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Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198041217
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
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Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198041217
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
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Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author: Eliezer Yudkowsky
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781939311184
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Charalambos D. Aliprantis
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3662058588
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 733
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Book Description
A collection of papers dealing with a broad range of topics in mathematical economics, game theory and economic dynamics. The contributions present both theoretical and applied research. The volume is dedicated to Mordecai Kurz. The papers were presented in a special symposium co-hosted by the Stanford University Department of Economics and by the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research in August 2002.
Author: Daphne R. Raban
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1802203966
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 579
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Book Description
The Elgar Companion to Information Economics dexterously navigates this interdisciplinary field of research which celebrates the crucial contribution of information to decision making, market dynamics, and economic well-being. Offering a wealth of conceptual analysis, this erudite Companion embarks on an intellectual journey exploring the fundamentals of information economics. This title contains one or more Open Access chapters.
Author: Sushil Jajodia
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030307190
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 270
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Book Description
Today’s cyber defenses are largely static allowing adversaries to pre-plan their attacks. In response to this situation, researchers have started to investigate various methods that make networked information systems less homogeneous and less predictable by engineering systems that have homogeneous functionalities but randomized manifestations. The 10 papers included in this State-of-the Art Survey present recent advances made by a large team of researchers working on the same US Department of Defense Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) project during 2013-2019. This project has developed a new class of technologies called Adaptive Cyber Defense (ACD) by building on two active but heretofore separate research areas: Adaptation Techniques (AT) and Adversarial Reasoning (AR). AT methods introduce diversity and uncertainty into networks, applications, and hosts. AR combines machine learning, behavioral science, operations research, control theory, and game theory to address the goal of computing effective strategies in dynamic, adversarial environments.
Author: Steven N. Durlauf
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230280846
Category : Literary Criticism
Languages : en
Pages : 391
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Book Description
Specially selected from The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2nd edition, each article within this compendium covers the fundamental themes within the discipline and is written by a leading practitioner in the field. A handy reference tool.
Author: Hans Peters
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3662469502
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 493
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Book Description
This textbook presents the basics of game theory both on an undergraduate level and on a more advanced mathematical level. It is the second, revised version of the successful 2008 edition. The book covers most topics of interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory. Part I presents introductions to all these topics on a basic yet formally precise level. It includes chapters on repeated games, social choice theory, and selected topics such as bargaining theory, exchange economies, and matching. Part II goes deeper into noncooperative theory and treats the theory of zerosum games, refinements of Nash equilibrium in strategic as well as extensive form games, and evolutionary games. Part III covers basic concepts in the theory of transferable utility games, such as core and balancedness, Shapley value and variations, and nucleolus. Some mathematical tools on duality and convexity are collected in Part IV. Every chapter in the book contains a problem section. Hints, answers and solutions are included.
Author: Tim Miller
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3030030989
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 687
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Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2018, held in Tokyo, Japan, in October/November 2018. The 27 full papers presented and 31 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 103 submissions. PRIMA presents subjects in many application domains, particularly in e-commerce, and also in planning, logistics, manufacturing, robotics, decision support, transportation, entertainment, emergency relief and disaster management, and data mining and analytics.
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9812818464
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
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Book Description
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Author: Econometric Society. World Congress
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521871522
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 431
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Book Description
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