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Author: Yim Tonia Chu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 110
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Book Description
Author: Yim Tonia Chu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 110
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Book Description
Author: Marshall Miles
Publisher: Master Point Press
ISBN: 9781894154130
Category : Games & Activities
Languages : en
Pages : 260
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Book Description
In this book, Miles addresses the complex arena of competitive bidding methods for the more advanced player. He discusses current thinking, and recommends methods which will continue to be playable as bridge enters its second century. This book will appeal to fairly serious players only. There are two earlier books on this topic by the same author, 5 and 10 years old respectively, and therefore superseded by this new work.
Author: Sajid Anwar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
The existing auction literature treats on-line auctions as running independently of one another with each bidder choosing to participate in only one auction. In fact, in the case of on-line auctions, many substitutable goods are auctioned concurrently and bidders can bid at several auctions at the same time. Recent theoretical research by Peters and Severinov (2001) is highly relevant to the study of bidding behavior in on-line auctions, showing that bidders can gain from the existence of competing auctions. In the light of this work, this paper attempts to provide an empirical assessment of the competing auctions theory. The evidence presented in this paper indicates that a significant proportion of bidders bid across competing auctions and that bidders tend to submit bids at auctions with the lowest standing bid. The paper also shows that winning bidders who bid across competing auctions pay lower prices than winning bidders who do not cross-bid. These findings jointly amount to the first evidence lending empirical support to competing auctions theory.
Author: Barbara Seagram
Publisher: Master Point Press
ISBN: 9781894154222
Category : Games & Activities
Languages : en
Pages : 230
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Book Description
A follow-up book from the author team that produced the award-winning and best-selling 25 Bridge Conventions You Should Know. Aimed at the same novice/social player audience as their first book, this new title deals with competitive auctions in which the opponents have opened the bidding. This is the most complex area of bridge bidding, and has never up to now been dealt with comprehensively in a book that is understandable for non-experts.
Author: Ernan Haruvy
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
ISBN: 1601983328
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 87
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Book Description
Internet Auctions reviews recent empirical and theoretical works on internet auctions with a focus on internet auction design, formats, and features that are currently debated in the marketing literature.
Author: Zack Hiwiller
Publisher: New Riders
ISBN: 013439464X
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 646
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Book Description
Game designers today are expected to have an arsenal of multi-disciplinary skills at their disposal in the fields of art and design, computer programming, psychology, economics, composition, education, mythology—and the list goes on. How do you distill a vast universe down to a few salient points? Players Making Decisions brings together the wide range of topics that are most often taught in modern game design courses and focuses on the core concepts that will be useful for students for years to come. A common theme to many of these concepts is the art and craft of creating games in which players are engaged by making meaningful decisions. It is the decision to move right or left, to pass versus shoot, or to develop one’s own strategy that makes the game enjoyable to the player. As a game designer, you are never entirely certain of who your audience will be, but you can enter their world and offer a state of focus and concentration on a task that is intrinsically rewarding. This detailed and easy-to-follow guide to game design is for both digital and analog game designers alike and some of its features include: A clear introduction to the discipline of game design, how game development teams work, and the game development process Full details on prototyping and playtesting, from paper prototypes to intellectual property protection issues A detailed discussion of cognitive biases and human decision making as it pertains to games Thorough coverage of key game elements, with practical discussions of game mechanics, dynamics, and aesthetics Practical coverage of using simulation tools to decode the magic of game balance A full section on the game design business, and how to create a sustainable lifestyle within it
Author: Darricades Patrick
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781771402255
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 98
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Book Description
In his first book, Optimal Hand Evaluation, the author introduced a number of corrections to the Goren point count to reach "optimal" hand evaluation accuracy. That first book focused on non-competitive bidding situations where no further adjustments were needed as a result of the opponents' bidding. This book now deals with this specific topic. First, it challenges the very premise of the Law of Total Tricks and compares the results of its application "at the table" by world-class players to the effectiveness of the Optimal point count. Then, it reveals how to precisely quantify: - The point-count adjustments that should be applied to hands that are short or long in a suit bid by the opponents. - Which point-count adjustments should be made to honors. - How adjustments translate a hand's Offense to Defense ratio. - What adjustments apply to balanced hands. This book begins with an overview and two-page summary of the Optimal point count. The full rationale and statistical support data justifying the point count can be found in the first book, as well as over 100 example hands illustrating its accuracy.
Author: Andrew Robson
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780962829734
Category : Contract bridge
Languages : en
Pages : 408
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Book Description
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Gerald Häubl
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 55
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Book Description
This research examines how the intensity of the dynamic competitive interaction with other bidders in ascending auctions influences consumers' willingness to pay for auctioned products. It focuses on one important aspect of this interaction - the speed of competitor reaction. The key hypothesis is that having one's own bids reciprocated by competing bidders more quickly increases one's WTP in an auction. Evidence from five experiments demonstrates this effect and pinpoints the essential aspects of the psychological mechanism that underlies it. In particular, the effect of speed of competitor reaction on bidding behavior (1) is serially mediated by the perception that the auction is more intensely competitive and by a greater desire to win, (2) is distinct from the effects of time pressure and of the auction's duration or overall rate of progression, (3) is not driven by inferences about the auctioned product's market value, (4) is not qualified by the number of competing bidders nor due to any inferences about the latter, and (5) hinges on direct competitive interaction with other human bidders.
