Author: Antonio Scalia
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bond market
Languages : en
Pages : 68
Book Description
Bidder Profitability Under Uniform Price Auctions and Systematic Reopenings
Author: Antonio Scalia
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bond market
Languages : en
Pages : 68
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bond market
Languages : en
Pages : 68
Book Description
Bidder Profitability Under Uniform Price Auctions and Systematic Reopenings
Author: Banca d'Italia
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government securities
Languages : en
Pages : 57
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government securities
Languages : en
Pages : 57
Book Description
Bidder Profitability Under Uniform Price Auctions and Systematic Reopenings
Author: Alberto Franco Pozzolo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bayesian statistical decision theory
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bayesian statistical decision theory
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
Bidder Profitabilty Under Uniform Price Auctions and Systematic Reopenings
Author: Antonio Scalia
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 57
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 57
Book Description
Bidder Behavior in Multiple Unit Auctions
Author: Kjell G. Nyborg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government securities
Languages : en
Pages : 54
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government securities
Languages : en
Pages : 54
Book Description
Putting Auction Theory to Work
Author: Paul Robert Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521536721
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 396
Book Description
Table of contents
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521536721
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 396
Book Description
Table of contents
Auction Theory
Author: Pak-Sing Choi
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030695751
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 304
Book Description
This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical examples, this textbook offers over 80 exercises that predict bidders’ equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller’s strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also included are several exercises based on published articles, with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters, Ph.D. Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction theory, this textbook is appropriate for students of economics, finance, and business administration. This book may also be used for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030695751
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 304
Book Description
This textbook provides a short introduction to auction theory through exercises with detailed answer keys. Focusing on practical examples, this textbook offers over 80 exercises that predict bidders’ equilibrium behaviour in different auction formats, along with the seller’s strategic incentives to organize one auction format over the other. The book emphasizes game-theoretic tools, so students can apply similar tools to other auction formats. Also included are several exercises based on published articles, with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper undergraduate and graduate students. The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions, which can be studied without using calculus, and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions. Exercises in each chapter are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise title, which allows students to pace their studies accordingly. The authors also offer a list of suggested exercises for each chapter, for instructors teaching at varying levels: undergraduate, Masters, Ph.D. Providing a practical, customizable approach to auction theory, this textbook is appropriate for students of economics, finance, and business administration. This book may also be used for related classes such as game theory, market design, economics of information, contract theory, or topics in microeconomics.
The Penalties of Unemployment
Author: Amartya Sen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Manpower policy
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Book Description
Explores the social consequences of unemployment and argues that employment policies need to be reconsidered in a more comprehensive way. Discusses the growing emphasis in European countries on the concept of self-help.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Manpower policy
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Book Description
Explores the social consequences of unemployment and argues that employment policies need to be reconsidered in a more comprehensive way. Discusses the growing emphasis in European countries on the concept of self-help.
Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse
Author: John H. Kagel
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400830133
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 424
Book Description
An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400830133
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 424
Book Description
An invaluable account of how auctions work—and how to make them work Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.
Properties of the Monetary Conditions Index
Author: Giuseppe Grande
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Foreign exchange rates
Languages : en
Pages : 70
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Foreign exchange rates
Languages : en
Pages : 70
Book Description