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Author: Maureen Sie
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 9781138294912
Category : Ethical relativism
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We blame, praise, punish, and benefit people on the basis of what we believe they deserve. Basic Desert, Reactive Attitudes and Free Will discusses whether such a notion of desert even makes sense and, if so, why exactly. Can we make sense of the widespread conviction that we are morally responsible beings? Do we deserve to be blamed and punished for our immoral actions, and how can this be justified given the philosophical and scientific reasons to believe that we lack the sort of free will required for this sort of desert? This book was originally published as a special issue of Philosophical Explorations.
Author: Maureen Sie
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 9781138294912
Category : Ethical relativism
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We blame, praise, punish, and benefit people on the basis of what we believe they deserve. Basic Desert, Reactive Attitudes and Free Will discusses whether such a notion of desert even makes sense and, if so, why exactly. Can we make sense of the widespread conviction that we are morally responsible beings? Do we deserve to be blamed and punished for our immoral actions, and how can this be justified given the philosophical and scientific reasons to believe that we lack the sort of free will required for this sort of desert? This book was originally published as a special issue of Philosophical Explorations.
Author: Maureen Sie
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317362969
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 161
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Book Description
Basic Desert, Reactive Attitudes and Free Will addresses the issue of whether we can make sense of the widespread conviction that we are morally responsible beings. It focuses on the claim that we deserve to be blamed and punished for our immoral actions, and how this claim can be justified given the philosophical and scientific reasons to believe that we lack the sort of free will required for this sort of desert. Contributions to the book distinguish between, and explore, two clusters of questions. The first asks what it is to deserve to be harmed or benefitted. What are the bases for desert – actions, good character, bad character, the omission of good character traits? The second cluster explores the disagreement between compatabilists and incompatibilists surrounding the nature of desert. Do we deserve to be harmed, benefitted, or judged, even if we lack the ability to act differently, and if we do not, what effect does this have on our everyday actions? Taken in full, this book sheds light on the notion of desert implicated in our practice of holding each other morally responsible. This book was originally published as a special issue of Philosophical Explorations.
Author: Mr Paul Russell
Publisher: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
ISBN: 1409485870
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 356
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Book Description
The philosophical debate about free will and responsibility has been of great importance throughout the history of philosophy. In modern times this debate has received an enormous resurgence of interest and the contribution in 1962 by P.F. Strawson with the publication of his essay "Freedom and Resentment" has generated a wide range of discussion and criticism in the philosophical community and beyond. The debate is of central importance to recent developments in the free will literature and has shaped the way contemporary philosophers now approach the problem. This volume brings together a focused selection of the major contributions and reactions to the free will and responsibility debate inspired by Strawson's contribution. McKenna and Russell also provide a comprehensive overview of the debate. This book will be of great value to scholars of Strawson and those interested in the free will debate more generally.
Author: Derk Pereboom
Publisher: Hackett Publishing
ISBN: 160384886X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 405
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Book Description
A unique anthology featuring contributions to the dispute over free will from Aristotle to the twenty-first century, Derk Pereboom's volume presents the most thoughtful positions taken in this crucial debate and discusses their consequences for free will's traditional corollary, moral responsibility. The Second Edition retains the organizational structure that made its predecessor the leading anthology of its kind, while adding major new selections by such philosophers as Spinoza, Reid, John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Galen Strawson, and Timothy O'Connor. Hackett Readings in Philosophy is a versatile series of compact anthologies, each devoted to a topic of traditional interest. Selections include classical, modern, and contemporary writings chosen for their elegance of exposition and success at stimulating thought and discussion.
Author: K. E. Boxer
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199695326
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 191
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Book Description
K. E. Boxer explores moral responsibility, and whether it is compatible with causal determinism. She suggests that to answer this question we must focus on responsibility in the sense of liability, and that an incompatibilist view may only be preserved on an understanding of the moral desert of punishment that many find morally problematic.
Author: Elizabeth Shaw
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108661262
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 247
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Book Description
'Free will skepticism' refers to a family of views that all take seriously the possibility that human beings lack the control in action - i.e. the free will - required for an agent to be truly deserving of blame and praise, punishment and reward. Critics fear that adopting this view would have harmful consequences for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and laws. Optimistic free will skeptics, on the other hand, respond by arguing that life without free will and so-called basic desert moral responsibility would not be harmful in these ways, and might even be beneficial. This collection addresses the practical implications of free will skepticism for law and society. It contains eleven original essays that provide alternatives to retributive punishment, explore what (if any) changes are needed for the criminal justice system, and ask whether we should be optimistic or pessimistic about the real-world implications of free will skepticism.
Author: Gregg D. Caruso
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108484700
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 401
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Book Description
Caruso argues against retributivism and develops an alternative for addressing criminal behavior that is ethically defensible and practical.
Author: Derk Pereboom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521029961
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 257
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Book Description
Argues that morality, meaning and value remain intact even if we are not morally responsible for our actions.
Author: Justin Caouette
Publisher: Cambridge Scholars Publishing
ISBN: 1443853232
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 280
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Book Description
Determinism is, roughly, the thesis that facts about the past and the laws of nature entail all truths. A venerable, age-old dilemma concerning responsibility distils to this: if either determinism is true or it is not true, we lack “responsibility-grounding” control. Either determinism is true or it is not true. So, we lack responsibility-grounding control. Deprived of such control, no one is ever morally responsible for anything. A number of the freshly-minted essays in this collection address aspects of this dilemma. Responding to the horn that determinism undermines the freedom that responsibility (or moral obligation) requires, the freedom to do otherwise, some papers in this collection debate the merits of Frankfurt-style examples that purport to show that one can be responsible despite lacking alternatives. Responding to the horn that indeterminism implies luck or randomness, other papers discuss the strengths or shortcomings of libertarian free will or control. Also included in this collection are essays on the freedom requirements of moral obligation, forgiveness and free will, a “desert-free” conception of free will, and vicarious legal and moral responsibility. The authors of the essays in this volume are philosophers who have made significant contributions to debates in free will, moral responsibility, moral obligation, the reactive attitudes, philosophy of action, and philosophical psychology, and include John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Michael McKenna, Alfred Mele, and Derk Pereboom.
Author: Bruce N. Waller
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262553813
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 365
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Book Description
A vigorous attack on moral responsibility in all its forms argues that the abolition of moral responsibility will be liberating and beneficial. In Against Moral Responsibility, Bruce Waller launches a spirited attack on a system that is profoundly entrenched in our society and its institutions, deeply rooted in our emotions, and vigorously defended by philosophers from ancient times to the present. Waller argues that, despite the creative defenses of it by contemporary thinkers, moral responsibility cannot survive in our naturalistic-scientific system. The scientific understanding of human behavior and the causes that shape human character, he contends, leaves no room for moral responsibility. Waller argues that moral responsibility in all its forms—including criminal justice, distributive justice, and all claims of just deserts—is fundamentally unfair and harmful and that its abolition will be liberating and beneficial. What we really want—natural human free will, moral judgments, meaningful human relationships, creative abilities—would survive and flourish without moral responsibility. In the course of his argument, Waller examines the origins of the basic belief in moral responsibility, proposes a naturalistic understanding of free will, offers a detailed argument against moral responsibility and critiques arguments in favor of it, gives a general account of what a world without moral responsibility would look like, and examines the social and psychological aspects of abolishing moral responsibility. Waller not only mounts a vigorous, and philosophically rigorous, attack on the moral responsibility system, but also celebrates the benefits that would result from its total abolition.
