Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information PDF Download
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Author: Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche
Publisher:
ISBN: 9782854188455
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Book Description
We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff.
Author: Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche
Publisher:
ISBN: 9782854188455
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
Get Book Here
Book Description
We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff.
Author: Johannes Horner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs across players. The characterization is tight: we define a set of payoffs that contains all the belief-free equilibrium payoffs; conversely, any point in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff vector when players are sufficiently patient. Further, we provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty, both for the case of known-own payoffs, and for arbitrary payoffs.
Author: Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche
Publisher:
ISBN: 9782854188844
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Book Description
Résumé en anglais.
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262011471
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 372
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Book Description
The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.
Author: Johannes Hörner
Publisher:
ISBN: 9782854189216
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 79
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Book Description
Résumé en anglais.
Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 28
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Book Description
We consider the following belief free solution concepts for games with incomplete information: (i) incomplete information rationalizability, (ii) incomplete information correlated equilibrium and (iii) ex post equilibrium. We present epistemic foundations for these solution concepts and establish relationships between them. The properties of these solution concepts are further developed in supermodular games and potential games.
Author: Andrés Perea
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107008913
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 581
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Book Description
The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0195300793
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
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Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author: Brian John Crone
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 212
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Book Description
Author: Olivier Compte
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 12
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Book Description
The repeated game literature studies long run/repeated interactions, aiming to understand how repetition may foster cooperation. Conditioning future behavior on past play is crucial in this endeavor. For most situations of interest a given player does not directly observe the actions chosen by other players and must rely on noisy signals he receives about those actions. This is typically incorporated into models by defining a monitoring structure, that is, a collection of probability distributions over the signals each player receives (one distribution for each action profile players may play). Although this is simply meant to capture the fact that players don.t directly observe the actions chosen by others, constructed equilibria often depend on players precisely knowing the distributions, somewhat unrealistic in most problems of interest. This paper aims to show the fragility of belief free equilibrium constructions when one adds shocks to the monitoring structure in repeated games.
