, how will negotiations proceed? How should an individual negotiate when only imperfect or limited information about the negotiation setting is available? When he or she has worse information than the other side and both know it? What negotiating procedures are successful in reaching mutually beneficial agreements? About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
Author: E. Coen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Alan Manning
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Collective bargaining
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
Author: Heike Hennig-Schmidt
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642457754
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 231
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Book Description
Bilateral bargaining situations are of great importance in reality. Traditional microeconomics, however, make cognitive and motivational assumptions of subjects` full rationality that are revealed as being unrealistic by a growing number of experimental investigations. The present book adds an important contribution to the understanding of principles of boundedly rational behavior by directly observing groups of subjects in a decision situation and videotaping their discussions. A very important result of the book is that the behavior of subjects is guided by aspirations regarding the final outcome. The levels of aspirations are influenced by prominence and different forms of the equity principle resulting in several fairness norms as to the allocation of the amount of money to be divided. Another important feature of the book stems from the analysis of break off discussions and enables a motivational explanation of the emergence of breakdowns in bargaining.
Author: Christopher J. Ellis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Collective bargaining
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Book Description
Author: Takayuki Ito
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 364230737X
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 239
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Book Description
Complex Automated Negotiations are a widely studied, emerging area in the field of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. In general, automated negotiations can be complex, since there are a lot of factors that characterize such negotiations. For this book, we solicited papers on all aspects of such complex automated negotiations, which are studied in the field of Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems. This book includes two parts, which are Part I: Agent-based Complex Automated Negotiations and Part II: Automated Negotiation Agents Competition. Each chapter in Part I is an extended version of ACAN 2011 papers after peer reviews by three PC members. Part II includes ANAC 2011 (The Second Automated Negotiating Agents Competition), in which automated agents who have different negotiation strategies and implemented by different developers are automatically negotiate in the several negotiation domains. ANAC is an international competition in which automated negotiation strategies, submitted by a number of universities and research institutes across the world, are evaluated in a tournament style. The purpose of the competition is to steer the research in the area of bilateral multi-issue, closed negotiation. This book includes rules, results, agents and domains descriptions for ANAC2011 submitted by organizers and finalists.
